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Abstract 
This PhD thesis investigates the sub-sovereign financial market in Italy, 
specifically focusing on the municipal bond market and on local government 
credit ratings. This research aims to identify empirically the economic and 
financial variables which affect bond yields and credit ratings of Italian local 
governments, and to understand the role of such variables in explaining the 
differences in interest costs paid by different bond issuers (or paid by the same 
issuer at different times) and the differences in the rating judgments assigned 
by the major international rating agencies. 
The Italian local government finance system is characterized by the several 
tiers of sub-sovereign governments (regions, provinces and cities) being 
differently linked to the central government finances, and by the central 
government itself conveying a non-negligible sovereign financial risk. The three 
local government tiers have a different institutional nature, while cities and 
provinces (jointly defined as local authorities) possess a similar status and are 
subject to the same legislation, regions are characterized by a greater 
independence and by a significantly higher degree of financial autonomy. These 
facts should affect the investors’ evaluation of local government credit risk and, 
therefore, one of the aims of this research is to analyze the determinants of sub-
sovereign bond yields and credit ratings in this institutional framework. 
Credit ratings are investigated under a dual perspective, beyond the analysis on 
the factors driving the determination of credit ratings, this research also aims to 
study the role played by ratings in affecting local bond yields. First, testing if the 
purchase of a rating is rewarded by lower yields, i.e. if rated issuers pay lower 
yields than their unrated peers, and then if the specific creditworthiness 
assessment assigned by rating agencies is considered by investors when they 
price a municipal bond, i.e. if a AAA-rated issuer pays less than a BBB-rated 
one. 
This work is organized in two parts. Part I provides the research framework, 
rationale and background, including the research planning, a description of the 
local government finance system in Italy and the review of the literature. Part II 
is dedicated to the empirical analysis, presenting the empirical methodology and 
results.  
Keywords: Municipal bonds, credit ratings, local government finance, bond 
yield premia, default risk. 
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Chapter I 
Research Planning 
This chapter outlines the rationale and design of the piece of research 
undertaken in the following Part II of the thesis. Section I.1 provides some 
preliminary information about the financial market for local governments in Italy 
and about the existing research on the subject, Section I.2 describes the 
research questions and Section I.3 introduces the general research approach. 
I.1 Introduction 
The financial market for local governments in Italy has grown significantly in the 
last fifteen years. The introduction of a new regulation in the mid-1990s has 
boosted recourse to bond financing by Italian cities, provinces and regions.1 
The bond market for local administrations has increased from 6 pilot issues in 
1996, for a total amount of € 227 million, to a long-term average, before the 
recent sovereign financial crisis, of 150-200 issues per year for a total amount 
of € 5-7 billion per year. By the end of December 2014, the overall amount of 
municipal outstanding bonded debt was around € 25 billion (accounting for a 
quarter of the whole local sector debt), with a peak of 85 sub-sovereign 
governments which, before the recent sovereign financial crisis, possessed a 
credit rating assigned by the major international agencies.2 
A vast empirical literature regarding municipal bonds and ratings exists, but 
almost entirely on the US market. However a few studies cover some European 
sub-sovereign bond markets such as Spain and Germany, and despite the 
increasing importance of the Italian municipal bond market in the last fifteen 
years, no empirical research has been carried out on the large but quite new 
Italian market.3 Similarly, also the empirical research on local governments’ 
credit ratings has mainly focused on the United States, even if the recent 
production has begun covering the European markets, including one paper  on 
the Italian market.4 
                                                             
1
 Law no. 724/1994, section 35 and Ministerial Decree no. 420/1996. 
2
 Sources: Benvenuti and Calò (2000); Bank of Italy, Indicatori monetari e finanziari: Mercato 
finanziario (1999-2014); Bank of Italy, Indicatori monetari e finanziari: Debito delle 
amministrazioni locali (2004-2014); Dexia-Crediop, “Le Emissioni Obbligazionarie degli Enti 
Territoriali Italiani (1996-2002)”, Public Finance (September 2003); Italian Government, 
Treasury Department, Indebitamento degli Enti Locali e Territoriali (December 2014); Dexia-
Crediop, La congiuntura finanziaria degli Enti Territoriali (July 2011).  
3
 Schulz and Wolff (2008), Schuknecht et al. (2009). 
4
 Venneri (2013). 
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The Italian constitutional system is very different from the US federal model 
and, even after the constitutional reform in 2001 which granted several new 
powers to sub-national governments, Italy still represents a unitary state model 
with devolved powers.5 Therefore, the well established findings on the US 
market may not be directly applicable under Italy’s institutional framework. The 
relationship between Italian central and local governments must be addressed 
and, particularly, its role in affecting sub-sovereign bond yields and credit 
ratings must be formally analyzed. 
I.2 Research questions 
This research aims to analyze the determinants of bond yields and credit ratings 
of Italian local governments, as well as the interaction between ratings and 
yields. Moreover, also the role of the interrelation between central and local 
governments in affecting yields and ratings is studied. Lastly, the informational 
power of credit ratings and the disciplinary power of financial markets are 
tested.  The main questions addressed in this research are: 
i. Which are the economic/financial factors determining Italian municipal 
bond yields? 
 
ii. Which are the economic/financial factors determining Italian sub-sovereign 
credit ratings? 
 
iii. Is the specific creditworthiness of an Italian local government relevant in 
influencing its bond yields? 
 
iv. Is the specific creditworthiness of an Italian local government relevant in 
influencing its credit rating? 
 
v. Does Italy’s sovereign financial risk affect sub-sovereign bond yields? 
 
vi. Does Italy’s sovereign credit rating affect sub-sovereign credit ratings? 
 
vii. Do the bond yields of the different tiers of sub-national governments 
unanimously react to changes in Italy’s sovereign financial risk? 
 
viii. Do the credit ratings of the different tiers of sub-national governments 
unanimously react to changes in Italy’s credit rating? 
                                                             
5
 Constitutional law no. 3, 18 October 2001. 
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ix. Are the ratings released by the three major international rating agencies 
driven by the same set of economic/financial variables? 
 
x. Do investors in Italian municipal bonds price differently rated and unrated 
issues? 
 
xi. Do the specific rating assessments (i.e. AAA, AA-, BBB+, etc.) attributed 
to Italian sub-national governments affect the Italian municipal bond 
yields? 
 
xii. Do the credit ratings attributed to Italian sub-national governments 
possess any additional informational role beyond the information 
obtainable from publicly available financial and economic data? 
 
xiii. Is the financial market able to impose debt discipline on the Italian local 
governments? 
I.3 Research approach 
This research is characterized by a rigorous empirical methodology. The 
precondition of the empirical analysis, the review of the literature, is the subject 
of Chapters III, while the core empirical analysis is undertaken in Part II 
(Chapters IV and V). 
First, the relevant literature on both municipal bonds and credit ratings is 
critically reviewed. The existing research on these subjects has been analyzed 
in order to address the issues relating the methodology applied, the data 
collection, the construction of indicators and variables best suitable for the 
research goals, and the understanding of the results.  
The empirical analysis is introduced in Part II. Chapter IV and Chapter V 
present the empirical analysis relating, respectively, the Italian municipal bond 
market (Chapter IV) and the Italian local governments’ ratings (Chapter V), 
including the description of the data, the analytic derivation of the estimated 
models and the results of the analyses. 
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Chapter II 
  Local Government Finance in Italy 
This chapter is divided into three sections, the first section describes the Italian 
local public finance system, while the second and the third provide a brief 
picture, respectively, of the municipal bond and of the rating market. 
II.1 The local public finance system 
This section contains a brief introduction to the Italian local public finance 
system, including the elements of the institutional framework and the features 
characterizing the interrelation between central and local governments finances. 
The following description is not meant to be exhaustive, as it serves the 
purpose of highlighting the aspects relating the pricing of municipal bonds and 
the assessment of credit ratings.  
II.1.1 Institutional framework 
The Italian Constitution, as amended by constitutional law no. 3/2001 which 
introduced fiscal federalism, reserves to the central government exclusive 
powers to act in the areas of international relations, justice, defence and 
national security, foreign trade and economic, monetary and energy policies. 
The central government also has powers to act in other areas, such as public 
works, water resources, railways and transportation. Except for the powers 
expressly reserved to the central government, legislative and executive powers 
are exercised in certain matters at local level.6 
The Italian Constitution defines four levels of sub-national government: regioni 
(regions), province (provinces), città metropolitane (metropolitan cities) and 
comuni (municipalities).7 As of December 2014 the Italian administration is 
organized in 20 regioni, 110 province, 8092 comuni and 14 città metropolitane. 
Regions exert both legislative and executive powers according to their statutes. 
Of Italy’s 20 regions, 15 operate under an ordinary degree of regional autonomy 
and are referred to as ordinary-statute regions, while five regions (Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta) are regulated by 
special statutes which provide these regions with greater autonomy and wider 
legislative powers, classifying them as special-statute regions or autonomous 
regions. The region Trentino-Alto Adige consists of two autonomous provinces 
                                                             
6
 Constitutional law no. 3, 18
th
 October 2001. 
7
 Constitution of the Italian Republic, section 114. 
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(Trento and Bolzano) whose powers, including legislative, correspond to those 
of a region. The constitutional law no. 3/2001 significantly increased the powers 
attributed to ordinary-statute regions, while only slightly increased the legislative 
powers of special-statute regions, which were already broad. 
Provinces exert administrative functions and regulatory powers within their 
territories, and coordinate inter-municipal planning. According to the Legislative 
Decree No. 267/2000 (the Local Authorities act), the matters under the 
provinces’ responsibility include: environment, water, energy, road network and 
education. The law no. 56/2014, transformed the Italian provinces into second-
level institutional bodies, formed by members of the constituent municipalities 
and with no elected council. This modification of provinces’ nature is the first 
step of the process for their complete abolition. 
Municipalities represent the basic local authorities’ level in the Italian system. 
The Italian Constitution attributes the administrative functions in the first place to 
municipalities, according to the principle stating that the management of public 
functions should be attributed to the entities which are the nearest to the 
citizens and therefore in the best position to grant them the most efficient 
services.8 
The above cited law no. 56/2014, on the 7th April 2014, activated the first 10 
metropolitan cities for ordinary-statute regions. The 4 metropolitan cities 
belonging to special-statute regions, at the time of writing, have not been 
activated yet. 
II.1.2 Local governments’ revenues and financial autonomy 
The constitutional law no. 3/2001 provides several principles relating the 
financial autonomy of Italian local governments. The new Section 119 of the 
Italian Constitution states that regions, provinces, metropolitan cities and  
municipalities are financially autonomous regarding revenues and expenditures.  
They are entitled to establish and collect their own taxes and revenues in 
accordance with the national public finance principles and taxation system, and 
they are entitled to receive a portion of the central government taxes collected 
within their territory. The redistribution of resources from richer to poorer areas 
is to be effected by an equalisation fund, and the above mentioned revenues 
must be sufficient to finance all local government’s functions and activities. In 
order to promote economic development and social cohesion the central 
government may allocate additional resources or carry out special actions in 
                                                             
8
 Constitution of the Italian Republic, section 118. 
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support of specific municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions. 
Local governments may incur debt only to finance investment expenses and 
their indebtedness is not guaranteed by the central government. 
The items of revenues collected by Italian local governments are specific to the 
different tiers of government.  
The regions’ main tax revenues are: the regional tax on productive activities, the 
additional income tax on individuals and the contribution on value added tax. 
The regional tax on productive activities, of which regions have the power to 
determine the tax rate within a range defined by the central government, is 
based on the net production value of enterprises and professionals. The 
additional income tax on individuals entitles regions to impose an additional 
amount on the national income tax, within a range defined by the central 
government. The contribution on value added tax is a portion, defined by the 
central government, of the national value added tax collected in a specific 
region which is transferred to the same region. Other less significant sources of 
income for regional governments are the automobile tax, the fuel tax and other 
minor taxes. 
The taxes that provinces are empowered to levy are: the car registration tax, the 
additional tax on electric power consumption, the tax on vehicle insurance and 
an environmental tax. Provinces are also entitled to a contribution on the 
national income tax on individuals defined by the central government. 
The municipal sources of tax revenues are principally represented by the 
property tax and by the municipal service tax. Municipalities are also entitled to 
apply an additional income tax on individuals, within a range defined by the 
central government. Other less significant sources of income for municipalities 
include a tax for the utilization of public areas and a public advertisement tax. 
Local governments also benefit from non-tax revenues, which include incomes 
derived from a variety of sources such as charges for public services, rents from 
property management, investment yields and profits on public owned firms.  
The ongoing fiscal federalism process has been transforming the financial 
relationship between central and local governments, granting greater financial 
autonomy and financial responsibility to the lowest tiers of public administration. 
This has resulted and will continue to result in a reduction of transfers by the 
central government as increased revenue generating powers are passed to the 
periphery. Transfer payments are also granted by regions to municipalities and 
provinces, according to each regions’ specific program.   
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II.1.3 Distinctive traits of the Italian local public finance system 
The Italian local public finance system is characterized by several idiosyncratic 
legal, market and procedural features. These distinctive traits of the system, 
which are briefly described below, affect the credit risk of a local government 
and must be taken into account when interpreting the results of the empirical 
analysis. 
Local governments in Italy are required to effect all payments and collect all 
revenues through one or more agent banks acting as their treasurer. The 
treasurer also intermediates funds between the local government and the Bank 
of Italy, which acts as the treasurer for the central government. The central 
government treasury system (Tesoreria Unica) requires the local governments’ 
treasurers to deposit cash into (and withdraw funds from) an account at the 
local branch of the Bank of Italy, according to the regulation in force for the 
different types of local government. 
Local governments’ loans and bonds may be supported by a irrevocable 
payment delegation (Delegazione di Pagamento), which compels the treasurer 
to allocate appropriate funds to meet the payment of the scheduled interest and 
principal on debt. Funds are allocated having recourse to the local government 
revenues and are paid with absolute priority with respect to other payment 
obligations. A payment delegation does not constitute a security interest in 
favour of the payee and, accordingly, creditors who receive the benefit of a 
payment delegation should be considered common unsecured creditors for the 
benefit of whom certain funds have been allocated in order to support the 
repayment obligations.9 
The Italian system has a special procedure for local authorities in financial 
distress (Dissesto Finanziario), similar to the private sector bankruptcy 
procedure, under which municipalities are subject to the rigorous control of an 
external committee which manages the financial position while the local 
authority’s management keeps the ordinary operations running.10 Although the 
Italian Constitution forbids any explicit central government guarantee on local 
government debt,11 to date, every financial distress procedures benefited from 
the intervention of the central government which granted dedicated funds for 
distressed local authorities.12 Moreover, central government intervention has 
                                                             
9
 Law no. 843, 21 December 1978, section 3. Law no. 724, 23 December 1994, section 35. 
Legislative decree no. 267, 18 August 2000, section 206. 
10
 Legislative decree no. 267, 18 August 2000, sections 244-269. 
11
 Constitution of the Italian Republic, section 119. 
12
 Recent examples involving large municipalities include the Euro 590 million fund allocated in 
2012 for, among others, the cities of Naples, Reggio Calabria and Alessandria (Government 
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happened also outside financial distress procedures, as in a recent case 
(September 2008), involving a provincial capital, where the City of Catania was 
about to default and was subsequently bailed out by the central government 
with a € 140 million transfer.13 It must be understood that the above mentioned 
financial distress regulation is not applicable to regions, as it is specifically 
aimed at local authorities only (municipalities and provinces). 
Furthermore, the local government debt market is dominated by a local 
government funding agency, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), funded by postal 
savings and under central government control. CDP, which accounts for a share 
of 45% of the whole sub-national lending market, finances local infrastructure 
projects and represents the main competitor of bond and loan markets.14 
Lastly, the law which introduced local government bonds in Italy, and still in 
force, states that municipal bonds’ gross yields at issue cannot exceed the 
average gross yield of the corresponding Italian Government bonds plus 1%.15 
II.2 Italian municipal bond market at a glance 
As described in Graph II.1 below, the overall indebtedness of Italian sub-
national tiers of government boosted after the above mentioned constitutional 
reform in 2001 which granted a higher financial autonomy to local governments. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
decree no. 174, 10 October 2012) and the Euro 150 million fund granted to the City of Taranto 
in 2007 (Government decree no. 159, section 24, 1 October 2007).   
13
 C.I.P.E. (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning) resolution n. 92, 30 September 
2008. 
14
 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti SpA, Relazione Finanziaria Semestrale Consolidata, 30 June 2013. 
15
 Law no. 724, 23 December 1994, section 35. 
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As reported in the graph above, the total amount of sub-sovereign debt grew 
from around € 35 billion in 2001 to an average of around € 100 billion along the 
2000s. Looking at the distribution between government types, it can be noted 
the regions and cities represent the higher shares of outstanding debt, while 
provinces account for less than 10% of the market. 
Considering the part of local government debt represented by bonds, Graph II.2 
shows that outstanding bonded debt reached a peak of more than € 30 billion 
between 2006 and 2008, and then experienced a contraction during the 
sovereign financial crisis. 
 
 
The effect of the financial crisis on municipal bond issuance is clearly 
represented in the following Graph II.3, which reports the amount of municipal 
bonds issued per year. 
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Graph II.3 shows how municipal bond issuance increased steadily from late 
1990s to 2006, where it reached the maximum of almost € 8 billion in a year. 
Starting 2007 the yearly amount decreased to around € 40 million in 2014. 
II.3 Italian Public Sector Rating Market at a Glance 
Although a relatively new market, with the earliest rated local governments 
dating in the mid-1990s, the Italian public sector rating market has significantly 
developed along the 2000s. As detailed in the following Graph II.4, the number 
of rated local governments grew from the first 4 entities in 1996 to a peak of 85 
(38 cities, 26 provinces and 21 regions) in 2007 and 2008.16 Subsequently, as 
shown in the graph, the rating market eventually experienced a significant 
contraction in conjunction with the sovereign financial crisis characterizing the 
last five years. At the end of 2014 the total number of rated local governments 
decreased to 31, with only the regions maintaining a number (19) close to the 
pre-crisis period, while both cities and provinces underwent a dramatic drop (to 
8 and 4 respectively). 
 
 
Now, in order to have a picture of the evolution of the credit risk involving the 
Italian public sector, the following Graph II.5 depicts the rating history of the 
central government. The graph reports the credit ratings assigned to the 
Republic of Italy by the three major rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch) by the end of each year between 1996 and 2014. 
 
                                                             
16
 The number of regions includes the two Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano. 
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Observing Graph II.5 it can be noticed how, after 15 years of stability, the three 
rating agency have applied a sudden series of downgrades, starting in 2011, 
following the recent euro-zone sovereign-debt crisis. By the end of 2014 Italy’s 
ratings have moved from the highest categories to the edge of the investment 
grade threshold, with the lowest rating assigned by S&P (BBB-), followed by 
Moody’s (Baa2) and Fitch (BBB+). 
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Chapter III 
Review of the Literature 
“No person of sound mind would lend on the personal security of an individual 
of doubtful character and solvency, and on mortgage over a valuable estate, at 
the same rate of interest. Wherever there is risk, it must be compensated to the 
lender by a higher premium or interest.” 17 
As stated around two centuries ago by the Scottish economist J.R. McCullough, 
scholars and practitioners have traditionally agreed on the fact that the interest 
rate paid on a loan depends on the risks borne by the lender. When the 
borrower is a local government, i.e. an authority which raises revenues by 
collecting taxes on a territory, receiving transfers from the central State and 
selling services to the public, several factors must be considered in order to 
assess its capability to duly service its debt.  
This chapter divides the relevant literature on the subject into four paragraphs. 
The first paragraph focuses on the studies which have identified and tested the 
significant factors in determining municipal bond yields, the second deals with 
the studies which have analyzed the role played by credit ratings in affecting 
yields, the third reviews the empirical publications analyzing the factors 
determining sub-sovereign ratings and the fourth critically addresses the issues 
concerning the empirical methodologies applied in the reviewed literature.  
III.1 Factors determining yields 
The relationship between risk and yields in the government bond market has 
been the object of the work of Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012), which developed a 
portfolio model of bond yield differentials based on financial theory, specifying 
basic settings such as investors’ preferences and market functioning. 
Afterwards, the model has been adapted to the case of local government bonds 
as in Booth et al. (2007) for Canadian provincial bonds and in Schuknecht et al. 
(2009) for German Lander’s bonds and Spanish provincial bonds. 
Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012) consider a risk-averse investor, optimising in a 
mean-variance space, in a market with two assets: a risk-free bond and a bond 
subject to default risk, both denominated in the same currency. After portfolio 
optimization and market clearing, the model defines the yield spread (between 
the risky and the risk-free bond) as a function of three factors: default risk, 
                                                             
17
 J.R. McCullough, The Principles of Political Economy: with a Sketch of the Rise and Progress 
of the Science (Edinburgh: William and Charles Tait, 1825). 
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liquidity risk and market risk. Therefore, the total yield premium, i.e. the 
compensation for the total risk borne, can be decomposed into three distinct 
parts: default risk premium, liquidity premium and market risk premium. To 
estimate empirically the risk-return relationship in their model, the authors 
employ a set of economic, fiscal and financial variables such as debt, deficit, 
business cycle, liquidity of the issue, maturity of the issue etc. Also, since the 
theoretical model states the influence of investors’ risk aversion on yield 
differentials, Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012) use yield spread between low grade 
US corporate bonds (BBB-rated) and benchmark US government bonds as an 
empirical proxy for global risk aversion. Testing their model on a sample of EU 
and US central government bonds, Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012) find that yield 
spreads are affected by default and liquidity risk. The default risk premium is 
positively affected by debt and debt service ratios of the issuer country, while 
the liquidity risk premium is lower in countries with larger market shares. 
Booth et al. (2007) employ the theoretical model developed by Bernoth et al. 
(2006, 2012) and adapt it to the Canadian sub-sovereign bond market. The 
authors derived an empirical specification of the model designed to estimate the 
impact of Canadian provinces’ fiscal and financial condition on their bond yields. 
The model specification, which adopts debt, deficit and employment as 
explanatory variables, is tested on a panel-data set of Canadian provincial 
government bonds issued between 1981 and 2000. The results clearly show 
that provincial fiscal positions, debt and deficit, significantly affect yield spreads 
between provincial and central government  bonds. Moreover, Booth et al. 
(2007) examine the relationship between corporate and provincial yield 
spreads. They find that provincial bonds behave similarly to corporate bonds 
since during recessions their yields increase compared to the federal 
government ones, therefore experiencing the well known “flight to quality” 
phenomenon. However, provincial debt responds in a less pronounced way to 
general economic conditions than corporate debt, implying that provincial bonds 
may be weak substitutes for corporate bonds. 
Schuknecht et al. (2009) study the risk premia paid by sub-national 
governments in Europe and Canada. They also analyze, with respect to 
European countries, how the risk premia were affected by the introduction of the 
Euro. They design an empirical model, derived from the above cited model of 
Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012), for the analysis of yield premia between sub-
sovereign and sovereign governments and apply it to a sample of bonds issued 
by German Landers (federal states) and by Spanish and Canadian provinces. 
The authors find that, after controlling for variables related to the credit quality, 
sub-sovereign governments paid positive interest differentials compared to their 
respective central governments. They argue that lower levels of government are 
 14 
 
perceived as riskier by the market because of their smaller and more volatile tax 
base, and are therefore requested a positive spread, over the central 
government yield, to compensate for the higher risk. Interestingly, the authors 
show that spreads between sub-sovereign and sovereign bonds narrowed in 
Germany and Spain after the introduction of the Euro, as a consequence of the 
mitigation of liquidity risk. Moreover, Schuknecht et al. (2009) assert that, before 
the introduction of the Euro, the risk premia paid by German Landers, especially 
those receiving transfers under the German fiscal equalization system, did not 
respond to fiscal balances, possibly because of the expectations of a bailout by 
the central government. This special condition seems to have disappeared with 
the start of the EMU, which imposed more fiscal discipline on German states. In 
contrast, Spanish provinces paid risk premia related to their fiscal balances both 
before and after the introduction of the Euro. Furthermore, they also find that 
Canadian provincial governments pay a significant risk premium related to their 
fiscal performance unless they belong to the group of net recipients under the 
Canadian fiscal equalization system, meaning that markets do not penalize 
provinces that consistently receive transfers for running large deficits. This 
infers that markets expect the Canadian government to provide financial 
assistance to the governments of these provinces should a financial crisis 
occur, a result which is similar to their findings for German states before the 
start of the EMU. 
The findings in Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012), Booth et al. (2007) and Schuknecht 
et al. (2009) identify the risk factors expected to determine municipal bond 
yields and propose a set of observable variables meant to capture the effect of 
such factors. The three risk factors highlighted in the above-cited papers 
(default risk, liquidity risk and market risk) have been measured by different 
variables and indicators which can be grouped into three categories: 
characteristics of the issuer; macroeconomic and market variables; 
characteristics of the security. Hence, the following three subsections analyze 
the empirical literature on the subject, identifying the adopted variables and 
explaining their relevance in quantifying the risk factors and, therefore, their 
relevance in explaining local government bond yields.  
III.1.1 Characteristics of the issuer: financial, fiscal, socio-economic 
This category includes those issuer-specific characteristics able to measure the 
creditworthiness of a local government. This includes: financial indicators such 
as debt load and debt service; fiscal variables such as fiscal balances and 
financial autonomy; socio-economic indicators such as local income, 
unemployment and population.  
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One of the most important variable affecting the default risk of an issuer is the 
existing debt load of the issuing local government. Clearly, the higher the debt 
burden the higher the portion of future revenues absorbed by payments due to 
principal and interest, so the lower the ability to pay in case of a decline in 
revenues. One of the earliest studies on the subject, Hastie (1972), using a 
cross-sectional regression analysis on a sample of US municipal bonds, is one 
of the first studies analyzing yields as a function of default risk. He obtains that 
default risk indicators, including the debt load, are able to explain a large share 
of the differences in municipal bond yields and finds a positive relationship 
between debt burden and yields. Following studies, including influential papers 
such as Liu and Thakor (1984), Capeci (1991 and 1994), Booth et al. (2007) 
and Schuknecht et al. (2009), have applied this indicator as a ratio over a 
measure of income (overall debt/GDP), revenues (overall debt/total revenues, 
overall debt/current revenues) or in per capita terms. However, Robbins and 
Simonsen (2012) highlight the possible endogeneity issue between outstanding 
debt and interest rates (if local governments reduced debt responding to 
increases in interest rates), and suggest the use of instrumental variables to 
avoid it. Another measure of the sustainability of a local government’s debt, 
used among others by Capeci (1994), is debt service. While the debt load 
measures the existing stock of debt, debt service (often expressed as a ratio 
over revenues) accounts for annual expenses in interest and capital repayment 
and therefore is affected by the debt structure and interest rates of existing 
loans. 
Also, fiscal balances (deficits/surpluses) are extremely important in assessing 
the financial condition of a local authority. Especially the current balance 
(difference between current revenues and current expenditures) indicates if the 
local government is generating or absorbing cash from its operating activities, 
cash which can be used for debt repayments and therefore the higher the 
current surplus the higher the probability that the issuer will be able to cope with 
debt service in the near future. The first study to examine the degree of 
association between measures of budget performance and yield differentials on 
new issue municipal bonds was Wilson (1983), finding that fiscal performance 
indicators are significant in explaining local governments’ credit risk. More 
recently, Benson and Marks (2007), in their study on the factors affecting the 
borrowing costs of US state governments (with specific attention to the impact 
of state fiscal imbalances), find that the interest costs determined in the market 
for state municipal securities do reflect estimates of state structural deficits, with 
states which exhibit greater structural deficits paying higher interest costs than 
states facing lower or no structural deficits. Other studies, including Capeci 
(1994), Booth et al. (2007) and Schuknecht et al. (2009), have included a fiscal 
balance indicator in the empirical specification of their models supported by a 
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fiscal or financial autonomy indicator, a ratio meant to describe the level of own 
revenues compared to the transfers from the central government.  
Moreover, Capeci (1994) analyzes how a local government’s fiscal policies 
affect the default risk premium on its borrowing cost. Focusing specifically on 
the endogeneity issue possibly arising between local fiscal policy and municipal 
bond yields, he asserts that causality is not unidirectional. Because, beyond the 
evidence that budget decisions affect the interest rate paid by the local 
authority, it is also likely that the same budget policies are affected by the 
borrowing cost. For example, a high interest rate might discourage the recourse 
to deficit spending through debt financing. Using a two-stage least squares 
model with instrumental variables employed to correct for endogeneity, he finds 
that treating fiscal variables as exogenous delivers biased estimators. 
Furthermore, Capeci observes that endogeneity is strictly related to asymmetric 
information between investors and issuers. His regressions’ results change 
dramatically when current variables (known only to the issuer) are substituted 
by lagged ones (publicly observable), proving that the cost of borrowing affects 
the fiscal policy decisions of a local authority but also that the borrowing cost 
itself is determined by the market as a function of observable fiscal variables. 
Similarly, Poterba and Rueben (1999) analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on 
municipal bond yields. As in Capeci (1994), they acknowledge the issue of 
endogeneity (which in their study is between fiscal institutions and fiscal policy) 
and address it by employing a set of instrumental variables, which proxy for 
fiscal institutions without being affected by fiscal policy, in a simultaneous 
equations model. Their results point out that fiscal institutions affect the required 
return on municipal bonds. Local governments subject to expenditure and 
borrowing limitations face lower borrowing costs, ceteris paribus, compared to 
local authorities which are not imposed this kind of fiscal constraints. 
Lastly, socio-economic variables have also proved to be relevant in explaining 
the variance in municipal bond yields. For instance local income, used among 
others by Liu and Thakor (1984) and Capeci (1991), is an important indicator 
(usually specified as local GDP per capita) of the economic base over which 
local taxes are levied, because the richer a territory the higher the taxes that 
can be collected on it. Similarly, unemployment, usually expressed as a 
percentage rate as in Johnson and Kriz (2005) and Booth et al. (2007) among 
others, helps assessing the economic strength of a territory, with weakness in 
the labour force employed always associated with higher interest rates. Also, 
population, a common measure for the size of a local authority, measured by 
the number of people on which it exercises its powers, has proved to be 
empirically significant in influencing local government’s interest rates. To this 
end, Simonsen et al. (2001) asserts that smaller local authorities often lack staff 
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with financial-management capacity, and this would affect the terms of the bond 
issue. Testing a sample of US municipal bonds they find that, after having 
controlled for a set of other variables likely to affect yields, the population size of 
a local government has a significant impact on interest rates and, specifically, 
that local authorities with a population below ten thousands citizens pay higher 
interest rates.  
III.1.2 Macroeconomic and market variables 
Given a certain creditworthiness of an issuer, other factors, external to the 
issuer but common to the market or the economy as a whole, are likely to affect 
the yield of a local bond issue. 
For example, Benson et al. (1981) examine the existence of a systematic 
variation in yield spreads for municipal bonds focusing specifically on the 
business cycle. The authors employ as explanatory variables, together with 
other variables used in previous studies (rating, size of the issue etc.), two 
business cycle indicators such as GDP change and a consumer sentiment 
index. They find that yield spreads (interest rate differentials between the 
analyzed bonds and a AAA-rated municipal bond index) widen during an 
economic downturn and narrow during an economic expansion, with a greater 
effect for lower-rated bonds than for higher-rated bonds. 
Moreover, Schulz and Wolff (2009) perform a quantitative analysis on the 
determinants of the yield differential between bonds issued by German Landers 
(federal states) and the bund (the German Government bond). Employing a 
panel-data regression model, the authors find that yield spreads between 
central and state government bonds are mainly driven by international risk 
aversion. Where risk aversion in international markets is proxied by  the yield 
differential between a US BBB-rated corporate bond index and US 
government’s treasury bonds. Schulz and Wolff (2009) assert that sub-
sovereign Lander’s bonds are not perceived by investors as substitute for the 
federal government’s bund, and that differences in yields remain even after 
having controlled for issuer’s and issue’s characteristics, since these 
characteristics have only a negligible effect on German state bonds. 
III.1.3 Characteristics of the security 
The empirical literature on the subject has traditionally included in the model 
specification a set of provisions stated in the bond issue agreement. Since early 
studies, variables such as amount of the issue, maturity, coupon structure and, 
more recently, sale type have consistently been included in empirical 
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estimations. These features affect yields independently of the creditworthiness 
of the issuer. 
For example maturity and coupon structure influence the duration of the bond, 
duration increases with the maturity of the bond and decreases with the 
frequency of coupons payments and with the size of coupon rate.18 Since 
duration is the main indicator of interest rate risk and in a normal upward 
sloping term structure of interest rates we expect a positive relationship 
between duration and rates, maturity is expected to raise yields while coupon 
frequency and size are expected to lower yields. Moreover, the amount of the 
bond issue can be seen as a proxy for liquidity or marketability, given the fact 
that the larger the issue the higher the number of intermediaries and investors 
involved and the less the impact of transaction costs. Hence, we expect lower 
yields for larger issues. Tanner (1975), for instance, investigates the effect of 
credit risk, underwriter competition, maturity date, and size of issue, among 
other variables, on interest costs of new municipal debt. He obtains that, 
besides the other relevant variables identified in other studies, also the time to 
maturity of a bond (with longer maturities paying higher interest rates) affect the 
interest costs of new bond issues. Also, Broaddus and Cook (1981), in their 
comprehensive regression analysis of the determinants of municipal bond 
yields, find that, in addition to the variables identified by previous research, also 
the specific provisions of the bond indenture such as the early redemption 
clause (call option) and the coupon structure affect municipal bond yields. 
Moreover, also the specific sale method chosen to float a municipal bond has 
been proven to influence its yield. To this end, Simonsen et al. (2001) explore 
the influence of bond’s sale type (competitive or negotiated sale) on municipal 
interest rates. The authors study the effects of bond’s sale type on yields, 
testing  if there is any significant interest rate differential between bonds sold 
through competitive and negotiated sale. Testing a sample of US municipal 
bonds they find that, after having controlled for a set of variables likely to affect 
yields (amount of the issue, maturity, callable option, market interest rates and 
rating), the bond’s sale type is found to be relevant. Bonds sold through 
competitive sale are characterized, ceteris paribus, by slightly lower yields 
compared to bonds sold through negotiated sale. From another perspective, 
Peng and Brucato (2003) examine the method of sale of municipal bonds as a 
certification mechanism, and analyze its impact on the borrowing cost of debt 
issues. They argue that the sale method can be viewed as a certification 
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 Duration or Macaulay duration is a measure of a bond price sensitivity to changes in interest 
rates. Duration is defined as the weighted average term to maturity of a security's cash flows, 
where the weights are the present values of each cash flow as a percentage to the security's 
price. This indicator was first proposed by Macaulay (1938).  
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mechanism as issuers self-select themselves into either competitive or 
negotiated groups based on their perception of the underlying degree of 
information asymmetry. Their findings demonstrates that local governments 
choose the method of sale according to the degree of information asymmetry 
between the issuer and investors. Where the information asymmetry is more 
severe, the negotiated sale method is chosen. After controlling for this self-
selection bias, they found that competitive bidding has, as in Simonsen et al. 
(2001), a slight cost advantage over negotiated sale.  
III.2 Role of credit rating in affecting yields 
The relationship between ratings, economic indicators, and yields of municipal 
bonds has been a traditional subject of interest for both academics and 
practitioners. For instance, Jantscher (1970) analyzes the differences in interest 
rates between local governments which have maintained a constant credit 
rating and issuers which have been downgraded, has been the first author to 
study the relationship between ratings and municipal bond yields. He finds that 
yield differentials between local authorities with different ratings are partly 
explained by the rating assessments from rating agencies and partly by the 
independent credit analysis done by investors, which Jantscher called “market 
rating”. Later on, Rubinfeld (1973) applied a two-stage regression model where 
local governments’ bond yields are explained by credit ratings and a set of 
indicators aimed to quantify the creditworthiness of the issuer (Jantscher’s 
market rating).  He first obtained a rating score variable (to convert the letter 
assessments Aaa, Aa, Baa etc. into numerical values) and then regresses it 
together with a set of financial, socio-economic and market variables. He 
obtains that published credit ratings have an independent effect beyond the 
market’s evaluation of the financial status of the rated municipality, meaning 
that the credit assessments provided by rating agencies carry additional 
information with respect to the independent market evaluation based on the 
publicly available observable variables. Also, Ingram et al. (1983) examined the 
information content of municipal bond rating changes by evaluating municipal 
bond price adjustments during the period surrounding a rating change. Testing 
a sample of US municipal bonds, they find that rating changes do have an 
impact on yields during the month of the change. As expected, upgraded bonds 
experience a decrease in yields while downgraded ones face a yield rise. 
The early studies described above have examined the role of credit rating in 
affecting yields, but they lacked in econometric rigour. The first study to formally 
address the issue of the contemporaneous estimation of the effects of the credit 
ratings assigned by rating agencies and of the observable economic/financial 
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variables relating a local government was Liu and Thakor (1984). Liu and 
Thakor (1984) develop an empirical model for the determination of the 
relationship between ratings, economic indicators, and yields of municipal debt, 
aimed to quantify the impact that credit ratings have, per se, on the interest 
rates paid by local governments. The authors assert that ratings have an 
independent effect beyond the observable characteristics of the issue, because 
ratings’ raison d’être is that they carry information that is not publicly available. 
That is, rating can be seen as a screening instrument à la Stiglitz (1975) and its 
acquisition by borrowers represents a signalling mechanism through which high 
standing issuers differentiate themselves from low quality ones, avoiding the 
“average quality pricing” phenomenon described by Akerlof (1970). Liu and 
Thakor acknowledge that an empirical model with both ratings and issuer’s 
economic characteristics as independent variables is exposed to serious 
multicollinearity problems. Because a bond’s yield depends on both the credit 
rating and the economic characteristics of the issuer, but the rating itself is 
affected by the same economic characteristics. The authors deal with the 
multicollinearity issue by adopting a two-stage regression model which employs 
an orthogonal rating indicator in order to avoid multicollinearity issues. Their 
results show that three variables (total debt, per-capita debt and 
unemployment), plus the rating, significantly affect municipal bond yields. 
Moreover, credit rating has an independent  and significant effect on yields, 
meaning that it carries additional information beyond the credit analysis done by 
investors upon observable variables (Jantscher’s market rating). 
Also, in his paper published in 1991, Capeci examines the channels through 
which a municipality's credit quality affects its borrowing rate, considering both 
the direct effect of changes in credit quality on changes in borrowing rates and 
the indirect effect that operates through changes in credit ratings. He employs 
the same econometric model proposed by Liu and Thakor, but, while the former 
used cross-sections, he applies it to a panel data set in order to assess the 
impact of changes in the credit quality on borrowing costs. Capeci (1991) 
asserts that changes in ratings need to be analyzed  together with changes in 
the underlying economic variables, because, since ratings are influenced also 
by public information, changes in yields due to changes in ratings could be 
actually determined directly by the publicly available information. Employing a 
random effects GLS estimation applied to first differences in a panel data set 
(an alternative way of facing the multicollinearity issue already addressed by Liu 
and Thakor), he obtains results which confirm the influence on yields of the 
economic and financial characteristics of the issuer as found in previous 
studies, but present a rating’s independent effect which is less significant 
compared to what was found by Liu and Thakor. 
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A different approach to the issue has been followed by Liu and Seyyed (1991). 
This study define and statistically estimate a model designed to evaluate the 
effect of socio-economic characteristics, and credit ratings, of a municipal bond 
issuer on its borrowing cost. They develop an empirical model for the analysis 
of the yield differential between a risky local bond and a risk-free Treasury bond 
as a function of: bond structure (maturity and coupon), socio-economic 
variables (income, tax revenues, debt, unemployment and population) and the 
credit rating released by Moody’s. Liu and Seyyed acknowledge, as Liu and 
Thakor (1984) and Capeci (1991), the issue of multicollinearity between socio-
economic variables and rating. They consider that multicollinearity doesn’t bias 
the estimated coefficients but only amplify the related standard errors, therefore 
making the conventional t-stats useless. In this respect, they propose a forward 
inclusion technique in a stepwise regression in which the rating variable enters 
after all socio-economic variables are included, with the statistical significance 
measured by an F-test. To assess the independent contribution of credit ratings 
to the yield equation, beyond the effect of socio-economic variables, they 
suggest to look at the significance of the F-stat after the rating variable is 
included in the stepwise regression. According to their methodology, a non-
significant F-stat would imply that risk premia are only affected by socio-
economic variables and that ratings would not provide additional information. 
Testing their model on a sample of US municipal bonds, Liu and Seyyed (1991) 
obtain that including the rating variable in the estimated equation significantly 
improve the explanatory power of the model and, therefore, they conclude that 
credit ratings have an independent effect on yields beyond the socio-economic 
characteristics of the issuer. 
The approach of the Liu and Thakor model has been strongly criticized by 
Stover (1991). In his study, Stover claimed that Liu and Thakor methodology 
would not be able to decompose the relationship between economic 
characteristics and yields, of a municipal bond issuer, into direct and indirect 
effects. Hence, he proposes a path analysis model aimed at quantifying the 
direct effect of observable variables on bond yields and the indirect effect which 
is exerted by the same variables through credit ratings. Applying his model to 
the same dataset used by Liu and Thakor (1984), he obtains conflicting results 
with respect to the latter study. Particularly, in Stover’s results the direct effect 
of the observable economic variables on yields is irrelevant, while the same 
variables are significant in explaining credit ratings and, therefore, they would 
affect yields only indirectly through their impact on ratings. Nevertheless, with its 
findings, Stover is negating any role for an investors’ independent evaluation on 
the creditworthiness of the issuer (Jantscher’s market rating). He asserts that 
only credit ratings are relevant in municipal bond pricing, contradicting what was 
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generally and almost unanimously found in the previous research on the 
subject. 
The role played by asymmetric information in municipal bond pricing has been 
further studied by Hsueh and Liu (1993). As in Liu and Thakor (1984), they see 
credit rating as a signalling instrument à la Akerlof which allows high-quality 
issuers to reveal their credit standing to the market. This reduces the agency 
costs between the issuer and investors, contributing to set market prices 
(yields) which reflect the credit quality of the issuers. Specifically, Hsueh and Liu 
are interested in testing if high-standing municipal borrowers which choose not 
to purchase a bond rating are penalized, in terms of interests paid, with respect 
to same quality issuers possessing a credit rating. They employ a probit model, 
based on maximum likelihood estimations, to predict the credit quality of 
unrated issues in order to analyze yields differentials between rated and 
unrated bonds with comparable creditworthiness.  Applying their model to a 
sample of US municipal bonds, they found that, after having controlled for the 
credit quality, unrated issuers are penalized by paying a higher yield. However, 
they also prove that investors correctly price the differences in the credit quality 
of unrated issues, and that the issuers most likely to forgo a credit rating are the 
smaller ones which aim at local markets. The authors conclude that this type of 
issuers (high-standing borrowers who choose not to purchase a rating), whose 
small size bonds are mainly marketed to regional banks, operate efficiently 
because the cost of acquiring a credit rating would exceed the benefit of having 
it. 
From another perspective, Johnson and Kriz (2005) investigate the impact of 
fiscal institutions on local government borrowing costs as in Poterba and 
Rueben (1999), but including in the analysis also the indirect effect on yields 
through the impact exerted by fiscal institutions on rating. Specifically they focus 
on the influence that fiscal rules relating borrowing, revenues and expenditure  
have on default risk and consequently on ratings and borrowing costs. The 
authors employ three empirical models. An ordered probit model (suitable to 
deal with the ordinal nature of credit ratings) to estimate the effect of fiscal 
institutions on ratings, OLS to estimate the effect on borrowing costs and path 
analysis to identify direct and indirect effects. Controlling for a set of variables 
among the most used in the empirical literature (amount of the issue, maturity, 
callable option, local income and unemployment, revenues, debt burden and 
sale type), Johnson and Kriz find a significant direct effect of revenue limits on 
yields (with the presence of revenue limits increasing yields) but no role for the 
same variable on ratings, whereas both expenditure and borrowing limits have a 
positive effect on ratings (with the presence of expenditure and borrowing limits 
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corresponding to higher ratings) and, as a consequence, a negative (lower cost) 
indirect effect on bond’s yields. 
An interesting test on the relationship between ratings and municipal bond 
yields, examining specifically whether the choice of forgoing a bond rating 
causes an interest cost penalty to the issuer, has been carried out by Allen et al. 
(2009). They criticize the previous research on the subject for being unable to 
determine, for unrated issues, which rating category would have been assigned 
if a rating had been requested. The authors argue that higher yields on unrated 
issues may reflect, as broadly considered, the higher uncertainty due to lesser 
information, but, on the other hand, may reflect the correct assessment of a 
higher default risk characterizing those issuers which forgo the rating because 
they expect a low valuation by rating agencies. Using a proprietary database 
containing a set of unpublished ratings for a sample of municipal issuers, they 
are able to compare yields of publicly rated bonds with yields belonging to 
unrated bonds which would have received the same rating, if a rating had been 
purchased by the issuer.19 They find that, after correcting for self-selection bias, 
there is no significant difference between yields of rated and unrated bonds, so 
they conclude that issuers that forgo to obtain a rating behave rationally. First 
because all the municipalities in their proprietary database received a low rating 
(most a non-investment grade one), and second because most of the issuers 
which don’t request a rating are small municipalities whose small and infrequent 
issues are generally marketed to local banks who know the creditworthiness of 
the issuer and are able to price correctly the bonds. So to this type of issuers 
incurring the costs of a rating would be irrational, given that obtaining a rating 
would not change the credit assessment of investors and therefore would not 
lower the interests paid on the bond. 
III.3 Factors determining sub-sovereign ratings 
Whilst a widely covered research subject for the US municipal market, local 
government credit ratings outside the US have been academically studied only 
starting in the mid-1990s, following the growth in the number of ratings assigned 
to non-US sub-national governments by the major international agencies.20 
However, despite the increasing importance of the local government market in 
the last twenty years, only one study, at the time of writing, has analyzed 
empirically Italian sub-sovereign ratings. 
                                                             
19
 The authors commissioned a project to Moody’s, which applied the same procedures 
normally used for solicited ratings. The analysts who worked on the assessment didn’t know 
that the ratings they produced were unsolicited and aimed at academic purposes, so they 
worked under standard informational conditions. 
20
 See Liu and Tan (2009). 
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III.3.1 US research 
The main empirical studies on US municipal rating market date back to the early 
studies in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, the relevance of variables such 
as population and debt ratios was already demonstrated in the seminal study of 
Carleton and Lerner (1969), which developed a prediction model, applied to a 
set of US municipal bonds, aimed at duplicating Moody’s local government 
ratings. Later on, the above cited Liu and Thakor (1984), estimating their non-
linear numerical transformation of ratings against a set of economic and 
financial variables, found that debt ratios and unemployment were able to 
explain a high percentage of the sample variance of ratings. However, Moon 
and Stotsky (1993) tested the differences in the determinants of municipal 
ratings for Moody’s and S&P and found significant discrepancies. While 
Moody’s ratings determinants confirmed previous studies results, with the 
strong significance of per capita income and debt ratios, Standard & Poor’s 
ratings were characterized by different significant variables and an overall lower 
relevance of socio-economic and financial variables.  
On the other hand, some studies asserted that fiscal and financial variables are 
not the key determinants of credit ratings. As an instance, Loviscek and 
Crowley (1988), applying a linear probability model to a set of city and county 
ratings, found that variables measuring economic base diversification (i.e. 
population growth and energy endowment) were more accurate than accounting 
and financial variables in explaining ratings. Moreover, Lipnick et al. (1999), 
analyzing Moody’s methodology, highlighted the importance of management 
and administrative factors in addition to economic and financial indicators.  
III.3.2 Non-US international research 
The academic research on local government credit ratings outside the US still 
amounts to a limited production. The first non-US empirical study on the subject 
is Cheung (1996). The author, applied an ordered probit model to estimate the 
relationship between the ratings released by Standard and Poor’s to Canadian 
Provinces and a set of economic and financial variables. The results highlighted 
the relevance, beyond variables already identified in previous studies such as 
debt to GDP, local GDP and unemployment, of the financial autonomy of the 
provinces, measured by the ratio of federal transfers to total revenues. 
More recently, Gaillard (2009) investigated Moody’s ratings for non-US local 
governments. Gaillard, adopting an ordered probit model, demonstrated that 
sub-sovereign ratings are essentially constrained by their respective sovereign 
rating. Moreover, adopting an ordered probit model, he also found that three 
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variables (sovereign default history, local per-capita GDP and local debt-to-
revenues ratio) were able to explain up to 80% of sub-sovereign ratings. 
III.3.3 National research 
The only empirical study to cover the Italian sub-sovereign rating market, at the 
time of writing, is Venneri (2013). Venneri, following Gaillard (2009), applied an 
ordered probit model to the ratings released by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s 
and Fitch, between 2004 and 2008, to a sample of Italian provinces and cities. 
The interpretation of Venneri’s findings, except for the significance of per capita 
GDP, is not straightforward since some of the significant variables appeared 
with the unexpected sign and, contrary to theoretical expectations and 
evidences from the literature, indebtedness indicators are never statistically 
significant. Venneri’s ambiguous results can be explained on technical bases, 
pointing out to multicollinearity issues due to the adoption of possibly redundant 
explanatory variables and to the small sample properties of the estimation 
method. 
III.4 Methodological issues 
The estimation of the effects of economic, fiscal and financial variables on 
municipal bond yields does not present particular problems per se. The large 
majority of the studies on the subject have adopted standard OLS cross-section 
and panel data models. However, several issues on the empirical methodology 
must be addressed.  
One major issue to be taken into account when estimating the impact of 
economic, fiscal and financial variables on yields is endogeneity. Endogeneity 
happens when one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
error term of a regression, causing the estimated parameters to be biased. In 
our setting, the main source of potential endogeneity is reverse causality, or the 
inability to discern the correct direction in a cause-effect relationship. For 
instance, Robbins and Simonsen (2012) warn about the possible endogenous 
relationship between outstanding debt and interest rates and suggest to 
estimate the model using two-stage least squares with instruments for the 
outstanding debt. The authors point out that as interest rates may rise in 
response to an increase in the debt load of a local government (because of the 
augmented credit risk), it might also happen that debt is cut back because 
interest rates have risen (because of the increased cost of borrowing). It needs 
to be specified, however, that the endogeneity problem between debt and 
interest rates can be avoided by using the risk premium (difference between the 
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municipal bond yield and a risk-free rate) as the dependent variable as done, 
among others, by Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012), Booth et al. (2007) and 
Schuknecht et al. (2009). Moreover, endogeneity has been highlighted also 
between fiscal policy and local bond yields. For example, Poterba and Rueben 
(1999), analyzing the impact of fiscal institutions on municipal bond yields, 
proposed the use of instrumental variables in a simultaneous equations setting 
to avoid the endogeneity issue between budget rules and fiscal policy. 
Furthermore, reverse causality is strictly connected to simultaneity. As 
remarked by Capeci (1994) in his study on the effect of local fiscal policy on 
bond yields, the simultaneous estimation of bond yields and fiscal variables may 
lead to endogenous explanatory variables. Since, for example, high interest 
rates might discourage the recourse to deficit spending through debt financing, 
this means that interest rates might affect budget decisions and so the direction 
of the causality is not unambiguous. Linking the issue of endogeneity to the 
existence of information asymmetries between issuers and investors, Capeci 
(1994) proved that this type of endogeneity can be addressed by substituting 
current explanatory variables with lagged ones, the latter being publicly 
available to investors while the former are known to the issuer only. 
Another major issue in analysing the role of economic, financial and fiscal 
variables in the same model is multicollinearity. Multicollinearity refers to a high 
degree of correlation, or linear dependence, among regressors and commonly 
occurs when a large number of independent variables are incorporated into a 
regression model. Given the wide range of economic, financial and fiscal 
indicators available, it is very likely that many of them measure the same 
phenomena, therefore showing cross-correlations. Multicollinearity affects the 
estimation of regression’s parameters, leading to a wrong assessment of 
statistical significance and erratic changes in the coefficients’ estimates. The 
variables suspected to affect estimates can be identified by measuring the 
variance inflation factor (VIF), as in Benson and Marks (2007). The variance 
inflation factor measures how much the variance of an estimated regression’s 
coefficient is increased by linear dependence, it is obtained by regressing an 
explanatory variable against all the other regressors and computing the R-
squared of such a regression. Although none of the reviewed papers have, in 
addition to the calculation of single variable cross-correlations and VIFs, also 
the whole covariance matrix of the explanatory variables should be tested. The 
standard test for ill-condition of a matrix is the condition number (or condition 
index) which, by considering the magnitude of the eigenvalues, gives a 
measure of the overall multicollinearity of a regression. 
Multicollinearity and endogeneity are also extremely relevant issues when an 
empirical model uses as regressors both credit ratings and observable variables 
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(fiscal, economic, financial etc.) simultaneously, as bond yields may depend on 
both the rating and observable variables, but the rating itself is likely to be 
affected by the same set of fiscal, economic and financial observable variables. 
The first study to address the issue of multicollinearity between rating and 
observable characteristics has been Liu and Thakor (1984). The authors deal 
with the multicollinearity issue by adopting a two-stage regression model: first 
the relationship between credit ratings and economic variables is estimated, 
then the residuals’ vector from this regression is inserted as a regressor in an 
equation (with yield spreads as the dependent variable) which employs also the 
same set of economic variables used in the first estimate. The residuals from 
the rating regression are orthogonal by construction with respect to the 
explanatory variables (so any correlation issue is avoided) and carry that part of 
the rating score which is not explained by the economic variables, so the 
corresponding coefficient gives a measure of the marginal impact of the credit 
rating assessment on yields beyond the effect of the other observable variables 
in the model. Furthermore, beyond multicollinearity issues, a single equation 
model including both ratings and financial/economic information simultaneously, 
as exogenous variables, may be affected  by an additional potential estimation 
problem. As noted by Reiter and Ziebart (1991), a single equation model of this 
kind is likely to suffer from endogeneity bias if an explanatory variable (i.e. the 
credit rating) is determined by other explanatory variables in the model (i.e. the 
economic and financial characteristics of the issuer). To tackle the possibly 
endogenous nature of the credit rating variable, Reiter and Ziebart (1991) adopt 
a system of two simultaneous structural equations (one for the yield and one for 
the rating), estimated through a two-stage generalized least squares model. 
One limit of the Reiter and Ziebart (1991) approach can be seen in the dated 
estimation technique adopted, specifically in the choice of the weight matrix in 
the optimization algorithm. A more generalized approach, to the same type of 
system modelling, can be obtained by employing the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation. 
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Appendix III 
Table APP.III.1 - Table of reviewed papers in chronological order 
Author Scope Methodology Data Results 
Carleton and 
Lerner (1969) 
Duplicate Moody’s 
ratings. 
Statistical scoring. 
US municipal 
bond ratings 
issued in 1967. 
Variables such as 
population and debt ratios 
are relevant in predicting 
ratings. 
Jantscher (1970) 
Analyze the differences 
in interest rates paid by 
local governments with 
different credit ratings. 
- - 
Yield differentials partly 
explained by credit rating 
and partly by the 
investors’ independent 
credit analysis (market 
rating). 
Hastie (1972) 
Analyze municipal bond 
yields as a function of 
default risk and 
marketability. 
OLS cross-sections. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1957 
and 1967. 
Indicators such as debt 
burden, default history, 
economic base, 
population, outstanding 
debt and block size 
explain a large share of 
municipal bond yields. 
Rubinfeld (1973) 
Study the role of credit 
ratings in affecting 
municipal bond yields. 
OLS cross-sections. 
Two-stage procedure 
to obtain rating 
scores estimates. 
US municipal 
bonds issued in 
1970. Ratings 
assigned by 
Moody’s. 
Published credit ratings 
have and independent 
effect beyond the market’s 
evaluation of the financial 
status of the rated 
municipality. 
Tanner (1975) 
To investigate the 
effect of risk, 
underwriter 
compensation, maturity 
date, and size of issue, 
among other variables, 
on interest costs of new 
municipal debt. 
OLS cross-sections. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1971 
and 1972. 
The time to maturity of a 
bond and the number of 
bids in the underwriting 
process affect the interest 
costs of new bond issues. 
Benson et al. 
(1981) 
Examine the existence 
of a systematic 
variation in yield 
spreads for municipal 
bonds. 
OLS cross-sections. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1966 
and 1975. 
Yield spreads widen 
during an economic 
downturn and narrow 
during an economic 
expansion, with a greater 
effect for lower-rated 
bonds than for higher-
rated bonds. 
Broaddus and 
Cook (1981) 
A comprehensive 
regression analysis of 
the determinants of 
municipal bond yields. 
OLS cross-sections. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1977 
and 1978. 
The specific provisions of 
the bond indenture, such 
as the early redemption 
clause (call option) and 
the coupon structure, 
affect municipal bond 
yields. 
Wilson (1983) 
Examine the degree of 
association between 
measures of budget 
performance and yield 
differentials on new 
issue municipal bonds.  
OLS cross-sections. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1978 
and 1981. 
Financial performance 
indicators such as current 
operating deficit and 
general fund deficit are 
important factors in 
analyzing local 
governments’ credit risk. 
Ingram et al. 
(1983) 
Examine the 
information content of 
municipal bond rating 
OLS regressions. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1976 
Rating changes have an 
impact on yields during 
the month of the change. 
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Table APP.III.1 - Table of reviewed papers in chronological order 
Author Scope Methodology Data Results 
changes by evaluating 
municipal bond price 
adjustments during the 
period surrounding a 
rating change. 
and 1979. Upgraded bonds 
experience a decrease in 
yields, while downgraded 
ones face a yield rise. 
Liu and Thakor 
(1984) 
Empirical determination 
of the relationship 
between the ratings, 
economic indicators, 
and yields of municipal 
debt. 
Two-stage 
regression model: 
first the relationship 
between credit 
ratings and economic 
variables is 
estimated; then the 
residuals’ vector from 
this regression is 
inserted as a 
regressor in an 
equation with the 
economic variables. 
US municipal 
bonds issued in 
1977. Ratings 
assigned by 
Moody’s. 
Three variables (total 
debt, per-capita debt and 
unemployment), plus 
ratings, significantly affect 
municipal bond yields. 
Credit rating has an 
independent  and 
significant effect on yields. 
Loviscek and 
Crowley (1988) 
Testing the relevance 
of variables measuring 
economic base 
diversification in 
determining municipal 
ratings. 
Linear probability 
model. 
Ratings assigned 
to US cities and 
counties  in 1970 
and in 1981. 
Variables measuring 
economic base 
diversification more 
accurate than accounting 
and financial variables in 
explaining ratings. 
Capeci (1991) 
Examine the channels 
through which a 
municipality's credit 
quality affects its 
borrowing rate, 
considering both the 
direct effect of changes 
in credit quality on 
changes in borrowing 
rates and the indirect 
effect that operates 
through changes in 
credit ratings. 
A random effects 
GLS estimation 
applied to first 
differences in a panel 
data set. 
US municipal 
bonds issued in 
1982 and in 
1987. Ratings 
assigned by 
Moody’s. 
The influence of the 
economic and financial 
characteristics of the 
issuer on yields is 
confirmed. The 
independent effect of 
ratings is less significant 
compared to what was 
found by Liu and Thakor. 
Liu and Seyyed 
(1991) 
Define and statistically 
estimate a model to 
analyze how the socio-
economic 
characteristics and the 
credit rating of a 
municipal bond issuer 
affect its borrowing 
cost. 
Forward inclusion 
technique in 
stepwise regression 
in which the rating 
variable enters after 
all socio-economic 
variables are 
included. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1981 
and 1983. 
Ratings assigned 
by Moody’s. 
Including the rating 
variable in the estimated 
equation significantly 
improve the explanatory 
power of the model. 
Therefore credit ratings 
have an independent 
effect on yields beyond 
the socio-economic 
characteristics of the 
issuer. 
Reiter and 
Ziebart (1991) 
Analyze the relative 
roles of credit ratings 
and economic/financial 
information in the 
determination of bond 
yields. 
System of 
simultaneous 
structural equations, 
estimated through a 
two-stage 
generalized least 
squares model. 
US public utility 
bonds issued 
between 1981 
and 1984. 
Ratings assigned 
by Moody’s and 
S&P. 
Both ratings and financial 
information are relevant in 
determining bond yields. 
Also, financial information 
is important in explaining 
yield differences for bonds 
belonging to the same 
rating category. 
Stover (1991) 
Design an empirical 
model to decompose 
the relationship 
Path analysis model 
with maximum 
likelihood estimation. 
US municipal 
bonds issued in 
1977, 1984 and 
The direct effect of the 
observable economic 
variables on yields is 
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Table APP.III.1 - Table of reviewed papers in chronological order 
Author Scope Methodology Data Results 
between economic 
characteristics and 
yields of a municipal 
bond issuer into direct 
and indirect effects. 
1985. Ratings 
assigned by 
Moody’s. 
irrelevant. The economic 
variables affect yields only 
indirectly through their 
impact on ratings 
Hsueh and Liu 
(1993) 
Study the role played 
by asymmetric 
information in municipal 
bond pricing, and 
examine why a non-
negligible percentage 
of  high-standing 
municipal borrowers 
choose not to purchase 
a bond rating. 
Probit model with 
maximum likelihood 
estimation for the 
credit rating 
prediction, and OLS 
for bond interest cost 
estimation. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1981 
and 1986. 
Ratings assigned 
by Moody’s. 
Unrated issuers are 
penalized by paying a 
higher yield. Investors 
correctly price the 
differences in the credit 
quality of unrated issues. 
The issuers most likely to 
forgo a credit rating are 
the smaller ones which 
aim at local markets. 
Moon and 
Stotsky (1993) 
Test the differences in 
rating determinants for 
Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s. 
Simultaneous 
equations estimated 
through maximum 
likelihood estimation. 
US municipal 
bond ratings 
issued in 1981. 
S&P’s ratings 
characterized by different 
significant variables and 
an overall lower relevance 
of socio-economic and 
financial variables. 
Capeci (1994) 
Analyze how a local 
government’s fiscal 
policies affect the 
default risk premium on 
its cost of borrowing. 
Two-stage least 
squares with 
instrumental 
variables employed 
to correct for 
endogeneity. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1975 
and 1977. 
The instrumental variables 
results suggest that there 
is an endogeneity issue 
between a municipality’s 
financial variables and the 
interest rate paid on a 
bond. 
Cheung (1996) 
To estimate the 
relationship between 
the S&P provincial 
credit ratings, and a 
number of economic 
variables. 
Ordered probit 
methodology. 
Canadian 
provincial ratings 
released by S&P 
from 1969 to 
1995. 
Relevance of the financial 
autonomy of the 
provinces, measured by 
the ratio of federal 
transfers to total 
revenues. 
Lipnick et al. 
(1999) 
Analyzing Moody’s 
rating methodology. 
- - 
Importance of 
management and 
administrative factors in 
addition to economic and 
financial indicators. 
Poterba and 
Rueben (1999) 
Analyze the impact of 
fiscal institutions on 
municipal bond yields. 
Instrumental 
variables in a 
simultaneous 
equations setting to 
avoid the  
endogeneity issue 
between budget 
rules and fiscal 
policy. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1973 
and 1995. 
Fiscal institutions affect 
the required return on 
municipal bonds. Local 
governments subject to 
expenditure and 
borrowing limitations face 
lower borrowing costs. 
Simonsen et al. 
(2001) 
Explore whether a local 
authority’s financial-
management capacity 
and the bond’s sale 
type (competitive or 
negotiated 
sale) influence 
municipal interest rates. 
OLS cross-sections. 
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1994 
and 1997. 
Smaller jurisdictions pay 
an interest cost penalty in 
the municipal bond 
market, and competitive 
sales result in slightly 
lower interest rates 
compared to negotiated 
sales. 
Peng and 
Brucato (2003) 
Examine the method of 
sale of municipal bonds 
as a certification 
Probit model and 
OLS regressions. 
US municipal 
bonds issued in 
1998. 
Local governments 
choose the method of sale 
according to the degree of 
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mechanism, and its 
impact on the 
borrowing cost of debt 
issues. 
information asymmetry. 
Competitive bidding has a 
slight cost advantage over 
negotiated sale. 
Johnson and Kriz 
(2005) 
Investigate the impact 
of fiscal institutions on 
local government 
borrowing costs. 
Ordered probit model 
to estimate the effect 
on ratings. OLS to 
estimate the effect 
on borrowing costs. 
Path analysis to 
identify direct and 
indirect effects.  
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1990 
and 1997. 
Positive direct effect of 
revenue limits on yields. 
Expenditure and 
borrowing limits have a 
positive effect on ratings. 
Negative indirect effect on 
bond’s yields. 
Bernoth et al. 
(2006, 2012) 
Study bond risk premia 
among EU government 
bonds as a function of 
default risk, liquidity risk 
and market risk. 
Portfolio model of 
bond yield 
differentials based on 
financial theory.  
OLS regressions and 
instrumental 
variables. 
EU and US 
central 
government 
bonds issued 
between 1993 
and 2005. 
Yield spreads are affected 
by default and liquidity 
risk. The default risk 
premium is positively 
affected by the debt and 
debt service ratios. The 
liquidity risk premium is 
lower in countries with 
larger market shares. 
Benson and 
Marks (2007) 
Study the factors 
affecting the borrowing 
costs of US state 
governments, with 
specific attention to the 
impact of state fiscal 
imbalances. 
OLS cross-sections. 
US state bonds 
issued in 1999 
and 2000. 
Interest costs reflect 
estimates of state 
structural deficits. States 
which exhibit greater 
structural deficits pay 
higher interest costs than 
states facing lower or no 
structural deficits. 
Booth et al. 
(2007) 
Estimate the impact of 
Canadian provinces’ 
fiscal and financial 
condition on their yield 
spreads over Canadian 
central government 
bonds. 
Bernoth et al. (2006, 
2012) theoretical 
portfolio model. 
Panel-data 
regressions. 
Canadian 
provincial 
government 
bonds issued 
between 1981 
and 2000. 
Provincial fiscal positions 
(debt and deficit) 
significantly affect yield 
spreads between 
provincial and federal 
government  bonds. 
Provincial bonds respond 
to changes in economic 
conditions in a similar way 
to corporate bonds. 
Allen et al. 
(2009) 
Investigate whether the 
choice of forgoing a 
bond rating causes an 
interest cost penalty 
higher than the cost of 
the rating. 
Probit and switching 
regression models.  
US municipal 
bonds issued 
between 1999 
and 2000. 
Proprietary data-
base containing 
unpublished 
ratings. 
No significant difference 
between yields of rated 
and unrated bonds. 
Issuers that forgo to 
obtain a rating behave 
rationally. 
Gaillard (2009) 
Investigate Moody’s 
ratings’ determinants 
for non-US local 
governments. 
Ordered probit 
model. 
Non-US 
municipal ratings 
released by 
Moody’s in 2005. 
Sub-sovereign ratings are 
constrained by sovereign 
rating. Three variables 
(sovereign default history, 
local per-capita GDP and 
local debt-to-revenues 
ratio) able to explain 80% 
of sub-sovereign ratings. 
Schuknecht et al. 
(2009) 
Study risk premia paid 
by sub-national 
governments in 
Germany, Spain, and 
Bernoth et al. (2006, 
2012) theoretical 
portfolio model. 
Cross-section 
German, Spanish 
and Canadian 
sub-national 
government 
Sub-sovereign 
governments paid positive 
differentials compared to 
their respective central 
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Author Scope Methodology Data Results 
Canada. Analyze how 
the risk premia were 
affected by the 
introduction of the 
Euro. 
regressions. bonds issued 
between 1991 
and 2005. 
governments. Spreads 
between sub-sovereign 
and sovereign bonds 
narrowed in Germany and 
Spain after the 
introduction of the Euro. 
Fiscal equalization 
schemes affect the credit 
risk of sub-national 
governments. 
Schulz and Wolff 
(2009) 
Quantitative analysis 
on the determinants of 
the yield differential 
between bonds issued 
by German Landers 
(federal states) and the 
bund (the German 
Government bond). 
Panel-data 
regressions. 
German federal 
states’ bonds 
issued between 
1992 and 2007. 
Yield spreads between 
central and state 
government bonds are 
mainly driven by 
international risk aversion. 
Robbins and 
Simonsen (2012) 
Investigate the effect of 
debt levels on the 
borrowing costs of US 
states. 
Two-stage least 
squares and OLS. 
US state bonds 
issued between 
2001 and 2006. 
The market does not 
extract an interest cost 
penalty for increasing debt 
loads. Municipal debt has 
increased unabated 
throughout the sample 
period, while states have 
maintained nearly 
uniformly high bond 
ratings. 
Venneri (2013) 
Investigate the 
determinants of ratings 
assigned by Moody’s, 
S&P and Fitch to Italian 
local governments. 
Ordered probit 
model. 
Ratings released 
by Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch to 
Italian local 
governments 
between 2004 
and 2008. 
Some  variables appeared 
with the unexpected sign 
and debt indicators are 
never statistically 
significant. 
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Chapter IV 
Determinants of Municipal Bond Yields 
This chapter develops extensively the empirical analysis on Municipal Bond 
Yields. The analysis is elaborated through five sections. Section IV.1 focuses on 
the relationship between risk and municipal bond yields. Section IV.2 illustrates 
the theoretical model and its empirical specification. Section IV.3 describes the 
dataset. Section IV.4 analyzes the basic regression analysis on the 
determinants of yields. Section IV.5 investigates the role of credit rating in 
affecting yields. 
IV.1 The relationship between risk and municipal bond yields 
As highlighted in Chapter III, the academic literature on municipal bond pricing 
has mostly focused on the relationship between the borrower’s risk and the 
lender’s required yield. 
When the borrower is a local government, i.e. an authority which raises 
revenues by collecting taxes on a territory, receiving transfers from the central 
State and selling services to the public, several factors must be considered in 
order to assess its capability to duly service its debt. The vast empirical 
literature on the subject has adopted a wide set of variables and indicators, 
which can be summarized in 3 classes: characteristics of the issuer, market and 
macroeconomic factors and characteristics of the security. 
IV.1.1 Characteristics of the issuer 
According to the existing research, the first class, characteristics of the issuer, 
can be divided into 3 categories: accounting and financial variables, fiscal 
variables and socio-economic variables.  
The first category, accounting and financial variables, includes: 
• debt load (Liu and Thakor, 1984; Capeci, 1991; Capeci, 1994; Booth et al., 
2007; Schuknecht et al., 2009; Venneri, 2013), probably the most important 
variable affecting the default risk of an issuer, this indicator for the existing 
debt has mainly been used as a ratio over a measure of income (overall 
debt / GDP), revenues (overall debt / total revenues, overall debt / current 
revenues) or in per capita terms; 
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• debt service (Capeci, 1994; Venneri, 2013), while the debt load measures 
the existing stock of debt, this indicator (often expressed as a ratio over 
revenues) accounts for annual expenses in interest and capital repayment 
and therefore is affected by the debt structure and interest rates of existing 
loans;  
• current and capital balances (Capeci, 1994; Booth et al., 2007; Schuknecht 
et al., 2008; Venneri, 2013), this type of variable is extremely important to 
assess the financial condition of an administration, especially the current 
balance (difference between current revenues and current expenditures) 
indicates if the local government is generating or absorbing cash from its 
operating activity, cash which can be used for debt repayments and 
therefore the higher the current surplus the higher the probability that the 
issuer will be able to cope with debt service in the near future. 
The second category, fiscal variables, accounts for:  
• tax revenues (Liu and Thakor, 1984; Capeci, 1991; Venneri, 2013), mainly 
expressed in per-capita terms, is clearly the most important source of 
revenues for a local government;  
• degree of fiscal autonomy (Capeci, 1991; Capeci, 1994; Schuknecht et al., 
2009; Venneri, 2013), a ratio meant to describe the level of own revenues 
compared to the transfers from the central government.  
The third category, socio-economic variables, consists of:  
• local income (Liu and Thakor, 1984; Capeci, 1991; Venneri, 2013), usually 
specified as local GDP per capita, indicators of local income are important 
to evaluate the economic base over which local taxes are levied, because 
the richer a territory the higher the taxes than can be collected on it;  
• population (Liu and Thakor, 1984; Capeci, 1991; Capeci, 1994), the size of 
a local administration, measured by the number of people on which it 
exercises its powers, has always proved to be significant when inserted in 
an empirical model, with smaller administrations usually paying higher 
interest rates compared to their larger peers, this can be explained by the 
fact that larger administrations have better management abilities, greater 
autonomy and are more familiar with financial markets;  
• unemployment (Liu and Thakor, 1984; Booth et al., 2007; Venneri, 2013), 
this indicator, expressed as a percentage rate, helps assessing the 
economic strength of a territory, with weakness in the labour force 
employed always associated with higher interest rates. 
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IV.1.2 Market and macroeconomic factors 
Given a certain creditworthiness of an issuer, other factors, external to the 
issuer but common to the market or the economy as a whole, are likely to affect 
the yield of a local bond issue. 
For example, early studies such as Benson et al. (1981), focused on the 
relationship between municipal bond yields and the business cycle. Using as 
explanatory variables, together with several issuer specific variables listed in 
section IV.1.1, two indicators such as national GDP growth rate and a consumer 
sentiment index, they observed that spreads over the risk-free rate (in every 
rating category) widened during economic downturns and narrowed during 
economic expansions. 
Moreover, Shultz and Wolff (2008), analysing the determinants of yield 
differentials between German state bonds issued by Länder and bund issued by 
the federal government, found that the yield spreads between state and federal 
bonds were mainly explained by international risk aversion, proxied by the yield 
spread between US corporate bonds rated BBB and treasury bonds issued by 
US government. 
IV.1.3 Characteristics of the security 
The empirical literature on the subject has traditionally included in the model 
specification a set of provisions stated in the bond issue agreement. Since early 
studies, variables such as amount of the issue (Hastie, 1972), maturity (Tanner, 
1975) and coupon structure (Broaddus and Cook, 1981) have consistently been 
included in empirical estimations. These features affect yields independently of 
the creditworthiness of the issuer.  
For example maturity and coupon structure influence the duration  of the bond, 
duration increases with the maturity of the bond and decreases with the 
frequency of coupons payments and with the size of coupon rate.21 Since 
duration is the main indicator of interest rate risk and in a normal upward 
sloping term structure of interest rates we expect a positive relationship 
between duration and rates, maturity is expected to raise yields while coupon 
frequency and size are expected to lower yields.  
                                                             
21
 Duration or Macaulay duration is a measure of a bond price sensitivity to changes in interest 
rates. Duration is defined as the weighted average term to maturity of a security's cash flows, 
where the weights are the present value of each cash flow as a percentage to the security's 
price. This indicator was first proposed by Macaulay (1938). 
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The amount of the bond issue can be seen as a proxy for liquidity or 
marketability, given the fact that the larger the issue the higher the number of 
intermediaries and investors involved and the less the impact of transaction 
costs. Hence, we expect lower yields for larger issues. 
IV.2 A model for the analysis of municipal bond yields 
The risk-return relationship can be based on financial theory, specifying basic 
settings such as investors’ preferences and market functioning. Once a 
theoretical model is obtained, the specific observable variables able to act as 
proxy for the underlying factors must be chosen from a wide set of possible 
candidates. 
IV.2.1 Theoretical framework 
The equation to be estimated can be easily derived from a simple portfolio 
model of bond yield differentials, as in Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012), Booth et al. 
(2007) and Schuknecht et al. (2009). Bernoth et al. (2006, 2012) considers a 
risk-averse investor, optimising in a mean-variance space, in a market with two 
assets: a risk-free bond and a bond subject to default risk, both denominated in 
the same currency. After portfolio optimization and market clearing the model 
delivers the following pricing equation:22 
(IV.1)                                                         
 
   , 
where  
     is the yield of the risky bond, 
     is the yield of the risk-free bond, 
      is the default probability of the risky bond (a function of   , which 
represents a set of variables affecting this probability), 
         is the fraction of the par value of the risky bond received by the 
investor in the event of default, 
   is the transaction cost for trading the risky bond (with transaction costs of the 
risk-free bond normalized to zero), 
   is the total supply of the risky bond, 
                                                             
22
 The notation used here follows the equation specification in Booth et al. (2007). 
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  is a measure of investors’ risk tolerance (the inverse of the relative risk 
aversion).23 
This model defines the yield spread (between the risky and the risk-free bond) 
as a function of three factors: default risk, liquidity risk and market risk. 
The first term on the right hand side,                 , reflects the default risk 
premium. It depends positively on the default probability of the risky issuer, 
     , and negatively on the fraction of repayment the investor receives in case 
of default,   . Since    ranges between 0 and 1 the default risk premium is 
always positive. 
The second term,   , is the liquidity premium, identified by the transaction cost 
(relative to the transaction cost of the risk-free bond, which has been 
normalised to zero). Clearly, the more liquid the risky bond, the smaller the 
premium. Given the fact that the risk-free asset is represented by highly liquid 
government bonds, this premium is non-negative. 
The third term,                            
 
   , represents the market risk 
premium which is affected by the total debt issued by the risky issuer,   , by the 
variance of the return on the risky security,                          
 
, and 
by investors’ risk tolerance,  , represented in the formula by its inverse,    , 
the investors’ risk aversion.24 The more investors care about the variance of 
their future wealth (the larger the risk aversion term), the larger will be the 
interest rate differential between the risky and the risk-free asset. Furthermore, 
the market risk premium clearly increases with the total supply of risky debt and 
with the variance of the risky security, as both the total debt and  the variance 
amplify the effect of risk aversion. Since all three terms   ,         
                 
 
 and   are positive by assumption, the market risk premium 
in the pricing equation is strictly positive. 
This general model can be adapted to the case of local government bonds as 
done by Booth et al. (2007) with Canadian provincial bonds and by Schuknecht 
et al. (2009) with German Lander’s bonds and Spanish provincial bonds. 
IV.2.2 Empirical specification 
                                                             
23
 The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (RRA) is 
       
     
. Pratt (1964).  
24
 The derivation of the variance of the risky bond can be found in Bernoth et al. (2012), page 
986. 
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Once the theoretical model has been outlined and the risk factors have been 
identified, the observable variables can be selected, among the categories 
detailed in section IV.1, in order to proxy for the underlying risk factors.   
The empirical model to be estimated, with the yield differential between a risky 
municipal bond and a risk-free bond as the dependent variable, can  be outlined 
as:25 
(IV.2)                  
          
          
           , 
Where      is the yield of the risky municipal bond,      is the yield of the risk-free 
bond,   is a scalar intercept,     
 
,     
 
 and     
 
 are row vectors of coefficients, 
    ,      and      are column vectors of, respectively, characteristics of the issuer, 
market/macroeconomic variables and characteristics of the security. The 
description of the variables is detailed in the following table.  
Table IV.1 - Description of variables 
Variable Symbol Description Formula Measure 
Exp. 
sign 
Accounting and financial variables 
Current 
Balance 
A_01_curr_bal 
Current revenues (CR) minus current 
expenditures (CE), over current 
revenues (CR). 
(CR – CE) / 
CR 
Ratio - 
Total Balance A_02_tot_bal 
Sum of current revenues (CR) and 
capital revenues (CaR) minus the 
sum of current expenditures (CE) 
and capital expenditures (CaE), over 
the sum of current revenues (CR) 
and capital revenues (CaR). 
((CR + CaR) – 
(CE + CaE)) / 
(CR + CaR) 
Ratio - 
Debt to 
Revenues 
A_03_debt_rev 
Total outstanding debt (D) over the 
sum of current revenues (CR) and 
capital revenues (CaR). 
D / (CR + 
CaR) 
Ratio + 
Per capita Debt A_04_pc_debt 
Total outstanding debt at constant 
prices* (Dcp) over population (P), 
log-transformed. 
Ln(Dcp / P) Ratio (log) + 
Debt Service A_05_debt_serv 
Sum of debt reimbursement (DR) 
and interest payments (I) over 
current revenues (CR). 
(DR + I) / CR Ratio + 
Interest 
Coverage  
A_06_int_cov 
Current revenues (CR) minus gross 
current expenditures (CE – I), over 
interest payments (I). 
(CR – CE + I) / 
I 
Ratio - 
Current 
Expenditures 
A_07_curr_exp 
Current expenditures (CE) over the 
sum of current expenditures (CE) 
and capital expenditures (CaE). 
CE / (CE + 
CaE) 
Ratio + 
Personnel 
Expenses 
A_08_pers_exp 
Personnel expenses (PE) over 
current expenditures (CE). 
PE / CE Ratio + 
Current Rigidity A_09_curr_rig 
Sum of personnel expenses (PE) 
and debt reimbursement (DR) over 
current revenues (CR). 
(PE + DR) / 
CR 
Ratio + 
Fiscal variables 
                                                             
25
 As detailed in section IV.3, the risk-free rate has been proxied by the 10-year German 
government treasury bond yield. 
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Table IV.1 - Description of variables 
Variable Symbol Description Formula Measure 
Exp. 
sign 
Per capita 
revenues 
F_01_pc_rev 
Sum of current revenues (CRcp) and 
capital revenues (CaRcp) at constant 
prices, over population (P), log-
transformed.* 
Ln((CRcp + 
CaRcp) / P) 
Ratio (log) - 
Net revenues F_02_net_rev 
Current revenues (CR) minus debt 
reimbursement (DR) and interest 
payments (I), over current revenues 
(CR). 
(CR – DR – I) / 
CR 
Ratio - 
Financial 
Autonomy 
F_03_fin_aut 
Sum of tax revenues (TR) and other 
revenues (OR) over current 
revenues (CR). 
(TR + OR) / 
CR 
Ratio - 
Tax Autonomy F_04_tax_aut 
Tax revenues (TR) over current 
revenues (CR). 
TR / CR Ratio - 
Socio-economic variables 
Unemployment E_01_unem Unemployment percent rate (U)**. U % + 
Population E_02_pop 
Number of residents (P), log-
transformed. 
Ln(P) Log - 
Per capita 
Income 
E_03_pc_inc 
Local per capita added value 
(LAVpc) over national per capita 
added value (NAVpc)**. 
LAVpc / 
NAVpc 
Ratio - 
Market and macroeconomic variables 
BTP-BUND 
Spread 
M_01_btp_bund 
Difference between 10-year Italian 
Government bond yield (BTP) and 
10-year German Government bond 
yield (BUND). 
BTP - BUND % + 
Rating Italy M_02_rat_ita 
Credit rating assigned to the central 
Italian Government (RATIta) by 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch***. 
RATIta *** - 
Risk Aversion M_03_baa_gov 
Difference between long term 
Moody’s Baa US corporate bond 
yields (Baa) and 10-year US 
Government bond yield (Gov). 
Baa – Gov % + 
Economic 
Sentiment 
M_04_econ_sen 
Italy’s monthly economic sentiment 
indicator (ES) published by Eurostat. 
ES 
Scaled to 
100 
- 
GDP Change M_05_gdp_cng 
Italy’s GDP growth rate compared to 
the same quarter of previous year, 
published by OECD. 
GDP % - 
Bond issue’s characteristics 
Maturity I_01_mat Bond maturity at issue in years. Mat Years + 
Average Life I_02_avg_life 
Weighted average of the times (t) of 
the principal (P) repayments of the 
bond at issue. 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 Years + 
Size I_03_size 
Amount of the issue in Euros (Size), 
log-transformed. 
Ln(Size) Log - 
Dummy variables 
Fixed Rate D_01_fixed 
Takes value 1 if the bond coupon is 
fixed, 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 + 
Rated Issuer D_02_rated 
Takes value 1 if the issuer is rated by 
at least one rating agency, 0 
otherwise. 
- 1,0 - 
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Table IV.1 - Description of variables 
Variable Symbol Description Formula Measure 
Exp. 
sign 
Southern Italy D_03_south 
Takes value 1 if, according to the 
European Union NUTS classification 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics),  the issuer belongs to the 
ITF group (Abruzzo, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia) 
or to the ITG group (Sardegna and 
Sicilia), 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 + 
Sovereign 
Crisis 
D_04_crisis 
Takes value 1 if the bond has been 
issued from 4 March 2008 onwards 
(day in which the BTP-BUND spread 
crossed the 50 basis point threshold 
for the first time since the 
introduction of the Euro), 0 
otherwise. 
- 1,0 + 
  * 
  ** 
 
  ***   
Base year: 1999. 
For the cities in the sample, since data at city level are unavailable, these indicators refer to the figures of the 
corresponding provinces. 
The calculation methodology for rating scores is explained in section IV.3. 
 
IV.3 Data 
The empirical analysis includes 399 bond issues, issued by 122 Italian local 
governments between 2000 and 2011.26 Of which 198 bonds issued by 56 
cities, 156 bonds issued by 50 provinces and 45 bonds issued by 16 regions. 
The list of local governments in the sample and the details on the bonds issued 
are given in Appendix IV.1 at the end of this chapter. 
IV.3.1 Data description  
The sub-sample relating the cities has been formed by cities (Comuni) 
possessing the status of Provincial Capital (Capoluogo di Provincia), therefore 
excluding the smallest and less significant local authorities, widely diversified 
across eighteen out of the twenty Italian regions as detailed in Appendix IV.1.27  
The yield spread has been divided into two categories: fixed coupon bonds (192 
out of 399 bonds) and floating rate bonds (207 out of 399 bonds). For the first 
one the yield spread has been calculated as the difference between the bond’s 
yield at issue and the yield of the 10-year German Government’s bond 
                                                             
26
 The observation period has been chosen to avoid exchange rate issues and therefore allows 
the use of German government Bund as the reference risk-free rate in the analysis. Given the 
fact that starting January 1999 Italy has adopted the Euro currency, all financial and statistical 
documents have been reported in Euro from that year. The bond sample starts in year 2000 
because the analysis requires previous year accounting and statistical figures for each issue. 
27
 The two missing regions are Trentino-Alto Adige and Val d’Aosta. 
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(generally referred to as the “Bund”) on the pricing date of the bond.28 For the 
second category the yield spread is the margin, expressed as annual 
percentage rate, over the base rate stated in each bond’s prospectus.29 
183 out of 399 bonds in the sample are rated by one (or more) of the three 
major international rating agencies, Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & 
Poor's Financial Services and Fitch Ratings, with the details on ratings assigned 
by the three agencies given in Table IV.2. In order to perform tests about the 
influence of ratings on bond yields, since credit ratings are expressed by letters, 
a conversion into numerical values was necessary.  The rating score has been 
calculated following Liu and Thakor (1984). First, out of sample (US market) 
yield differentials between rating classes have been calculated, then a value 
proportional to the yield differentials has been assigned to each rating category, 
with the highest score assigned to the Aaa/AAA class and a value equal to zero 
assigned to the Baa2/BBB category (no bond in the sample has a rating below 
Baa2/BBB).30 
Table IV.2 - Number of bonds in each rating category 
Rating category 
Rating agency 
Total 
Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Aaa/AAA - - - - 
Aa1/AA+ - - - - 
Aa2/AA 34 13 6 53 
Aa3/AA- 41 17 52 110 
A1/A+ 11 27 15 53 
A2/A 7 12 4 23 
A3/A- 1 2 1 4 
Baa1/BBB+ - 1 - 1 
Baa2/BBB - - - - 
Total 94 72 78 244* 
* The number of rated bonds in the sample is 183, 57 of which have two ratings and 2 have three ratings, hence the 
total number of 244. 
                                                             
28
 Fixed rate bond’s yield has been calculated as the internal rate of return (IRR) of the bond’s 
cash flows at the issue date, expressed as an annual percentage rate. The IRR is defined as 
the discount rate that makes the net present value of all cash flows from an investment equal to 
zero. 
29
 For all floating rate bonds in the sample the base rate is the Euribor rate. Euribor stands for 
Euro Inter Bank Offered Rate and represents the reference rate for floating rate loans and 
bonds in the European Monetary Union. For bonds issued under or above par, the reported 
margin would not be a good measure of a bond yield differential. In these cases an interest rate 
correction has been applied in order to account for the extra (positive or negative) yield deriving 
from the premium or discount in the price of the bond. In this study only 3 out of the 207 floating 
rate bonds in the sample were not issued at par. 
30
 The bond yields for every rating class have been taken from “BofA Merrill Lynch US 
Corporate Bond Effective Yield” indexes, as the average of the period 01/01/2000 – 31/12/2011. 
The rating scores for each rating category are: Aaa/AAA = 1.50, Aa1/AA+ = 1.46, Aa2/AA = 
1.37, Aa3/AA- = 1.23, A1/A+ = 1.03, A2/A = 0.80, A3/A- = 0.55, Baa1/BBB+ = 0.28, Baa/BBB = 
0. The rating scores have been calculated as average yield differentials between a given rating 
category and the lowest Baa/BBB category, with yields’ averages computed on daily data over 
the period 01/01/2000-31/12/2011. E.g. the 1.37 score assigned to the Aa2/AA category is 
equal to the absolute difference between the Aa2/AA average yield (4.84) and the Baa/BBB 
average yield (6.21). 
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Table IV.2 shows that credit ratings are almost equally spread among the three 
rating agencies, with a slightly higher number of ratings released by Moody’s. 
Interestingly, all bonds in the sample were rated as investment grade and the 
large majority of rating assessments falls into high categories (with two thirds of 
ratings ranging between Aa2/AA and Aa3/AA-). 
IV.3.2 Data analysis  
Table IV.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables used in the empirical analysis. For each variable in the sample are 
reported the average of the pooled sample together with those of the six sub-
samples relating to: cities (198 observations), provinces (156 observations), 
regions (45 observations), rated issues (183 observations), bond issued by 
issuers located in southern regions (69 observations), bond issued during the 
financial crisis (51 observations).31 
Table IV.3 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Symbol 
Total 
Avg 
Cities 
Avg 
Provinces 
Avg 
Regions 
Avg 
Rated 
Avg 
South 
Avg 
Crisis 
Avg 
Dependent variables 
Fixed Rate 
Spread 
01_fix_spread 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.44 0.60 0.82 
Floating Rate 
Spread 
02_float_spread 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.26 0.34 
Rating Score 03_rating 1.15 1.16 1.09 1.17 - 0.94 1.20 
Accounting and financial variables 
Current 
Balance 
A_01_curr_bal 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Total Balance A_02_tot_bal -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19 -0.03 
Debt to 
Revenues 
A_03_debt_rev 0.83 0.89 0.94 0.20 0.72 0.86 0.87 
Per capita 
Debt * 
A_04_pc_debt 719 1,190 167 562 923 441 854 
Debt Service A_05_debt_serv 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.19 0.17 
Interest 
Coverage  
A_06_int_cov 3.85 2.03 3.91 11.66 5.40 3.34 2.40 
Current 
Expenditures 
A_07_curr_exp 0.65 0.67 0.59 0.78 0.69 0.64 0.64 
Personnel 
Expenses 
A_08_pers_exp 0.27 0.33 0.27 - 0.23 0.26 0.32 
Current 
Rigidity 
A_09_curr_rig 0.40 0.46 0.33 - 0.41 0.47 0.40 
Fiscal variables 
                                                             
31
 According to the European Union NUTS classification (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics), in this study the southern region category includes the ITF group (Abruzzo, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia) and the ITG group (Sardegna and Sicilia). 
Moreover, in this chapter for financial crisis is intended the sample period from 4 March 2008 
(day in which the BTP-BUND spread crossed the 50 basis point threshold for the first time since 
the introduction of the Euro) to 31/12/2011. 
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Table IV.3 - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Symbol 
Total 
Avg 
Cities 
Avg 
Provinces 
Avg 
Regions 
Avg 
Rated 
Avg 
South 
Avg 
Crisis 
Avg 
Per capita 
revenues * 
F_01_pc_rev 1,020 1,350 191 2,440 1,444 807 1,043 
Net revenues F_02_net_rev 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.97 0.85 0.81 0.83 
Financial 
Autonomy 
F_03_fin_aut 0.69 0.75 0.60 0.76 0.73 0.57 0.70 
Tax Autonomy F_04_tax_aut 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.73 0.55 0.48 0.45 
Socio-economic variables 
Unemployment E_01_unem 6.18 5.72 6.42 7.30 6.04 13.71 4.04 
Population * E_02_pop 669K 204K 692K 2,635K 1,030K 770K 313K 
Per capita 
Income 
E_03_pc_inc 1.06 1.08 1.05 1.01 1.07 0.71 1.17 
Market and macroeconomic variables 
BTP-BUND 
Spread 
M_01_btp_bund 0.33 0.38 0.30 0.23 - - 1.02 
Rating Italy M_02_rat_ita 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.31 - - 1.21 
Risk Aversion M_03_baa_gov 2.45 2.48 2.45 2.33 - - 3.94 
Economic 
Sentiment 
M_04_econ_sen 101.29 100.54 101.62 103.43 - - 90.47 
GDP Change M_05_gdp_cha 0.98 0.83 1.04 1.46 - - -1.98 
Bond issue’s characteristics 
Maturity I_01_mat 20.27 18.68 21.97 21.4 - - - 
Average Life I_02_avg_life 12.12 10.71 12.84 15.80 - - - 
Size * I_03_size 54.8M 33.6M 18.9M 272.5M - - - 
* These indicators have been computed in log form for the regression analysis but displayed in standard measures in 
this table for an easier interpretation of the data. 
 
Looking first at the dependent variables, we can notice that there are no 
significant differences in the averages between cities, provinces and regions. 
Also, the yield spreads are slightly lower on average for rated bonds, slightly 
higher for bonds issued by southern issuers and much higher for those bonds 
issued during the financial crisis. We can also notice that rating scores are 
lower for southern issuers and higher for issues floated during the crisis. 
Moving to the several sets of independent variables (accounting, financial, fiscal 
and socio-economic), we can notice that, with exception of socio-economic 
indicators, there are significant differences between the averages of cities, 
provinces and regions, with the main variance occurring for regional 
governments. Moreover, we can see that average values for rated issues do not 
differ systematically from those relative to the full sample.32 On the other hand, 
for southern issuers many  indicators (for an evident example: unemployment 
and per-capita income) show a worse economic condition for this sub-sample. 
Lastly, looking at the average values for the cities and provinces which have 
issued bonds during the financial crisis (no region has issued during the 
                                                             
32
 More precise statistical tests will be carried in the next section. 
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financial crisis), we can notice that they are characterized by higher socio-
economic figures and by similar accounting and fiscal indicators. 
To sum up, first of all, we can conclude that the three tiers of local government 
are characterized by different levels particularly in issuer-specific indicators 
such as fiscal and financial variables. Besides, it seems that rated issuers pay 
lower interest rates while their economic, accounting and fiscal characteristics 
are not (on average) different from those related to the full sample. Moreover, 
southern cities show lower ratings and this seems justified by their weaker 
economic condition. Also, bonds issued during the crisis show much higher 
spreads, compared to the full sample, even if rating and overall indicators are 
better or at least not worse. The latter result leads to two considerations: first, 
we are facing a market selection issue where only high standing cities in strong 
economic and financial condition went to the bond market during the crisis; 
second, higher spreads paid by local governments during the crisis are driven 
by national and international market factors (all five market and macroeconomic 
variables in Table IV.3 show worse average levels for this sub-sample) and are 
not affected by the creditworthiness of the issuer. 
These impressions derived by the observation of the descriptive statistics will be 
formally tested in the following sections. 
IV.3.3 Data sources  
All the data used in this study have been collected from official sources, such as 
the national institute of statistics, the Italian Government, the Italian stock 
exchange, Eurostat and OECD, as detailed below.33 These databases allowed 
a wide set of indicators (listed in Table IV.1 above) to be used to measure the 
three risk factors highlighted in section IV.1: default risk, liquidity risk and 
market risk.34 
Bond prospectuses have been provided by Monte Titoli SpA (the Italian custody 
and settlement bank belonging to the Italian Stock Exchange) which allowed 
special access to its proprietary database for the purposes of this research. 
Accounting data of each Comune and Provincia in the sample have been 
obtained from the local finance database of the Italian Government. While data 
for the Regioni have been obtained from each regional government website or 
                                                             
33
 Each source website is reported in the References section. 
34
 Due to lack of data it hasn’t been possible to build a property value indicator, often used as a 
tax base indicator for property tax. This is a minor drawback since the Italian property tax in 
force during the sample period, I.C.I. (Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili), was not directly linked 
to the property value but depended on the size, use (business, residential etc.) and the area 
where the estate is located. 
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provided directly by regional administration offices, because accounting data for 
regions are not included in the local finance database. 
Socioeconomic data at territorial level such as local income, population, 
unemployment etc. have been obtained from Istat’s “Sitis” data-warehouse.35 
Economic data at national level such as GDP, price indices, economic 
sentiment etc. have been obtained from Istat, Eurostat and OECD. 
Financial data for German and Italian Government bond yields have been 
obtained by Bloomberg Professional Service, data for Euribor rates from the 
European Money Markets Institute, data for US Government and Corporate 
bond yields from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
Credit ratings assigned to each rated issuer have been provided by Moody’s 
Investors Service, Standard & Poor's Financial Services and Fitch Ratings. 
IV.4 Basic model estimation 
This section deals with the estimation issues involving the basic empirical 
model, aimed at understanding the role of the different factors expected to 
affect municipal bond yields. The statistical procedure for selecting the actual 
variables to be inserted in the final version of the empirical model is illustrated in 
sub-section IV.4.1, and the results of the regression analysis are presented in 
sub-section IV.4.2. 
A further deeper analysis on the role of credit ratings in influencing sub-
sovereign yields is carried out in Section IV.5. 
IV.4.1 Choice of variables  
As first pointed out by Liu and Thakor (1984), a major issue in analysing the role 
of economic, financial and fiscal variables in the same model is multicollinearity. 
Given the wide range of indicators that can be used to assess the default risk of 
an issuer, it is very likely that many suitable variables show cross-correlation or 
linear dependence and therefore affect the estimation of regression’s 
parameters, which may lead to a wrong assessment of statistical significance 
and erratic changes in the coefficients’ estimates. The sets of indicators 
described in Table IV.1 include many interchangeable variables. Clearly, as an 
example, the issuers located in a wealthy area (high per-capita income, E_03) 
                                                             
35
 Istat is the Italian national institute for Statistics. “Sitis” (Sistema di Indicatori Territoriali) is a 
system of economic, demographic, social and environmental indicators referring to geographical 
areas, regions, provinces and cities. 
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should face low unemployment (E_01) and are likely to benefit from high per-
capita revenues (F_01), therefore showing a higher financial autonomy (F_03) 
compared to issuers in worse economic condition. Similarly, a local government 
with a high debt compared to its revenues (A_03) is likely to show high debt 
figures also in per-capita terms (A_04). Also, badly managed local governments 
have all expenditure-quality indicators such as current expenditures (A_07), 
personnel expenses (A_08) and current expenditure rigidity (A_09) pointing out 
the same condition. Moreover, also market indicators are evidently interrelated, 
since as international risk-aversion (M_03) increases so does the sovereign risk 
indicator (M_01), which is, by the way, also affected by Italy’s GDP growth rate 
(M_05). Hence, the first step of this empirical analysis is to select the best 
variables in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of the empirical model. 
The variables most likely to affect estimates have been identified by measuring 
the variance inflation factor (VIF), the condition index related to the variance-
covariance matrix of regressors, together with the pair wise correlations of both 
variables and regression coefficients. The details of the selection procedure for 
the elimination of the inefficient variables are given in Appendix IV.2. After the 
variable selection procedure, the following variables have left: two accounting 
variables (A_01, A_03), one socio-economic variable (E_03), one market 
variable (M_01), one issue-related variable (I_02) and two dummy variables 
(D_01, D_02). As detailed in Appendix IV.2, the model show a condition index 
of 21, extremely low VIFs and no cross-correlation above 25%. The cross-
correlations (for both the variables and the coefficients) are displayed in Table 
IV.4. 
Table IV.4 - Correlation matrix (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Variable A_01 A_03 E_03 M_01 I_02 D_01 D_02 
A_01_curr_bal 1       
A_03_debt_rev 
0.14 
(-0.15) 
1      
E_03_pc_inc 
0.15 
(-0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
1     
M_01_btp_bund 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(-0.04) 
0.16 
(-0.19) 
1    
I_02_avg_life 
0.02 
(-0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
1   
D_01_fixed 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(-0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(-0.23) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
1  
D_02_rated 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.24 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(-0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(-0.01) 
-0.03 
(-0.01) 
1 
 
The final set of indicators comprises a wide range of regressors able to detect 
the three risk factors (default risk, liquidity risk and market risk) identified in 
section IV.2. It includes: a measure of the current deficit/surplus (A_01), a debt 
burden indicator (A_03), a major economic condition indicator such as the per-
capita income (E_03), the sovereign-risk indicator (M_01) meant to assess how 
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national and international financial factors affect local government yields, a 
technical indicator able to detect the exposure of the bond to interest rate risk 
(I_02), and two dummy variables. The first dummy (D_01) has a technical 
function as it accounts for the difference in scale between fixed and floating rate 
bonds, while the second (D_02) is meant to identify any significant difference, in 
terms of yield, between rated and unrated bonds.  For convenience, Table IV.5 
below reports the same information contained in Table IV.1 (description, 
formulas, measure and expected sign) but only for the variables which are 
going to be used in the regression analysis.  
Table IV.5 - Description of the variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Symbol Description Formula Measure 
Exp. 
sign 
Accounting and financial variables 
Current 
Balance 
A_01_curr_bal 
Current revenues (CR) minus current 
expenditures (CE), over current 
revenues (CR). 
(CR – CE) / 
CR 
Ratio - 
Debt to 
Revenues 
A_03_debt_rev 
Total outstanding debt (D) over the 
sum of current revenues (CR) and 
capital revenues (CaR). 
D / (CR + 
CaR) 
Ratio + 
Socio-economic variables 
Per capita 
Income 
E_03_pc_inc 
Local per capita added value 
(LAVpc) over national per capita 
added value (NAVpc)*. 
LAVpc / 
NAVpc 
Ratio - 
Market and macroeconomic variables 
BTP-BUND 
Spread 
M_01_btp_bund 
Difference between 10-year Italian 
Government bond yield (BTP) and 
10-year German Government bond 
yield (BUND). 
BTP - BUND % + 
Bond issue’s characteristics 
Average Life I_02_avg_life 
Weighted average of the times (t) of 
the principal (P) repayments of the 
bond at issue. 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 Years + 
Dummy variables 
Fixed Rate D_01_fixed 
Takes value 1 if the bond coupon is 
fixed, 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 + 
Rated Issuer D_02_rated 
Takes value 1 if the issuer is rated by 
at least one rating agency, 0 
otherwise. 
- 1,0 - 
   *  For the cities in the sample, since data at city level are unavailable, these indicators refer to the figures of the 
corresponding provinces. 
 
Another important concern in choosing the empirical specification is 
endogeneity. As Capeci (1994) asserted in his study on the effect of local fiscal 
policy on bond yields, treating the explanatory variables as exogenous when 
analysing the simultaneous relationship between fiscal variables and borrowing 
costs might lead to biased estimations, as the direction of the causality is not 
clear (fiscal variables affect interest rates but also interest rates affect budget 
decisions). Capeci links the issue of endogeneity to the existence of information 
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asymmetries, as he noted that the endogeneity bias disappears when current 
variables are substituted with lagged ones, the latter being publicly available 
and known to investors when they price new bond issues. In this study all 
accounting, fiscal and socio-economic variables refer to previous year (with 
reference to the issue date) financial statements and statistics, with only market 
and macroeconomic data taken as simultaneous (as endogeneity is clearly 
excluded).36 
IV.4.2 Regression results  
Throughout this section the dependent variable used in the regression analysis 
is the bonds' yield spread. As detailed in the previous section IV.3, the yield 
spread is calculated differently for the two bond coupon types, fixed rate and 
floating rate. For the fixed rate bonds in the sample the yield spread is 
represented by the yield differential between a municipal bond and the German 
10-year Bund, while for the floating rate bonds is represented by the margin 
over the Euribor base rate (corrected for bonds issued under or above par). 
The first step of the regression analysis is a poolability test. Since the 
descriptive statistics in Table IV.3 show a possible different behavior for the 
variables relating to the different categories of issuers (cities, provinces and 
regions), the poolability of the three categories has been formally tested. The 
first half of table IV.6 reports the results of two tests, called Poolability 1 and 
Poolability 2. The former tests whether there is a structural difference in the 
intercept and slopes of the regression model for the regions. A dummy variable 
taking the value 1 in case the issuer is a region (and 0 otherwise) and four 
interaction terms have been employed and tested both individually and jointly. 
One significant interaction term (E_03, per-capita income) and the joint F-test 
around 5% detect a difference in the behavior of the group of bonds issued by 
regions compared to the remaining group of cities and provinces. Moreover, 
Poolability 2 does the same type of test between cities and provinces. Here, 
unlike regions, no interaction term is significant and the joint F-test is above 
55%, meaning that no structural difference between cities and provinces is 
detected.37 These results, given the institutional nature of the three sub-national 
governments considered, are not quite surprising. Since, while cities and 
                                                             
36
 The 30
th
 of April of each year is taken as a cut-off date to assume all information to be publicly 
available, (i.e. a bond issued on the 1
st
 of May 2010 refers to data at 31
st
 December 2009, while 
a bond issued on the 30
th
 of April 2010 refers to data at 31
st
 December 2008). Such a cut-off 
date has been chosen because Italian law compels local authorities to approve their annual 
financial statements no later than the 30
th
 of April of each year and because socio-economic 
statistics are usually released soon after the first quarter of each year. 
37
 This result has been confirmed by the two individual regressions run on cities and provinces 
separately. 
 50 
 
provinces possess a similar status and are subject to the same legislation, 
Italian regions (which are not considered local authorities) are more 
independent, have some legislative powers and a higher fiscal autonomy. 
Therefore, in the following analysis, regions will be studied separately while 
cities and provinces will be pooled together and jointly identified under the term 
“Local Authorities” (Enti Locali in Italian). 
The different behavior of regions is confirmed by the direct comparison of 
regressions 1 and 2 in Table IV.6, the first is run on the sample consisting of 
regions alone and the second on the sample consisting of cities and provinces 
altogether (local authorities). Two evident differences immediately arise, the role 
of per-capita income (E_03) which is significant only for regions, and the effect 
of BTP-BUND spread (M_01) which, vice versa, is significant only for cities and 
provinces. These results indicates that, while yields paid by local authorities are 
strongly linked to the yields paid by the Italian central government, the yields 
paid by regions are not. This means that the market perception of sovereign risk 
directly affects the pricing of local authorities’ bonds but it’s not affecting the 
bonds issued by regions. Moreover, Regression 2 shows that for local 
authorities none of the variables related to default risk (A_01 current balance, 
A_03 debt-revenue ratio and E_03 per-capita income) is significant (individually 
and jointly). For local authorities, around 60% of the variance in yield spreads is 
explained by market risk (M_01) and interest rate risk (I_02), together with the 
two dummy variables. On the other hand, Regression 1 shows that for regions 
the socio-economic variable  (E_03 per-capita income) it is significant at 5% 
level and it appears with the expected sign, meaning that wealthier regions are 
charged lower interest rates compared to their poorer peers, once the 
characteristics of the bond have been controlled for (by variables I_02 and 
D_01).  
Looking at the remaining regression’s results, it can be observed that all 
significant variables enter with the correct expected sign. Also, the two 
dummies, the fixed coupon dummy (D_01) and the rated dummy (D_02), have 
very significant coefficients. The former is extremely important in this model 
because the dependent variable consists of both fixed and floating rate bonds’ 
spreads, therefore this dummy is essential to correct for the different scale 
existing between the yields of the two bond types. The rated dummy (D_02) is 
extremely significant and has a negative sign, this means that (after having 
controlled for all the variables in the model) rated bonds pay, on average, 9 
basis points less than their unrated counterparts.38 Lastly, since both 
                                                             
38
 Regression 1 does not report a coefficient for the rated dummy D_02 because all bond issued 
by the regions in the sample are rated. An analysis on the role of credit ratings will be carried in 
the next section. 
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heteroschedasticity and serial correlation have been detected, White test and 
LM test have been run for each regression and robust standard errors 
computed accordingly. Test type and standard error’s correction is reported in 
each regression’s table together with standard regression output information. 
Table IV.6 - Poolability tests (robust t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Poolability 1 
Regions 
Poolability 2 
Provinces 
Regression 1 
Regions 
Regression 2 
Local Authorities 
A_01_curr_bal 
-0.11 
(-0.45) 
-0.77 
(-1.52) 
-0.09 
(-0.30) 
-0.12 
(-0.47) 
A_03_debt_rev 
0.02 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.04 
(-0.12) 
0.02 
(0.54) 
E_03_pc_inc 
-0.03 
(-0.54) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
-0.56** 
(-2.65) 
-0.03 
(-0.56) 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.41*** 
(8.26) 
0.41*** 
(8.04) 
0.19 
(0.56) 
0.41*** 
(8.53) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.02*** 
(7.35) 
0.02*** 
(7.52) 
0.01** 
(2.59) 
0.02*** 
(7.41) 
D_01_fixed 
0.31*** 
(11.74) 
0.30*** 
(10.22) 
0.43*** 
(5.48) 
0.29*** 
(10.78) 
D_02_rated 
-0.09*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.07** 
(-2.03) 
- 
-0.09*** 
(-2.97) 
C 
-0.15** 
(-2.07) 
-0.19* 
(-1.87) 
0.46 
(1.59) 
-0.18** 
(-2.35) 
Observations 399 354 45 354 
Adj. R2 - - 63.60% 59.80% 
F-test (prob.) - - 0.00% 0.00% 
Wald F-test (prob.) - - 88.52% 70.84% 
Condition index - - 26.14 21.07 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.47% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 12.88% 0.00% 
S.E. correction Newey-West Newey-West White Newey-West 
Poolability diagnostics 
Reg_dummy 0.42 
(1.60) 
- - - 
A_01_curr_bal x Reg_dummy 
-0.18 
(-0.47) 
- - - 
A_03_debt_rev x Reg_dummy 
0.30 
(0.99) 
- - - 
E_03_pc_inc x Reg_dummy 
-0.45* 
(-1.93) 
- - - 
M_01_btp_bund x Reg_dummy 
0.16 
(0.43) 
- - - 
Prov_dummy 
- 
0.04 
(0.29) 
- - 
A_01_curr_bal x Prov_dummy - 
1.12 
(1.54) 
- - 
A_03_debt_rev x Prov_dummy - 
0.03 
(0.44) 
- - 
E_03_pc_inc x Prov_dummy - 
-0.16 
(-1.60) 
- - 
M_01_btp_bund x Prov_dummy - 
0.06 
(0.48) 
- - 
Joint F-test interactions (prob.) 5.40% 55.74% - - 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
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Now, after having detected the differences between regions and local 
authorities, a second test is necessary. Since all regional bonds in the sample 
have been issued before the financial crisis, the differences detected between 
the two groups could also be due to a possible structural break between the two 
periods before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, a similar test as above 
have been run on the local authorities’ sample and the results displayed in 
Table IV.7. A dummy variable taking the value 1 in case the bond has been 
issued during the financial crisis (and 0 otherwise) and four interaction terms 
have been employed and tested both individually and jointly. As reported under 
the Structural break 1 regression in the table, a weakly significant  interaction 
term has been found (the BTP-BUND spread M_01) but the joint F-test failed to 
reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, two separate regressions have been run 
and compared, one consisting of bonds issued before the financial crisis 
(Structural break 2) and one consisting of bonds issued during the crisis 
(Structural break 3). Comparing the two regressions it can be noticed that M_01 
and D_01 have different coefficients and this is clearly explained by the general 
widening of yields spreads which has characterized the financial crisis. But what 
is most important in this test is that no creditworthiness related variable (A_01, 
A_03 and E_03) is significant in any of the two test regressions, particularly the 
E_03 indicator which was significant in the regions’ sample. Hence, the 
irrelevance of issuer specific characteristics, in favor of market and bond 
characteristics indicators, is not due to the shock brought by the crisis but is 
intrinsic in the standard pricing of Italian local authorities’ bonds. For a more 
convenient comparison, Table IV.7 includes also Regression 2 already reported 
above. 
Table IV.7 – Financial crisis structural-break tests (robust t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Str. break 1 
Full sample 
Str. break 2 
Pre-crisis 
Str. break 3 
Crisis 
Regression 2 
Local Authorities 
A_01_curr_bal 
-0.10 
(-0.62) 
-0.13 
(-0.77) 
0.29 
(0.27) 
-0.12 
(-0.47) 
A_03_debt_rev 
0.03 
(1.04) 
0.03 
(1.11) 
-0.24 
(-1.44) 
0.02 
(0.54) 
E_03_pc_inc 
-0.09* 
(-1.77) 
-0.08 
(-1.63) 
1.09 
(1.69) 
-0.03 
(-0.56) 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.62*** 
(3.77) 
0.57*** 
(3.58) 
0.33*** 
(5.95) 
0.41*** 
(8.53) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.02*** 
(7.13) 
0.02*** 
(7.64) 
0.04** 
(2.40) 
0.02*** 
(7.41) 
D_01_fixed 
0.28*** 
(10.52) 
0.25*** 
(10.13) 
0.51*** 
(3.98) 
0.29*** 
(10.78) 
D_02_rated 
-0.07** 
(-2.36) 
-0.11*** 
(-5.21) 
0.22 
(1.37) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.97) 
C 
-0.17** 
(-2.12) 
-0.13* 
(-1.67) 
-1.60* 
(-1.81) 
-0.18** 
(-2.35) 
Observations 354 303 51 354 
Adj. R2 - 56.61% 32.75% 59.80% 
F-test (prob.) - 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 
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Table IV.7 – Financial crisis structural-break tests (robust t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Str. break 1 
Full sample 
Str. break 2 
Pre-crisis 
Str. break 3 
Crisis 
Regression 2 
Local Authorities 
Wald F-test (prob.) - 8.53% 22.72% 70.84% 
Condition index - 20.98 54.08 21.07 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 9.53% 0.00% 
S.E. correction Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West 
Structural-break diagnostics 
Crisis_dummy 
-0.31 
(-0.66) 
- - - 
A_01_curr_bal x Crisis_dummy 
0.48 
(0.46) 
- - - 
A_03_debt_rev x Crisis_dummy 
-0.13 
(-1.36) 
- - - 
E_03_pc_inc x Crisis_dummy 
0.53 
(1.46) 
- - - 
M_01_btp_bund x Crisis_dummy 
-0.32* 
(-1.82) 
- - - 
Joint F-test interactions (prob.) 16.72% - - - 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
Now, lastly, an analysis on the sensitivity of regression coefficients to changes 
in the sample composition will be performed. The full sample analyzed above, in 
order to use the most information available and to not intervene arbitrarily on the 
data,  included all bonds in the data set without any adjustment. The major 
issue with this sample is that is not balanced, as shown in Appendix IV.1 some 
issuers have floated several bonds while some others only one, some years 
have seen a large number of bond issues while some others only a few or no 
issue at all. So, in order to test if regression’s coefficients are stable, two 
adjustments have been applied to the full sample available.  
First, a single year cross-section has been selected. The year chosen is 2005 
given the highest number of observations available and the relative stability of 
market and macroeconomic indicators. The bonds in this sub-sample include all 
bonds issued by cities and provinces from 1st May 2005 to 31st December 2005, 
so that the same information set applied (financial report year, socio-economic 
statistical releases etc.). This sub-sample consists of 76 bonds, almost equally 
divided between cities and provinces, almost equally divided between fixed and 
floating rate and of which 27 bonds possess a credit rating. The rationale of the 
choice of this sub-sample relies on testing bonds issued under similar market 
and macroeconomic conditions, and on avoiding the problems involving those 
entities with a high number of issues over the full sample period 2000-2011. 
Specifically, the aim of this test is to check if the relevance of issuer-specific 
characteristics (A_01, A_03 and E_03) have been dominated by the effect of 
the sovereign risk indicator (M_01) over the full sample period. As reported in 
 54 
 
Table IV.8 under Regression 3, the BTP-BUND spread is, as expected, non-
significant, but even in this scenario none of the three default risk indicators are 
significant either.  So this means that, even when the dominance of market 
factors is excluded, the characteristics of the issuing local government are not 
taken into account by investors when they price an Italian municipal bond. Also, 
the other significant variables in Regression 3 confirm almost identical 
coefficients and statistical significance as in the full sample, the R-squared is 
quite high (above 70%) and the serial correlation in the errors vanished as 
stated by the LM test. 
The second adjustment applied to the data set consisted in building a more 
balanced sample of bonds, correcting for the possible bias due to the fact that 
some issuers have floated many bonds during the sample period 2000-2011 
while some others have issued only once over the same period, and increasing 
the sample size compared to the single year cross-section. Hence, in the new 
balanced sample a maximum of two bonds per issuer have been allowed, with 
only one bond belonging to same coupon type (one floating rate and one fixed 
rate bond per issuer). The priority has been given to the earliest bonds floated 
by a single issuer, assuming that investors exerted a deeper analysis when a 
local government approached the bond market for the first time. This second 
sub-sample consists of 135 bonds, almost equally divided between cities and 
provinces, almost balanced between fixed and floating rate and of which 41 
bonds possess a credit rating. The results relating this second sub-sample are 
reported under Regression 4 in Table IV.8. As expected, the problems due to 
serial correlation have been significantly reduced as confirmed by the LM test 
(around 14%) and the overall result has not changed compared to the full 
sample (Regression 2).  
Table IV.8 - Local authorities’ sample sensitivity analysis (robust t-stats in 
parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Regression 2 
 Full sample 
Regression 3  
Cross-section (2005) 
Regression 4 
Balanced sample 
A_01_curr_bal 
-0.12 
(-0.47) 
-0.20 
(-1.23) 
-0.26 
(-1.04) 
A_03_debt_rev 
0.02 
(0.54) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.07 
(1.49) 
E_03_pc_inc 
-0.03 
(-0.56) 
-0.04 
(-0.62) 
-0.02 
(-0.27) 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.41*** 
(8.53) 
-1.29 
(-1.08) 
0.49*** 
(5.50) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.02*** 
(7.41) 
0.02*** 
(4.10) 
0.02*** 
(4.67) 
D_01_fixed 
0.29*** 
(10.78) 
0.26*** 
(9.01 
0.31*** 
(9.12) 
D_02_rated 
-0.09*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.10*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.08** 
(-2.46) 
C -0.18** 0.18 -0.18** 
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Table IV.8 - Local authorities’ sample sensitivity analysis (robust t-stats in 
parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Regression 2 
 Full sample 
Regression 3  
Cross-section (2005) 
Regression 4 
Balanced sample 
(-2.35) (0.57) (-2.03) 
Observations 354 76 135 
Adj. R2 59.80% 70.85% 62.33% 
F-test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wald F-test (prob.) 70.84% 44.21% 33.80% 
Condition index 21.07 63.89 17.53 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 0.00% 65.60% 13.68% 
S.E. correction Newey-West White White 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
Summarizing the results obtained in this section, several interesting findings 
can be identified. First, it seems that investors price differently bonds issued by 
regions compared to those issued by cities and provinces. While local 
authorities’ yields are closely linked to central government’s ones, this doesn’t 
happen with yields paid by regions, as these are mainly driven by the economic 
strength of the issuer. Also, the results show that none of the default-risk 
indicators are significant in local authorities’ regressions, implying that the 
market does not discriminate yields according to borrower’s risk, applying a sort 
of average pricing to the whole category of issuers. This surprising result has 
been confirmed as robust by several tests on the sample, and even in the single 
year cross-section (which excluded sovereign risk by construction) there was no 
role for issuer-specific characteristics. Moreover, another interesting finding is 
that possessing a credit rating matters. In every sample version rated issuers 
paid in interests, ceteris paribus, less than their unrated peers, with the benefit 
ranging from eight to ten basis point per year. A deeper analysis on the role of 
credit ratings is the subject of the next section. 
IV.5 Role of credit rating 
The regression output presented in Table IV.8 shows that rated issuers benefit 
from a credit rating compared to their unrated peers. The coefficient for the 
rated dummy (D_02) was extremely significant in the full sample (Regression 2) 
and in the adjusted samples (Regression 3 and Regression 4) and showed a 
value between  -0.08 and -0.10, this means that ceteris paribus, after having 
controlled for all the variables in the model, rated issuers on average had a yield 
spread between 0.08% and 0.10% (in annual percentage rate) lower than their 
unrated counterparts, i.e. they paid in interest 8-10 basis points less on average 
 56 
 
for any given level of the other (financial, economic, market etc.) variables in the 
model.   
To this end, Liu and Thakor (1984) asserted that ratings have an independent 
effect beyond the observable characteristics of the issuer, because ratings’ 
raison d’être is that they carry information that is not publicly available. That is, 
rating can be seen as a screening instrument à la Stiglitz and its acquisition by 
borrowers represents a signalling mechanism through which high standing 
issuers differentiate themselves from low quality ones, avoiding the “average 
quality pricing” phenomenon described by Akerlof.39 Other studies, as Hsueh 
and Liu (1993), confirmed the view of credit rating as a signalling instrument 
through which high-quality issuers can reveal their true creditworthiness to the 
market, reducing the agency cost between the issuer and the investor and 
therefore increasing the information content of market prices.  
Once the positive effect of possessing a rating has been demonstrated in 
section IV.4.2, the impact of the rating assessment must be addressed (i.e. if, 
for example, a AA rated issuer pays less interests than a BBB one). Now, a 
model that uses as regressors both the rating and the other observable 
variables (accounting, economic, market etc.) simultaneously is seriously 
exposed to multicollinearity problems, because bond yields depend both on the 
rating and on the other variables, but the rating itself is affected by the same set 
of accounting, fiscal, economic and market variables. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Reiter and Ziebart (1991), the use of a single 
equation including both ratings and financial/economic information 
simultaneously as exogenous variables can raise an additional potential 
problem in the estimation. Such a model is likely to suffer from endogeneity bias 
if an independent variable (i.e. the credit rating) is determined by other 
independent variables (i.e. the economic and financial characteristics of the 
issuer) in the single equation specification.  
Therefore, two different models have been estimated, tested and compared. A 
single equation two-stage regression model adopting an orthogonal rating 
indicator in order to avoid multicollinearity issues, and a system of simultaneous 
structural equations adopting a set of instrumental variables to address 
endogeneity problems. The two methods are illustrated in section IV.5.1 and 
V.5.2 respectively. 
IV.5.1 Orthogonal rating residuals  
                                                             
39
 Stiglitz (1975). Akerlof (1970). 
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Following the Liu and Thakor (1984) methodology, a two-stage regression 
model is adopted, first the rating score (calculated as described in section 
IV.3.1) is regressed against the same set of variables used to analyze the yield 
spreads, then the residuals from this regression are inserted as an additional 
regressor in the original model.40 The residuals from the rating regression are 
orthogonal (by construction) with respect to the explanatory variables (so any 
collinearity issue is avoided) and carry that part of the rating score which is not 
explained by the model, so the corresponding coefficient gives a measure of the 
marginal impact of the credit rating assessment on yields beyond the effect of 
the other observable variables in the model.  
The following analysis has been conducted separately on the rated sub-sample 
of local authorities (138 observations) and on regions (45 observations), 
therefore the rated dummy (D_02) has been dropped from the variables’ list and 
alternatively replaced by the rating score and by the orthogonal rating residuals 
as displayed in the following tables. 
Table IV.9 reports the results of four regressions for the local authorities’ 
sample: Regression 5, the standard model (without the rated dummy) applied to 
bonds possessing a credit rating; Regression 6, the standard model plus the 
rating score variable; Regression 7, the standard model plus the orthogonal 
rating residuals; Regression 8, a model excluding the three default-risk 
variables (A_01, A_03 and E_03) replaced by the rating score. Firstly, it can be 
noticed that Regression 5 has analogous results compared to Regression 2 in 
previous section, meaning that the findings of the full sample are also valid for 
the rated sub-sample. Moreover, simply adding the rating score variable 
(Regression 6) to the standard model alters, as expected, both coefficients and 
standard errors due to the multicollinearity issues explained above. So, applying 
the Liu and Thakor procedure, the residuals from the rating regression are used 
as an additional regressor in the standard model (Regression 7). The coefficient 
of the rating residuals in Regression 7 appears with the expected negative sign 
(the higher the rating the lower the spread) but is not statistically significant.41 
Lastly, Regression 8 prove that even when the rating-related issuer specific 
variables are dropped from the model still the rating variable remains non-
significant. 
Table IV.9 - Analysis on ratings - Local Authorities (robust t-stats in parentheses) 
                                                             
40
 For the bonds possessing more than one credit rating, the average of the ratings scores 
assigned by the different agencies has been adopted. 
41
 To be noted that, as pursued by the Liu and Thakor methodology, the rating score in 
Regression 6 shows the same coefficient and significance as found for the Liu and Thakor 
residuals in Regression 7 (clearly all other variables’ coefficients and significance in Regression 
6 are altered). 
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Explanatory Variables 
Regression 5 
Rated sample 
Regression 6 
Rating score 
Regression 7 
Orthogonal 
Regression 8 
Rating only 
A_01_curr_bal 
0.21 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
- 
A_03_debt_rev 
-0.08 
(-0.70) 
-0.11 
(-0.91) 
-0.08 
(-0.71) 
- 
E_03_pc_inc 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.76) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
- 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.47*** 
(5.87) 
0.47*** 
(5.76) 
0.47*** 
(5.76) 
0.46*** 
(5.92) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.03*** 
(5.97) 
0.03*** 
(5.65) 
0.03*** 
(5.92) 
0.03*** 
(5.42) 
D_01_fixed 
0.23*** 
(3.95) 
0.25*** 
(3.97) 
0.23*** 
(3.99) 
0.21*** 
(4.20) 
Rating score - 
-0.26 
(-1.58) 
- 
-0.12 
(-1.37) 
Orthogonal rating residuals - - 
-0.26 
(-1.58) 
- 
C 
-0.30** 
(-2.26) 
-0.09 
(-0.49) 
-0.30** 
(-2.28) 
-0.16 
(-1.43) 
Observations 138 138 138 138 
Adj. R2 51.32% 51.82% 51.82% 51.65% 
F-test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wald F-test (prob.) 37.63% 21.11% 21.11% n.a. 
Condition index 22.20 28.98 22.20 20.18 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
S.E. correction Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
By the results in Table IV.9 we can conclude that, even if section IV.4.2 
demonstrated that possessing a rating reduces spreads, it seems that the rating 
assessment assigned to a local authority doesn’t affect yields. So that, for 
example, a BBB issuer doesn’t suffer an interest rate penalty compared to a AA 
one, but both of them get a benefit from having a credit rating in comparison 
with an unrated issuer. These results confirm the findings in previous sections, 
where, for the local authorities’ sample, the creditworthiness of the issuer was 
found to be irrelevant in the determination of the yield of a municipal bond.  
Also, this fact questions the reason of the lower yields observed for rated local 
authority bonds. If investors do not take into account the credit quality of a 
specific local authority, it is unlikely that they price rated bonds differently 
because having a rating signals, as asserted by Liu and Thakor (1984), higher 
quality. So, what probably makes rated bond different is their marketability in 
the secondary market, with the possession of a rating making easier the 
possibility of selling back the security with no (or with a lesser) discount with 
respect to its fair value. As stated by Amihud and Mendelson (1991): “ratings 
provide investors with more information on the bond, increasing its liquidity and 
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helping to reduce required yield”.42 Hence, the reason for this pricing 
discrimination can be attributed to liquidity risk, and not to default risk.43 
Now, the same procedure described above has been applied to the regions in 
the sample. As already stated, all 45 regional bonds in the sample possess a 
credit rating. Table IV.10 reports the results of four regressions for the regions’ 
sample, similarly to the previous analysis for local authorities: Regression 1, the 
standard model (without the rated dummy); Regression 9, the standard model 
plus the rating score variable; Regression 7, the standard model plus the 
orthogonal rating residuals; Regression 8, a model excluding the three default-
risk variables (A_01, A_03 and E_03) replaced by the rating score. 
As expected, Regression 9 shows altered coefficients and standard errors, 
particularly for the per-capita income indicator (E_03), because of the 
multicollinearity issue due to the presence of the rating score in this 
specification. This is confirmed by the higher condition number and by the lower 
probability of the Wald test which includes per-capita income in the joint F-test. 
Also, it can be noticed that, in Regression 10, the Liu and Thakor rating 
residuals don’t affect the other regression coefficients as these are identical to 
those in Regression 1. The rating score and the rating residuals, respectively in 
Regression 9 and 10, show the correct negative sign but are not statistically 
significant. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that when the issuer-specific 
characteristics (A_01, A_03 and E_03) are removed and substituted by the 
rating score (regression 11), the latter become extremely significant and with 
the correct negative sign (the higher the rating the lower the yield spread).  
Table IV.10 - Analysis on ratings - Regions (robust t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Regression 1 
Regions 
Regression 9 
Rating score 
Regression 10 
Orthogonal 
Regression 11 
Rating only 
A_01_curr_bal 
-0.09 
(-0.30) 
-0.07 
(-0.24) 
-0.09 
(-0.30) 
- 
A_03_debt_rev 
-0.04 
(-0.12) 
-0.07 
(-0.21) 
-0.04 
(-0.12) 
- 
E_03_pc_inc 
-0.56** 
(-2.65) 
-0.52 
(-1.51) 
-0.56** 
(-2.61) 
- 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.19 
(0.56) 
0.20 
(0.56) 
0.19 
(0.55) 
0.32 
(0.79) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.01** 
(2.59) 
0.01** 
(2.59) 
0.01** 
(2.57) 
0.01*** 
(2.82) 
D_01_fixed 
0.43*** 
(5.48) 
0.43*** 
(5.31) 
0.43*** 
(5.48) 
0.41*** 
(5.45) 
Rating score - 
-0.05 
(-0.19) 
- 
-0.42*** 
(-2.86) 
Orthogonal rating residuals - - 
-0.05 
(-0.19) 
- 
                                                             
42
 Amihud and Mendelson (1991).  
43
 For other studies on the relationship between bonds’ ratings and liquidity see: Chen et al. 
(2007) and Ederington et al. (1987).  
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Table IV.10 - Analysis on ratings - Regions (robust t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
Regression 1 
Regions 
Regression 9 
Rating score 
Regression 10 
Orthogonal 
Regression 11 
Rating only 
C 
0.46 
(1.59) 
0.49 
(1.68) 
0.46 
(1.57) 
0.35 
(1.49) 
Observations 45 45 45 45 
Adj. R2 63.60% 62.64% 62.64% 62.19% 
F-test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wald F-test (prob.) 88.52% 8.19% 95.62% n.a. 
Condition index 26.14 39.92 26.14 21.59 
White test (prob.) 0.47% 2.54% 2.54% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 12.88% 14.45% 14.45% 28.69% 
S.E. correction White White White White 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
In conclusion, the results in this section confirm the findings of the previous 
section IV.4.2. Investors price differently the bonds issued by regions from 
those issued by local authorities. Whereas all issuer default-risk related 
variables, including rating, are irrelevant in the pricing of local authorities’ 
issues, this is not true for the pricing of regional bonds. Beyond the previously 
demonstrated role of the major economic indicator (E_03, per-capita income), 
also the credit rating of a region affect bond yields. Specifically, what emerged 
by the comparison of the several regressions estimated in this section is that 
the default risk of a region matters, either measured by the economic indicator 
or by the credit rating. But when the two variables, credit rating and per-capita 
income, are included in the same regression the former becomes irrelevant, 
meaning that credit ratings are not adding new information to investors beyond 
the information already obtainable by the analysis of publicly available 
economic indicators. 
IV.5.2 System of simultaneous equations  
To address the possible endogenous nature of the credit rating variable, a 
model consisting of a system of two structural equations, one for the yield 
spread and one for the credit rating, is estimated trough Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). The system specification is: 
(IV.3)                 
          
          
                      ; 
(IV.4)              
           . 
The equation for the yield spread (IV.3) is the standard model plus the rating 
score variable (RAT). The equation for the rating score (IV.4) includes the three 
issuer specific characteristics (A_01, A_03 and E_03) previously adopted and a 
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constant ( ). In order to deal with the endogenous formulation of the system, a 
set of instrumental variables must be used as instruments for the rating 
variable. The chosen instrumental variables must be exogenous (uncorrelated 
with the error term), correlated with the issuer-specific explanatory variables 
(A_01, A_03 and E_03) and possibly non correlated with each other to avoid 
collinearity issues. The selection procedure detailed in appendix APP.IV.3 has 
delivered two sets of instrumental variables, one for the Local Authorities’ 
sample and one for the Regions’ sample. The lists of instrumental variables will 
be included in the results tables for every estimated system. 
The first sample to be analyzed is the Local Authorities’. Table IV.11 reports the 
estimation results of three different systems: System 1, the full model described 
by equations IV.3 and IV.4; System 2, the full model excluding the rating 
variable in equation IV.3; System 3, the full model excluding the three issuer 
specific characteristics (A_01, A_03 and E_03) but including the rating variable 
in equation IV.3. Since the analysis in section IV.4.2 detected both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the Local Authorities’ sample, an 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix has 
been adopted for the GMM estimation, with the parameters reported in the 
table. 
Table IV.11 - System of simultaneous equations - Local Authorities (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
System 1 
Full model 
System 2 
No Rating 
System 3 
Rating only 
Yield equation 
A_01_curr_bal 
-0.62 
(-0.83) 
-0.43 
(-0.48) 
- 
A_03_debt_rev 
-0.32 
(-1.45) 
-0.30 
(-1.23) 
- 
E_03_pc_inc 
0.19 
(0.63) 
0.04 
(0.22) 
- 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.48*** 
(5.15) 
0.49*** 
(5.05) 
0.42*** 
(6.06) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.03*** 
(2.94) 
0.03*** 
(3.79) 
0.02*** 
(5.93) 
D_01_fixed 
0.26*** 
(3.48) 
0.27*** 
(3.49) 
0.22*** 
(4.84) 
Rating score 
-0.27 
(-0.55) 
- 
-0.24 
(-1.36) 
C 
0.12 
(0.34) 
-0.09 
(-0.54) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
Rating equation 
A_01_curr_bal 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(-0.09) 
-0.13 
(-0.26) 
A_03_debt_rev 
0.05 
(0.39) 
0.05 
(0.39) 
0.05 
(0.37) 
E_03_pc_inc 
0.55*** 
(2.95) 
0.54*** 
(3.03) 
0.48*** 
(3.05) 
C 
0.50** 
(2.24) 
0.51** 
(2.43) 
0.58*** 
(2.97) 
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Table IV.11 - System of simultaneous equations - Local Authorities (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
System 1 
Full model 
System 2 
No Rating 
System 3 
Rating only 
Observations 138 138 138 
No. of parameters 12 11 9 
No. of moments 19 19 19 
Initial weight matrix Unadjusted Unadjusted Unadjusted 
GMM weight matrix HAC HAC HAC 
Kernel option Bartlett Bartlett Bartlett 
Bandwidth Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West 
Hansen's J-test (prob.) 11.25% 15.13% 19.37% 
Instrumental variables Yield equation: A_02, A_06, A_07, F_01, F_02, F_04, E_01, M_01, I_02, D_01. 
Instrumental variables Rating equation: A_02, A_06, A_07, F_01, F_02, F_04, E_01. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
The results in Table IV.11 are almost identical to those in Table IV.9, meaning 
that the GMM estimation of the system of simultaneous equations confirms the 
findings of the OLS single equation estimation. Again, all three issuer specific 
characteristics (A_01, A_03 and E_03) are non-significant, while the BTP-
BUND spread (M_01), the average life of the bond (I_02) and the fixed coupon 
dummy are extremely significant in every system formulations. Also, as in the 
previous section, the credit rating variable is non-significant even when the 
issuer-specific variables are excluded (System 3). Therefore, the irrelevance of 
default-risk indicators in favour of market and issue-related variables has been 
confirmed for the Local Authorities’ sample. Moreover, the rating equation 
shows only one significant variable, the per-capita income E_03, which has the 
correct positive sign (the higher the income the higher the rating) and is 
significant at 1% level. Lastly, the Hansen’s J-test confirms the validity of the 
model’s over-identification restrictions for all the three system formulations. 
Now, the same systems of simultaneous equations are estimated for the 
Regions’ sample. Since the analysis in section IV.4.2 detected 
heteroskedasticity but no serial correlation in this last sample, an 
heteroskedasticity consistent (White) covariance matrix has been adopted for 
the GMM estimation, whose parameters are reported in Table IV.12. 
Table IV.12 - System of simultaneous equations - Regions (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
System 1 
Full model 
System 2 
No Rating 
System 3 
Rating only 
Yield equation 
A_01_curr_bal 
0.38 
(0.74) 
0.16 
(0.67) 
- 
A_03_debt_rev 
-0.57 
(-0.88) 
-0.31 
(-1.28) 
- 
E_03_pc_inc 
-0.54 
(-0.54) 
-0.99*** 
(-6.58) 
- 
M_01_btp_bund 0.19 0.04 0.37 
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Table IV.12 - System of simultaneous equations - Regions (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables 
System 1 
Full model 
System 2 
No Rating 
System 3 
Rating only 
(0.55) (0.14) (1.08) 
I_02_avg_life 
0.01*** 
(2.83) 
0.01*** 
(3.80) 
0.01*** 
(2.92) 
D_01_fixed 
0.42*** 
(5.87) 
0.43*** 
(6.83) 
0.34*** 
(5.02) 
Rating score 
-0.46 
(-0.43) 
- 
-0.81*** 
(-4.75) 
C 
1.08** 
(2.43) 
0.99*** 
(4.97) 
0.86*** 
(3.25) 
Rating equation 
A_01_curr_bal 
0.32* 
(1.85) 
0.30* 
(1.79) 
0.44*** 
(4.84) 
A_03_debt_rev 
-0.64*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.63*** 
(-4.24) 
-0.60*** 
(-5.25) 
E_03_pc_inc 
0.88*** 
(11.23) 
0.89*** 
(12.50) 
0.93*** 
(14.29) 
C 
0.40*** 
(4.24) 
0.39*** 
(4.44) 
0.33*** 
(4.14) 
Observations 45 45 45 
No. of parameters 12 11 9 
No. of moments 19 19 19 
Initial weight matrix Unadjusted Unadjusted Unadjusted 
GMM weight matrix White White White 
Hansen's J-test (prob.) 67.81% 66.53% 57.07% 
Instrumental variables Yield equation:  A_02, A_04, A_06, F_02, F_03, E_01, E_02, M_01, I_02, D_01. 
Instrumental variables Rating equation:  A_02, A_04, A_06, F_02, F_03, E_01, E_02. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
The results in Table IV.12, again, confirm the findings of Section IV.4.2. As 
above, Regions show a different behaviour compared to Local Authorities. First, 
the sovereign risk (M_01, the BTP-BUND spread) is not significant in any of the 
three systems, confirming that Regions are perceived as less dependent on the 
central government compared to Local Authorities. Also, when the credit rating 
is excluded from the model (System 2), the per-capita income (E_03) becomes 
extremely significant and appears with the correct negative sign (the higher the 
income the lower the spread). Similarly, when the three issuer specific variables 
(A_01, A_03 and E_03) are replaced by the rating variable (System 3), the latter 
becomes extremely significant and as well with the correct negative sign (the 
higher the rating the lower the spread). However, when the credit rating is 
estimated together with the three default-risk related variables (System 1), both 
the rating and the per-capita income appear with correct negative sign but are 
not statistically significant. Moreover, the issue-related variables (I_02 and 
D_01) show, as usual, an extreme statistical significance, a stable coefficients’ 
magnitude and a correct sign. Furthermore, the rating equation is characterized 
by all three explanatory variables being significant and with the expected sign. 
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Lastly, the Hansen’s J-test largely confirms the validity of the model’s over-
identification restrictions for all the three system formulations. 
Interestingly, the system formulation of the model allows to account for the 
direct and indirect (through the credit rating) effects of the issuer-specific 
characteristics, and specifically of the per-capita income. The direct effect of 
per-capita income on yields is given by the coefficient in the yield equation of 
System 1 (-0.54), while the indirect effect of the per-capita income through the 
rating is given by the product of the rating coefficient in the yield equation of 
System 1 (-0.46) by the per-capita income coefficient in the rating equation of 
System 1 (0.88). So, the indirect effect can be quantified in -0.40 (-0.46 X 0.88) 
and the direct effect in -0.54, where the sum of the two effects (-0.94, the total 
effect) is very close to the estimated coefficient for per-capita income in the 
yield equation of System 2 (-0.99). Unfortunately, given the statistical non-
significance of both the per-capita income and the rating coefficients in System 
1, it is not possible to assess which, between the direct and indirect, effect 
dominates the other. As obtained in the previous section, it has been confirmed 
that default risk matters in regional bond pricing, either measured by economic 
indicators (System 2) or by credit ratings (System 3). However, it has not be 
detected any additional informational role for credit ratings beyond the 
information obtainable from publicly available financial and economic data. 
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Appendix IV 
APP.IV.1 Details on local governments and bonds in the sample 
For the cities in the sample, the list of issuers and the number of bonds issued 
is given in Table APP.IV.1. 
Table APP.IV.1 - Number of bonds in the sample per city and per year 
City 
Year 
Rating 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Alessandria - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Ancona - - 1 1 1 3 - - - - - - 6 No 
Avellino - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 No 
Bergamo - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 No 
Biella - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Cagliari - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Campobasso - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 No 
Carrara - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 Yes 
Caserta 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 No 
Catania - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 No 
Cesena - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 No 
Chieti - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Como - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Cosenza - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 No 
Fermo - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Ferrara - - 2 2 - 1 1 - - - - - 6 No 
Firenze - 2 - - - 1 - - - - - - 3 Yes 
Foggia - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 Yes 
Forlì - - - - - 1 1 2 3 2 1 - 10 No 
Genova 1 - 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 - - - 13 Yes 
Grosseto - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2 No 
L’Aquila - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2 Yes 
La Spezia - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Lecce - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Lecco - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 Yes 
Mantova - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2 No 
Massa - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 No 
Messina - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 No 
Milano - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Modena 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 3 No 
Napoli - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Parma - - - 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 - 11 No 
Perugia 1 1 1 1 1 2 - - - - - - 7 No 
Pescara - 1 - - 1 1 - - - - - - 3 No 
Piacenza - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - 2 No 
Pisa - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Potenza - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Prato - - - 1 2 - 1 - - - - - 4 Yes 
Ravenna 1 1 - - - 1 1 - 1 - - - 5 No 
Reggio E. 2 1 1 1 1 2 - - 1 - - - 9 No 
Rimini - - - 1 2 4 1 1 2 2 - - 13 Yes 
Roma - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Rovigo - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 No 
Salerno - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 No 
Sassari - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Savona - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 No 
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Table APP.IV.1 - Number of bonds in the sample per city and per year 
City 
Year 
Rating 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Siena 1 - - 5 6 5 3 3 3 2 3 2 33 Yes 
Taranto - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 No 
Teramo - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 2 No 
Terni - - - 1 - 2 1 - - - - - 4 No 
Torino 3 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - 5 Yes 
Trieste - - - - 1 2 - - - - - - 3 Yes 
Udine - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Venezia - - 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 - - 12 Yes 
Verona 1 - 1 1 - - 1 - - - - - 4 Yes 
Viterbo - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Total  12 9 14 24 28 45 21 9 17 11 6 2 198 22 
 
For the provinces in the sample, the list of issuers and the number of bonds 
issued is given in Table APP.IV.2. 
Table APP.IV.2 - Number of bonds in the sample per province and per year 
Province 
Year 
Rating 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Alessandria - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Ancona - 1 1 - - - - - 1 - - - 3 Yes 
Arezzo - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Ascoli - - - - - 2 2 - - - - - 4 No 
Belluno - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 No 
Biella - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2 No 
Bologna - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 Yes 
Brescia - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 2 Yes 
Chieti - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Cosenza - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 2 No 
Crotone - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2 No 
Forlì-Cesena - - - - - - 3 1 2 - - - 6 No 
Frosinone - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Genova - - - - 1 2 1 - 1 - - - 5 Yes 
Imperia - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Lecce - - - - 1 3 2 - - - - - 6 Yes 
Lecco - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 No 
Macerata - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Mantova - 1 1 - - - 1 - - - - - 3 No 
Massa - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 No 
Milano - - 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - 3 Yes 
Modena - - - - 1 2 2 3 3 1 - - 12 No 
Padova - - 1 - - 1 2 1 3 - - - 8 No 
Palermo - - - 1 1 1 - - - - - - 3 Yes 
Parma - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 No 
Pavia - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Perugia - - - 1 - - 1 1 - - - - 3 Yes 
Pesaro 2 2 2 1 1 1 - - 2 - - - 11 No 
Pescara 1 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 3 No 
Pisa - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 No 
Potenza - - - 1 1 - - - 1 - - - 3 No 
Prato - - - 1 1 - 1 - - - - - 3 Yes 
Ravenna - - - - - 2 1 2 - - - - 5 Yes 
Reggio E. - 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - 4 No 
Rimini 2 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - 4 No 
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Table APP.IV.2 - Number of bonds in the sample per province and per year 
Province 
Year 
Rating 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Roma - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Salerno - - - - 1 2 1 - - - - - 4 No 
Savona - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Siracusa - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - 2 No 
Taranto - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Teramo - 1 1 2 - 1 - - - - - - 5 No 
Torino - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Trapani - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 No 
Treviso - 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - - 3 Yes 
Udine - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Varese 1 - - 1 - - 1 2 1 1 - - 7 Yes 
Venezia - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Verona 1 1 - 2 3 2 1 1 - - - - 11 No 
Vibo Val. - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 No 
Vicenza - - 1 - 1 2 - - - - - - 4 Yes 
Total  7 12 13 16 19 37 22 13 15 2 0 0 156 20 
 
Lastly, the details of the bonds issued by regions are listed in Table APP.IV.3. 
Table APP.IV.3 - Number of bonds in the sample per region and per year 
Region 
Year 
Rating 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Abruzzo - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - - - - - 4 Yes 
Campania - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 Yes 
Emilia Rom. - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Friuli V. G. - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - 6 Yes 
Lazio - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Liguria - - - - 3 - - - - - - - 3 Yes 
Marche - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Molise - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Piemonte - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 2 Yes 
Puglia - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 Yes 
Sardegna - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Sicilia 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 2 Yes 
Toscana - 1 6 - - - 2 - - - - - 9 Yes 
Umbria 1 - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - 3 Yes 
Val d’Aosta - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - 2 Yes 
Veneto - - - 1 1 - 2 - - - - - 4 Yes 
Total 3 3 9 5 9 4 10 2 0 0 0 0 45 16 
 
APP.IV.2 Selection procedure for explanatory variables  
Table APP.IV.4 reports the VIF indicator and the number of pair wise 
correlations (of both variables and regression coefficients) for those variables 
showing a VIF greater than 10 and a correlation above 50%.44 
                                                             
44
 According to Gunst and Mason (1980), multicollinearity is not a problem when the VIFs are 
below 10. 
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Table APP.V.4 - Multicollinearity test step 1 
Variable VIF 
Number of correlated 
variables 
Number of correlated 
coefficients 
A_09_curr_rig 239.17 4 4 
F_02_net_rev 119.90 1 4 
A_08_pers_exp 72.38 4 4 
F_01_pc_rev 29.66 1 2 
A_04_pc_debt 26.92 2 2 
A_03_debt_rev 10.93 1 5 
  
Now, after having identified the variables with the highest VIF, in the following 
Table APP.IV.5 can be reported the pair wise cross-correlations of this variables 
with the other highly correlated variables, where coefficients’ correlations are 
reported in parentheses. 
Table APP.IV.5 - Correlation matrix step 1 (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Variable A_01 A_03 A_04 A_05 A_08 A_09 F_01 F_02 E_02 I_03 
A_01_curr_bal 1          
A_03_debt_rev 
0.14 
(0.36) 
1         
A_04_pc_debt 
-0.33 
(-0.24) 
0.25 
(-0.76) 
1        
A_05_debt_serv 
-0.03 
(-0.68) 
0.35 
(-0.57) 
0.28 
(0.14) 
1       
A_08_pers_exp 
-0.11 
(-0.63) 
0.51 
(-0.55) 
0.31 
(0.09) 
0.39 
(0.96) 
1      
A_09_curr_rig 
-0.18 
(0.69) 
0.41 
(0.57) 
0.37 
(-0.15) 
0.88 
(-0.99) 
0.76 
(-0.97) 
1     
F_01_pc_rev 
-0.39 
(0.36) 
-0.33 
(0.74) 
0.79 
(-0.93) 
0.02 
(-0.18) 
-0.13 
(-0.11) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
1    
F_02_net_rev 
0.03 
(0.68) 
-0.35 
(0.57) 
-0.28 
(-0.14) 
-1.00 
(-) 
-0.39 
(-0.96) 
-0.88 
(0.99) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
1   
E_02_pop 
0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.23 
(-0.15) 
-0.55 
(0.21) 
-0.30 
(-0.11) 
-0.65 
(-0.01) 
-0.56 
(0.11) 
-0.29 
(-0.06) 
0.30 
(0.11) 
1  
I_03_size 
-0.03 
(-0.16) 
-0.25 
(-0.02) 
0.02 
(-0.01) 
-0.13 
(0.04) 
-0.53 
(0.07) 
-0.35 
(-0-05) 
0.27 
(-0.15) 
0.13 
(-0.04) 
0.53 
(-0.34) 
1 
 
As shown in the table above, the three variables with the highest VIF (A_09, 
F_02 and A_08) have also the highest number of cross-correlations. Moreover, 
F_02 shows a perfect negative correlation with A_05 due to the fact that by 
construction these two variables are one the linear combination of the other.45 
Also, F_01 and A_04, besides being characterized by a high VIF, show a high 
correlation between themselves and with A_03. The latter A_03 is a very 
important indicator measuring the debt load of the issuer, its VIF is just slightly 
above the 10 threshold and its correlations are almost all due to the above cited 
variables. Furthermore, the four remaining variables in the table, which didn’t 
show a high VIF are as well characterized by some high cross-correlations, 
particularly A_05 with both A_01 and A_03. Lastly, a separate analysis must be 
conducted for E_02 and I_03 (the population of the issuing government and the 
amount of the issue). These two variables, beyond being correlated with some 
                                                             
45
 Refer to the variables’ description in Table IV.1. 
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other variables in the table, are also highly correlated with type of the issuer 
(region, city or province), with regions being characterized by the larger 
population figures and by the larger sizes of bond issues. Clearly, the inclusion 
of these variables could affect the estimation of the model. So, eight variables 
are to be dropped from the first version of the model ( and only two variables 
listed in Table APP.V.5 are left, A_01 the current balance indicator and A_03 
the debt revenue ratio. Then, the same procedure is applied to test the model 
without the dropped variables. 
The second step of the model, without the eight dropped variables, shows an 
evident improvement in terms of multicollinearity, no variable has a VIF above 
10 and the condition index has dramatically decreased from 140,337,717 for the 
first model to 162 for the second version of the model. But there is room for 
improvement since the condition index, although extremely improved, is still 
above the rule of thumb threshold of 30. So, as done before, cross-correlations 
(for both the variables and the coefficients) are checked.  
Table APP.IV.6 - Correlation matrix step 2 (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Sym. A_01 F_03 E_01 M_01 M_03 M_04 I_01 
A_06 
0.53 
(-0.64) 
      
F_03 
0.03 
(0.31) 
1      
F_04 
0.26 
(-0.40) 
0.57 
(-0.64) 
     
E_01 
-0.15 
(-0.07) 
-0.42 
(0.09) 
1     
E_03 
0.15 
(-0.09) 
0.40 
(-0.14) 
-0.80 
(0.40) 
    
M_01 
-0.04 
(-0.12) 
0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.02) 
1    
M_02 
0.04 
(-0.12) 
-0.07 
(-0.09) 
0.13 
(0.06) 
-0.66 
(0.41) 
   
M_03 
-0-03 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
-0.14 
(-0.09) 
0.56 
(-0.31) 
1   
M_04 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.19 
(-0.11) 
-0.41 
(0.18) 
-0.68 
(0.26) 
1  
M_05 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.21 
(-0.16) 
-0.43 
(-0.20) 
-0.66 
(0.42) 
0.86 
(-0.69) 
 
I_01 
0.03 
(-0.06) 
-0.20 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.05) 
-0.11 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
1 
I_02 
0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(-0.03) 
0.16 
(-0.06) 
-0.12 
(-0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(-0.03) 
0.87 
(-0.86) 
 
Table APP.IV.6 reports the correlation matrix of those variables with at least 
one cross-correlation above 50%. Two accounting indicators, A_01 (current 
balance) and A_06 (interest coverage ratio), have a similar construction hence 
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they are correlated. Similarly, two fiscal indicators, F_03 (financial autonomy) 
and F_04 (tax autonomy), are as well very similar and hence highly correlated. 
Moreover, the two socio-economic indicators in the table, E_01 (unemployment) 
and E_03 (per-capita income), show a very high negative correlation, because 
clearly an area characterized by high unemployment is also very likely to be 
characterized by low per-capita income. Furthermore, moving to the market 
indicators, it can be noticed that they are all cross-correlated. M_01 (BTP-
BUND spread) is correlated with both M_02 (Italy’s rating) and M_03 
(international risk aversion), while M_03 is also correlated with M_04 (Italy’s 
economic sentiment) and M_05 (Italy’s GDP growth), and the two latter 
variables are highly correlated between themselves . Lastly, the two issue 
related indicators, I_01 (bond’s maturity) and I_02 (bond’s average life), are, by 
construction, extremely correlated. But given that the vast majority of the bonds 
in the sample are amortizing bonds which repay the principal by installments, 
the average life (I_02) is a better measure to take into account the effect of 
interest rates risk on bond yields. In addition, two dummy variables, D_03 
(southern Italy) and D_04 (financial crisis), happen to be extremely correlated 
with economic indicators and with market indicators, therefore they cannot be 
included in the model. 
So, given the above considerations, some of the mentioned variables are to be 
dropped as they are very likely to cause the multicollinearity detected by the 
high condition index in the previous version of the model. The chosen variables 
to be removed are A_06, F_04, E_01, M_02, M_03, M_04, I_02 and the two 
dummies D_03 and D_04. 
At this stage, after the second step of the variable selection procedure, the 
following variables have left: A_01, A_02, A_03, F_03, E_03, M_01, M_05, 
I_02, D_01, D_02. This last version of the model show a condition index of 24, 
very low VIFs and no cross-correlation above 50%. The signals of 
multicollinearity have dramatically reduced, even if the condition index, although 
decreased is still in the “warning area”. So, this last version of the model has 
been tested on the data. Three variables, A_02, F_03 and M_05, seem to 
cause some stability problems in other variables’ coefficients. The following 
Table APP.V.7 show the coefficients obtained regressing each of these three 
variables against the remaining explanatory variables in the model. We can 
noticed that A_02 is extremely related to A_03 and significantly related to F_03 
and M_01, that F_03 is extremely related to E_03 and D_02 and that M_05 
show a very strong relationship with M_01 and a significant one with E_03.  
 
 
 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Therefore, these last three variables (A_02, F_03 and M_05) are to be excluded 
from the model to be estimated. Finally, the final version of the empirical model 
consists of seven variables (five explanatory variables and two dummy 
variables):  A_01, A_03, E_03, M_01, I_02, D_01, D_02. This final version of 
the model is characterized by extremely low VIFs, no cross-correlated terms 
and a condition index of 21. Even if the concerns relating multicollinearity 
cannot be completely ruled out, the risk of computing affected estimates have 
been significantly reduced. The consistency, stability and significance of the 
parameters is analyzed in section IV.4. 
APP.IV.3 Selection procedure for instrumental variables  
The following procedure concerns the selection of the instrumental variables for 
the rating variable, the only possibly endogenous variable in the system. Market 
and issue-specific variables will not be instrumented given their clear 
exogenous nature. Two different lists of instrumental variables are identified, 
one for the Local Authorities sample and one for the Regions sample. 
Table APP.IV.8 reports, for the Local Authorities sample, the VIF indicator and 
the number of pair-wise correlations (of both variables and regression 
coefficients) for those variables showing a VIF greater than 10 and a correlation 
above 50%. 
Table APP.IV.7 - Cross-regression coefficients (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
A_02_tot_bal F_03_fin_aut M_05_gdp_cng 
A_01_curr_bal 
0.07 
(0.82) 
-0.09 
(-0.96) 
0.31 
(0.30) 
A_02_tot_bal - 
0.15 
(2.84) 
-0.91 
(-1.48) 
A_03_debt_rev 
-0.09 
(-6.21) 
0.03 
(1.84) 
0.06 
(0.33) 
F_03_fin_aut 
0.13 
(2.84) 
- 
0.88 
(1.55) 
E_03_pc_inc 
0.05 
(1.52) 
0.30 
(8.33) 
-1.28 
(-2.91) 
M_01_btp_bund 
0.06 
(2.99) 
-0.03 
(-1.19) 
-1.89 
(-7.94) 
M_05_gdp_cng 
-0.01 
(-1.48 
0.01 
(1.55) 
- 
I_02_avg_life 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
-0.01 
(-1.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
D_01_fixed 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.02 
(1.58) 
-0.12 
(-0.77) 
D_02_rated 
-0.01 
(-1.48) 
0.06 
(4.31) 
0.06 
(0.39) 
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Table APP.IV.8 - Multicollinearity test 1 - Local Authorities 
Variable VIF 
Number of correlated 
variables 
Number of correlated 
coefficients 
A_04_pc_debt 16.61 4 2 
F_01_pc_rev 12.51 3 1 
  
Two variables, A_04 and F_01, are extremely correlated (93.39%), the former 
has been dropped given its higher VIF and the higher number of cross-
correlations. Now, after having eliminated the variables most likely to affect 
estimates, in the following Table APP.IV.9 can be reported the pair wise cross-
correlations of the remaining variables, where coefficients’ correlations are 
reported in parentheses. 
Table APP.IV.9 - Correlation matrix - Loc. Aut. (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Variable A_02 A_06 A_07 F_01 F_02 F_03 F_04 E_01 E_02 
A_02_tot_bal 1         
A_06_int_cov 
0.01 
(-0.21) 
1        
A_07_curr_exp 
0.43 
(-0.44) 
-0.24 
(0.27) 
1       
F_01_pc_rev 
0.20 
(-0.09) 
-0.49 
(0.40) 
0.26 
(0.01) 
1      
F_02_net_rev 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
0.26 
(-0.19) 
0.14 
(-0.31) 
-0.27 
(-0.14) 
1     
F_03_fin_aut 
0.11 
(-0.04) 
-0.27 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.53 
(-0.33) 
-0.48 
(0.42) 
1    
F_04_tax_aut 
-0.25 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(-0.04) 
-0.30 
(0.06) 
-0.43 
(0.29) 
0.09 
(-0.15) 
0.08 
(-0.54) 1 
  
E_01_unem 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(-0.13) 
-0.21 
(-0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.32) 
-0.45 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
1  
E_02_pop 
-0.18 
(-0.13) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.66 
(0.29) 
0.33 
(-0.11) 
-0.56 
(0.40) 
0.48 
(-0.46) 
0.29 
(-0.07) 
1 
 
As shown in the table above, four indicators show cross-correlations above 
50%: F_01, F_03, F_04 and E_02. Of which the highest is between F_01 and 
E_02, negative at 66% level. The following Table APP.IV.10 reports the VIF 
indicator and the number of pair-wise correlations (of both variables and 
regression coefficients) for these four variables.46 
Table APP.IV.10 - Multicollinearity test 2 - Local Authorities 
Variable VIF 
Number of correlated 
variables 
Number of correlated 
coefficients 
F_03_fin_aut  3.21 2 1 
E_02_pop 2.79 2 0 
F_01_pc_rev 2.64 2 0 
F_04_tax_aut 2.06 0 1 
 
First, one of the two highly correlated variables, E_02 and F_01, must be 
dropped. The former, E_02, is chosen given its slightly higher variance inflation 
                                                             
46
 The VIF indicators for variable F_01 in tables APP.IV.9 and APP.IV.10 differ because the 
former include the variable A_04 in the regression while the latter doesn’t. 
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factor. Moreover, the F_03 indicator (financial autonomy) is eliminated in favour 
of the similar F_04 indicator (tax autonomy) given the higher number of pair-
wise correlations and the higher VIF. So, the final list of instrumental variables 
to be used for the Local Authorities sample is: A_02, A_06, A_07, F_01, F_02, 
F_04 and E_01. 
Now, the same selection procedure is applied to the Regions sample. Table 
APP.IV.11 reports the VIF indicator and the number of pair-wise correlations (of 
both variables and regression coefficients) for those variables showing a VIF 
greater than 10 and a correlation above 50%. 
Table APP.IV.11 - Multicollinearity test - Regions 
Variable VIF 
Number of correlated 
variables 
Number of correlated 
coefficients 
F_04_tax_aut 32.23 1 3 
F_03_fin_aut 28.51 1 3 
A_07_curr_exp 20.47 4 3 
  
Two fiscal variables F_03 and F_04 are extremely correlated (94.94%), the 
latter has been dropped given its higher VIF. Also A_07, the current expenditure 
indicator has been eliminated given its high VIF and the number of correlated 
variables. Now, after having eliminated the variables most likely to affect 
estimates, in the following Table APP.IV.12 can be reported the pair wise cross-
correlations of the remaining variables, where coefficients’ correlations are 
reported in parentheses. 
Table APP.IV.12 - Correlation matrix - Regions (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Variable A_02 A_04 A_06 F_01 F_02 F_03 E_01 E_02 
A_02_tot_bal 1        
A_04_pc_debt 
-0.43 
(0.20) 
1       
A_06_int_cov 
0.02 
(-0.11) 
0.15 
(0.37) 
1      
F_01_pc_rev 
-0.27 
(-0.09) 
0.76 
(-0.74) 
0.52 
(-0.42) 
1     
F_02_net_rev 
0.15 
(-0.01) 
-0.43 
(0.58) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(-0.35) 
1    
F_03_fin_aut 
0.18 
(-0.08) 
0.19 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.39 
(-0.60) 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
1   
E_01_unem 
-0.27 
(0.31) 
0.09 
(-0.09) 
-0.19 
(0.03) 
-0.07 
(-0.06) 
-0.04 
(-0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
1  
E_02_pop 
0.39 
(0.16) 
-0.52 
(-0.09) 
-0.50 
(0.15) 
-0.73 
(0.55) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(-0.51) 
0.16 
(-0.29) 
1 
 
As shown in the table above, indicator F_01 (per-capita revenue) shows six 
cross correlations above 50% of which three above 70% and therefore has 
been dropped from the list of possible instrumental variables. Two more 
variables, A_04 and E_02, also show a couple of pair-wise correlations above 
50%, nevertheless have been left given the limited number of cross-correlations 
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and the measures only slightly above 50%. The effect of these variables will be 
tested for over-identification in the GMM estimation. So, the final list of 
instrumental variables to be used for the regions sample is: A_02, A_04, A_06, 
F_02, F_03, E_01 and E_02. 
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Chapter V 
Determinants of Local Governments’ Ratings 
This chapter empirically investigates the determinants of Italian sub-sovereign 
credit ratings. The analysis, in order to deal with the qualitative nature of ratings, 
adopts two different methodologies, a multinomial Ordered Probit model 
estimated through Maximum Likelihood Estimation and a non-linear numerical 
transformation of ratings allowing the use of standard Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. The analysis in this chapter is elaborated through four sections. 
Section V.1 focuses on the methodological issues. Section V.2 describes the 
dataset. Section V.3 illustrates the empirical specification. Section V.4 analyzes 
the results. 
V.1 Methodology 
In order to deal with the qualitative ordinal nature of ratings, this study 
approaches the investigation on the determinants of credit ratings under two 
different methods. First, as in Gaillard (2009), a multinomial ordered probit 
model is adopted. Then, a procedure to convert ratings judgements into 
numerical rating scores, which allows standard regression analysis, is 
implemented following Liu and Thakor (1984). 
V.1.1 Ordered probit model 
The multinomial ordered probit model is appropriate when dealing with a 
polytomous ordinal dependent variable such as the credit rating. The model 
defines the probability of the rating assessment attributed to a local government 
as a function of a set of explanatory variables. The model can be expressed as 
follows: 
(V.1)       
                   
Where      is the unobserved creditworthiness of the local government,    is a 
row vector of coefficients,      is a column vector of explanatory variables and 
     is an i.i.d. disturbance term with            .
47 
                                                             
47
 The model omits the intercept for identification purposes of the following log-likelihood 
optimization. Omitting the intercept is equivalent to setting the cut-off point      as an 
identifying restriction. Moreover, the other necessary identification constraint is to set the 
variance parameter     .  
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Since     , the credit standing of a local government, is unobservable, it can be 
related to the observed ratings      through a probability function. The rating 
judgments attributable to local governments need first to be ordered into ordinal 
values as displayed in the following Table V.1. 
Table V.1 - Ordinal transformation of ratings 
Rating category Ordinal transformation Rating category Ordinal transformation 
Aaa/AAA 17 Baa3/BBB- 8 
Aa1/AA+ 16 Ba1/BB+ 7 
Aa2/AA 15 Ba2/BB 6 
Aa3/AA- 14 Ba3/BB- 5 
A1/A+ 13 B1/B+ 4 
A2/A 12 B2/B 3 
A3/A- 11 B3/B- 2 
Baa1/BBB+ 10 Caa/CCC 1 
Baa2/BBB 9 - - 
 
The observed rating      takes the value             according to the 
relationship: 
(V.2)                        ;        
where      is the unknown cut-off point. This relationship can be exemplified as 
follows: 
(V.3)                  ;        
                             ;  
         ... 
                    .  
Then, indicating with   the cumulative function of the standard normal 
probability distribution, the implicit probabilities of the observed rating      can be 
expressed as: 
(V.4)                    
               
       ;    
or, in terms of the actual ordinal outcomes: 
(V.5)                    
       ;       
                    
             
       ; 
     ... 
 77 
 
                        
       . 
The model is estimated through Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) where 
the log-likelihood function can be represented as: 
(V.6)                   
 
   
 
   
 
             ;      
where              
       and                  
      . 
V.1.2 Rating score regression 
The second estimation method consists in attributing a meaningful numerical 
value to each rating category, allowing the use of standard regression analysis. 
The problem in assigning arbitrary values to the qualitative rating categories is 
to find a numerical measure directly related to the latent variable determining 
the ratings, which is      the unobserved creditworthiness of the local 
government. To this end, being observable market prices of credit risk, the 
average bond yield differentials between rating classes have been chosen to 
compute a numerical rating score indicator. 
The procedure, analogously to what has been done in section IV.3.1,  consists 
in first calculating the yield differentials between rating categories, and then 
assigning a value proportional to the yield differentials to each rating category, 
where the highest score is assigned to the Aaa/AAA rating and a value equal to 
zero to the Caa/CCC category. The rating scores have been calculated as the 
absolute values of the average yield differentials between a given rating 
category and the lowest Caa/CCC category. The rating scores for each rating 
category are reported in Table V.2.48 
Table V.2 - Numerical transformation of 
ratings Rating category Rating score Rating category Rating score 
Aaa/AAA 9.41 Baa3/BBB- 7.20 
Aa1/AA+ 9.28 Ba1/BB+ 6.52 
Aa2/AA 9.12 Ba2/BB 6.04 
Aa3/AA- 8.93 Ba3/BB- 5.85 
A1/A+ 8.73 B1/B+ 5.55 
A2/A 8.56 B2/B 4.58 
A3/A- 8.41 B3/B- 2.59 
Baa1/BBB+ 8.20 Caa/CCC 0.00 
Baa2/BBB 7.82 - - 
 
The numerical score transformation allows the application of standard 
regression analysis model to the equation V.1 illustrated above, without the 
                                                             
48
 The yields’ averages have been computed on daily data over the sample period 01/01/2005-
31/12/2013, taken from the “BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Bond Effective Yield” indexes. 
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restrictions on intercept and errors’ variance which was previously necessary for 
the ordered probit estimation. 
V.2 Data 
The data sample consists of the full set of the credit ratings assigned by the 
three major international rating agencies, Moody’s Investors Service, Standard 
& Poor's Financial Services and Fitch Ratings, between 2005 and 2013 to the 
three tiers of Italian sub-sovereign governments (regions, provinces and cities). 
V.2.1 Rating Distribution 
The local governments sample includes 21 regions, 26 provinces and 38 cities, 
for a total number of 258 observations collected in three different cross-
sectional periods: 2005 (96 observations), 2008 (107 observations) and 2013 
(55 observations).49 The following Table V.3 illustrates, in addition to the rating 
of the central government (the Republic of Italy), the rating distribution per year 
subdivided for rating category and government type.50 Moreover, the table 
reports the rating changes between the years 2005-2008 and between 2008-
2013, accounting for upgrades, downgrades, rating confirmations, new ratings 
and withdrawn ratings. 
Table V.3 - Ratings’ distribution for rating category, government type and rating changes 
 2005 2008 2013 Pooled 
Italy’s rating Aa2/AA-/AA Aa2/A+/AA- Baa2/BBB/BBB+ - 
Rating Category 
Aaa/AAA - 5 - 5 
Aa1/AA+ 7 2 - 9 
Aa2/AA 12 8 - 20 
Aa3/AA- 41 35 - 76 
A1/A+ 14 32 - 46 
A2/A 15 17 4 36 
A3/A- 4 4 3 11 
Baa1/BBB+ 2 3 15 20 
Baa2/BBB 1 1 22 24 
Baa3/BBB- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
5 5 
Ba1/BB+ - 3 3 
Ba2/BB - 1 1 
Ba3/BB- - 1 1 
B1/B+ - 1 1 
Total 96 107 55 258 
Government Type 
Regions 35 37 35 107 
Provinces 23 27 5 55 
Cities 38 43 15 96 
Total 96 107 55 258 
Rating Changes 
                                                             
49
 The credit rating for each local government is detected on the 31 December of each year. 
50
 Italy’s ratings reported on Table V.3 are Moody’s, S&P and Fitch respectively. 
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 2005-2008 2008-2013 
Upgrades 15 0 
- Downgrades 25 48 
- Unchanged 42 1 
- New ratings 25 6 
- Withdrawn 14 58 
-  
The representation in Table V.3 above show a dramatic change in the ratings’ 
distribution for the year 2013. While years 2005 and 2008 are characterized by 
a similar composition, with all ratings above the Baa2/BBB category, the ratings 
attributed in 2013 suffered an overall downgrade following the heavy 
downgrade of the Republic of Italy. Moreover, the information on the rating 
changes in the table, between 2005-2008 and 2008-2013, helps understanding 
the different behaviour in 2013. While between 2005 and 2008 local 
governments experienced both upgrades and downgrades together with more 
new released ratings than withdrawn ratings, between 2008 and 2013 there 
were 48 downgrades and no upgrade, 58 withdrawn ratings and only 6 new 
ratings. Lastly, the distribution for government type in the table show how only 
the largest governments (regions) maintained a significant rating coverage over 
the sample period, with rated provinces and cities experiencing a dramatic drop 
in 2013 and, among these, with only the larger authorities keeping the rating 
assessment.51 
V.2.2 Data Sources 
The data on Moody’s ratings have been collected from Moody’s Investors 
Service official website. Data on S&P and Fitch ratings have been provided by 
the Italian branches of the two agencies for the purposes of this research. 
The accounting data of each city and province in the sample have been 
collected from the Finanza locale database of the Italian Ministry of Interior. The 
accounting data of the regions have been collected from regional governments’ 
websites or directly provided by regional offices. 
The local socioeconomic data including income, population and unemployment 
have been obtained from the “Sitis” (Sistema di Indicatori Territoriali) data-
warehouse of the Italian national institute for Statistics (Istat). The national 
economic data such as GDP and price indices have been collected from Istat.52 
                                                             
51
 The cities and provinces which maintained a rating coverage in 2013 are characterized by an 
average population of 1.103.193, compared to an average of 727.622 for rated cities and 
provinces in the 2005-2008 period. 
52
 For further information about data sources see section IV.3.3. Each source website is 
reported in the References section. 
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V.3 Empirical Specification 
As illustrated in section IV.4.1, a major issue concerning the definition of the 
empirical specification of the model to be estimated is multicollinearity, i.e. the 
cross-correlation (or linear dependence) among regressors. Given the ample 
availability of economic and accounting data for local governments, it is very 
likely that several observable variables may be driven by the same 
phenomenon such as, for example, the weak economic condition of an area 
leading to high unemployment and low per capita income or the high level of 
debt of a local authority leading to several poor financial ratios. The inclusion of 
redundant regressors can cause multicollinearity, affecting the estimation of 
regression’s parameters and possibly leading to a wrong assessment of 
statistical significance. Therefore, a prerequisite for the empirical estimation is 
the careful selection of the most efficient variables to be included in the model, 
among the many economic, financial and fiscal indicators available.  
V.3.1 Choice of variables 
Following the variable selection procedure described in section IV.4.1 the 
variables expected to affect regression’s estimates have been identified using 
standard multicollinearity diagnostics such as the variance inflation factor (VIF), 
the condition index and the pair wise cross-correlations of variables and 
coefficients. The details of the selection procedure for the elimination of the 
inefficient variables are given in Appendix V. The variable selection procedure 
has identified six variables, of which four explanatory variables and two dummy 
variables. Table V.4 below reports the description of the variables together with 
their formulas, measures and expected signs.53 
Table V.4 - Description of the variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Symbol Description Formu
la 
Measu
re 
Exp. 
sign Current 
Balance 
A_01_curr_bal 
Current revenues (CR) minus current expenditures 
(CE), over current revenues (CR). 
(CR – 
CE) / CR 
Ratio + 
Debt to 
Revenues 
A_03_debt_rev 
Total outstanding debt (D) over the sum of current 
revenues (CR) and capital revenues (CaR). 
D / (CR 
+ CaR) 
Ratio - 
Financial 
Autonomy 
F_03_fin_aut 
Sum of tax revenues (TR) and other revenues (OR) 
over current revenues (CR). 
(TR + 
OR) / CR 
Ratio + 
Per capita 
Income 
E_03_pc_inc 
Local per capita added value (LAVpc) over national 
per capita added value (NAVpc)*. 
LAVpc / 
NAVpc 
Ratio + 
Year 2008 
Dummy 
D_05_2008 
Takes value 1 if the rating assessment refers to year 
2008, 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 ? 
Year 2013 
Dummy 
D_06_2013 
Takes value 1 if the rating assessment refers to year 
2013, 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 ? 
* For the cities in the sample, since data at city level are unavailable, these indicators refer to the figures of the 
corresponding provinces. 
                                                             
53
 It can be noted that three issuer-specific variables (A_01, A_03 and E_03) are the same as in 
the municipal bonds’ analysis described in Table IV.5. This model specification, in addition, 
shows the financial autonomy indicator (F_03) and the two year dummies. 
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The final set of indicators, delivered by the variable selection procedure in 
Appendix V, comprises a wide set of regressors able to measure the main 
financial, fiscal and economic characteristics of a local government. The set of 
explanatory variables includes: a measure of the current deficit/surplus (Current 
Balance), a financial autonomy indicator (Financial Autonomy), a debt burden 
indicator (Debt to Revenues), a major economic condition indicator (Per capita 
Income) and two year dummies (Year 2008 and Year 2013). The two year 
dummy variables are meant to control for the general macroeconomic 
conditions, including the ratings assigned to the central government, 
characterizing the three different observation periods (base year 2005, 2008 
and 2013). 
The final version of the model proves to be free of any multicollinearity issues, 
showing a condition index of 16.89 with extremely low VIFs and cross-
correlations. The correlation matrix is displayed in Table V.5 below. 
Table V.5 - Correlation matrix (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Variable A_01 A_03 F_03 E_03 D_05 D_06 
A_01_curr_bal 1      
A_03_debt_rev -0.01 
(0.06) 
1     
F_03_fin_aut 0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.23 
(0.27) 
1    
E_03_pc_inc 0.31 
(-0.32) 
0.14 
(-0.19) 
0.17 
(-0.21) 
1   
D_05_2008 -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(-0.03) 
-0.25 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(-0.01) 
1  
D_06_2013 0.02 
(-0.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.40 
(-0.34) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.44 
(0.38) 
1 
 
V.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table V.6 below reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables adopted in the empirical analysis. For each variable in 
the sample the average is displayed together with the standard deviation in 
parentheses. Moreover, the data regarding the three sub-samples relating the 
years 2005, 2008 and 2013 are represented in the table. 
Table V.6 - Variables averages per year (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Variable Pooled Sample 2005 2008 2013 
Rating Ranking 
12.54 
(2.28) 
13.55 
(1.41) 
13.36 
(1.46) 
9.18 
(1.54) 
Rating Score 
8.60 
(0.58) 
8.84 
(0.26) 
8.81 
(0.27) 
7.77 
(0.67) 
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Table V.6 - Variables averages per year (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Variable Pooled Sample 2005 2008 2013 
Current Balance 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
Debt to Revenues 
0.56 
(0.46) 
0.53 
(0.41) 
0.59 
(0.45) 
0.55 
(0.56) 
Financial Autonomy 
0.77 
(0.16) 
0.75 
(0.17) 
0.72 
(0.16) 
0.89 
(0.10) 
Per capita Income 
1.05 
(0.27) 
1.05 
(0.26) 
1.04 
(0.24) 
1.07 
(0.33) 
Observations 258 96 107 55 
 
The data displayed in Table V.6 above show that, even if the rating indicators 
worsened in 2013, all economic and financial variables either remained stable 
or improved. This fact poses some insights for the following regression analysis, 
since the ratings have generally been downgraded probably following the 
macroeconomic context affecting the central government finances (and rating) 
rather than for specific local government factors. 
V.4 Regression Results 
This section presents the results of the two different models adopted in this 
chapter. First the outcome of the ordered probit model is illustrated, and then 
the findings of the standard regression analysis are discussed. While the 
ordered probit model is the natural choice when studying the behavior of an 
ordinal variable such as the credit rating, its properties are only valid 
asymptotically. Therefore, the strict assumptions on the errors’ distribution 
together with the limited size of the sample require a further robustness test 
allowing heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the errors. Hence, the 
standard regression on the numerical rating scores is estimated allowing 
standard regression’s diagnostics and interpretation.  
V.4.1 Poolability test 
Before the estimation of the two models on the sample, it is necessary to test 
for the poolability of the data belonging to the three rating agencies. The 
following regressions test for structural differences in the intercept and slopes 
for the ratings released by S&P and Fitch, compared to the base group 
represented by Moody’s ratings.  The following Table V.7 reports the results of 
two regressions, a regressions analyzing the data of the three agencies 
altogether (Pooled), and a regression adopting a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 in case the ratings is, respectively, released by S&P or Fitch (and 0 if 
released by Moody’s) and four interaction terms which have been tested both 
individually and jointly. 
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Table V.7 - Poolability test (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables Pooled Poolability test 
Current Balance 
0.40*** 
(2.78) 
0.39* 
(1.74) 
Debt to Revenues 
-0.21*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.50*** 
(-2.75) 
Financial Autonomy 
-0.10 
(-0.85) 
-0.56* 
(-1.81) 
Per capita Income 
0.58*** 
(6.19) 
0.73*** 
(4.22) 
Year 2008 Dummy 
-0.02 
(-0.59) 
-0.06* 
(-1.84) 
Year 2013 Dummy 
-1.07*** 
(-11.59) 
-1.13*** 
(-15.10) 
C 
8.39*** 
(75.83) 
8.72*** 
(38.27) 
Observations 258 258 
Adj. R2 66.18% 71.51% 
F-test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 
Condition index 16.89 46.49 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 0.00% 6.53% 
S.E. correction Newey-West White 
Poolability diagnostics 
S&P Dummy - 
-0.77** 
(-2.39) 
Current Balance x d_S&P - 
-0.89** 
(-2.08) 
Debt to Revenues x d_S&P - 
0.31 
(1.45) 
Financial Autonomy x d_S&P - 
0.88* 
(1.84) 
Per capita Income x d_S&P - 
-0.13 
(-0.41) 
Fitch Dummy - 
-0.30 
(-1.10) 
Current Balance x d_Fitch - 
-0.04 
(-0.14) 
Debt to Revenues x d_Fitch - 
0.34* 
(1.75) 
Financial Autonomy x d_Fitch - 
0.77** 
(2.09) 
Per capita Income x d_Fitch - 
-0.26 
(-1.25) 
Joint F-test S&P interactions (prob.) - 0.00% 
Joint F-test Fitch interactions (prob.) - 2.42% 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Significant at 5% level. 
Significant at 1% level. 
** 
*** 
 
The poolability test, reported in Table V.7, detected a structural difference in the 
behaviour of the ratings released by the three different agencies. The 
differences are stronger for S&P ratings, with three significant variables and a 
joint F-test with a 0.00% probability, than for Fitch’s which, however, has two 
significant variables and a 2.42% probability of rejecting the null in the joint F-
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test. Therefore, in the following analysis the ratings of the three agencies will be 
studied separately. 
V.4.2 Ordered probit model 
The following Table V.8 reports the results of the ordered probit model, as 
illustrated in the previous sections, for the ratings assigned by the three 
agencies.  
Table V.8 - Ordered probit models (z-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Current Balance 
2.04*** 
(3.02) 
-0.25 
(-0.14) 
1.84*** 
(2.88) 
Debt to Revenues 
-1.44*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.91** 
(-2.55) 
-1.08*** 
(-4.46) 
Financial Autonomy 
0.70 
(0.85) 
1.58 
(1.22) 
-1.28* 
(-1.80) 
Per capita Income 
3.02*** 
(5.89) 
2.66*** 
(3.35) 
2.19*** 
(4.45) 
Year 2008 Dummy 
0.10 
(0.39) 
-0.72** 
(-2.30) 
-0.40 
(-1.49) 
Year 2013 Dummy 
-10.22 
(-0.08) 
-9.14 
(-0.03) 
-4.00*** 
(-8.18) 
Observations 95 64 99 
Pseudo R2 41.14% 35.41% 33.79% 
Chi2-LR (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Condition index 16.54 22.50 17.84 
Log likelihood -118.67 -68.85 -127.82 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Significant at 5% level. 
Significant at 1% level. 
** 
*** 
 
The results of the ordered probit model, as anticipated by the poolability test in 
the previous section, show a different behaviour for the three rating agencies. 
Moody’s results highlight the relevance of three out of the four explanatory 
variables adopted. Current Balance, Debt to Revenues and Per capita Income 
are all extremely significant and appear with the expected signs, while the 
Financial Autonomy indicator is non-significant. The results for S&P’s ratings 
show two significant, and with the correct signs, variables (Debt to Revenues 
and Per capita Income) as in Moody’s results (but with Debt to Revenues only 
significant at 5% level). However, the Current Balance, which was extremely 
significant in Moody’s results, becomes non-relevant in S&P equation. 
Moreover, the Year 2008 Dummy is unexpectedly significant for S&P’s, while 
the expected Year 2013 Dummy is not. Fitch’s results are more similar to 
Moody’s, with Current Balance, Debt to Revenues and Per capita Income 
extremely significant and with the expected signs. However, for Fitch’s also the 
Financial Autonomy indicator is significant, even if with the wrong sign and only 
10% significance level. In this last regression, moreover, the Year 2013 Dummy 
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appears very significant and with expected negative sign. Lastly, the models’ 
goodness of fit indicator, the pseudo R-squared, is around 41% for Moody’s and 
slightly lower for the two other rating agencies.54 Needs to be considered, 
however, that, in addition to the mentioned caveats in using ordered probit on 
small sized samples, the S&P’s sample (64 obs.) is significantly smaller than 
both Moody’s and Fitch’s (95 and 99 obs. respectively). 
V.4.3 Standard regression analysis 
The following Table V.9 reports the results of three regressions, one for each 
rating agency, adopting as dependent variable the rating scores’ curve, based 
on bond yield differentials, illustrated in the previous sections. Moreover, the 
regressions’ residual are tested for heteroschedasticity (White test) and serial 
correlation (LM test) and the t-stats are computed accordingly. 
Table V.9 - Regression analysis (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory Variables Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Current Balance 
0.43** 
(2.19) 
-0.46 
(-1.03) 
0.32** 
(2.57) 
Debt to Revenues 
-0.46*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.19* 
(-1.80) 
-0.18*** 
(-4.20) 
Financial Autonomy 
-0.16 
(-0.67) 
0.23 
(0.82) 
-0.20 
(-1.49) 
Per capita Income 
0.66*** 
(4.30) 
0.61** 
(2.31) 
0.43*** 
(4.80) 
Year 2008 Dummy 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.09 
(-1.33) 
-0.07 
(-1.37) 
Year 2013 Dummy 
-1.50*** 
(-11.48) 
-1.09*** 
(-6.81) 
-0.77*** 
(-11.99) 
C 
8.51*** 
(46.71) 
8.01*** 
(30.94) 
8.71*** 
(60.14) 
Observations 95 64 99 
Adj. R2 80.21% 64.84% 73.18% 
F-test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Condition index 16.54 22.50 17.84 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 1.43% 28.47% 
Serial correlation LM test (prob.) 72.50% 50.03% 54.25% 
S.E. correction White White None 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Significant at 5% level. 
Significant at 1% level. 
** 
*** 
 
The results of the standard regression analysis, reported in Table V.9 above, 
first of all, confirm the overall findings of the ordered probit model but appear 
clearer and more consistent. Here, Moody’s and Fitch present identical results 
in terms of significance and signs, with minor difference in the magnitude of 
                                                             
54
 The analysis adopts McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. This statistics is based on the ratio of 
the log-likelihood of the full model over the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model, therefore 
measuring the improvement of the model’s effectiveness given by the inclusion of the 
explanatory variables. 
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coefficients. The three explanatory variables Current Balance, Debt to 
Revenues and Per capita Income, as in the ordered probit model, are extremely 
significant and with the expected signs, while the Financial Autonomy indicator 
is non-significant for both Moody’s and Fitch. In S&P’s results, as in the ordered 
probit model, the Current Balance in non-significant, while Debt to Revenues 
and Per capita Income are both significant but at lower probability levels 
compared to the other two rating agencies. Unlike ordered probit findings, here 
the role of the year dummies is unambiguous, with, as expected, the Year 2013 
Dummy extremely significant and with the correct negative sign in all three 
regressions. This result point out to a possible structural break in 2013, due to 
the financial crisis, which will be tested in the next section. Lastly, it can be 
noted the overall high measure for the goodness of fit, with and adjusted R-
Squared above 80% in Moody’s regression and of 73% and 65% for Fitch and 
S&P respectively. As before, the smaller size of the S&P sample needs to be 
taken into account. 
V.4.4 Financial crisis test 
Since the descriptive statistics and the regressions’ results highlighted a 
different behavior of the variables for the year 2013, an augmented specification 
allowing different slopes for the year 2013 is tested. This version of the model 
consists of the same variables in the standard model plus four interaction terms 
of the year 2013 dummy variable (taking the value 1 in case the data refer to 
the year 2013 and 0 otherwise) with the four explanatory variables (Current 
Balance, Debt to Revenues, Financial Autonomy and Per capita Income). 
Moreover, the four interaction terms have been tested both individually and 
jointly in order to assess for a structural break in the year 2013’s estimation 
parameters. The results of the above cited analysis are reported in the following 
Table V.10.55 
Table V.10 - Financial crisis structural test (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Current Balance 
0.23** 
(2.46) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.24* 
(1.76) 
Debt to Revenues 
-0.12** 
(-2.13) 
-0.15 
(-1.44) 
0.21*** 
(-4.81) 
Financial Autonomy 
0.13 
(0.96) 
0.29 
(0.80) 
-0.30** 
(-2.39) 
Per capita Income 
0.49*** 
(6.72) 
0.45** 
(2.19) 
0.51*** 
(4.88) 
Year 2008 Dummy 
0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.08 
(-1.02) 
-0.07 
(-1.51) 
Year 2013 Dummy 
-1.23** 
(-2.06) 
-0.79 
(-0.71) 
-1.57** 
(-2.08) 
                                                             
55
 For completeness, the same structural break test have been run also for the year 2008. The 
test detected no structural difference for the year 2008. 
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Table V.10 - Financial crisis structural test (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Current Balance x d_2013 
1.17 
(1.62) 
-2.93** 
(-2.56) 
0.47 
(1.39) 
Debt to Revenues x d_2013 
-1.56*** 
(-5.67) 
-0.07 
(-0.38) 
0.10 
(1.14) 
Financial Autonomy x 
d_2013 
-0.50 
(-0.79) 
-1.12 
(-0.89) 
1.01* 
(1.76) 
Per capita Income x d_2013 
0.68** 
(2.22) 
0.79** 
(2.05) 
-0.19 
(-0.60) 
C 
8.32*** 
(62.64) 
8.07*** 
(23.56) 
8.71*** 
(63.31) 
Observations 95 64 99 
Adj. R2 90.87% 67.14% 74.03% 
F-test (prob.) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Joint F-test interactions 
(prob.) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Condition index 30.99 42.19 44.22 
White test (prob.) 0.00% 25.82% 0.00% 
Serial correlation LM test 
(prob.) 
61.59% 58.90% 83.47% 
S.E. correction White None White 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Significant at 5% level. 
Significant at 1% level. 
** 
*** 
 
The structural change test points out, as expected, the differences for the year 
2013, in the coefficients and intercept of the explanatory variables. The joint F-
test strongly rejects the null for all the three rating agencies. Needs to be 
specified, however, that the estimation of the four explanatory variables of the 
model (Current Balance, Debt to Revenues, Financial Autonomy and Per capita 
Income) is not reliable, since the inclusion of the interaction terms in the model 
has caused a rise in the condition index above the 30 threshold. 
V.4.5 Summary of results 
Summing up the results obtained in this section it can be noted, first of all, how 
both methodologies detected the same relevance for the explanatory variables 
in the model. For Moody’s and Fitch three variables (Current Balance, Debt to 
Revenues and Per capita Income) are found to be extremely significant and 
with the expected signs, while for S&P the Current Balance appears as non-
significant.56 The positive sign of Current Balance and Per capita Income means 
the higher the indicator the better the rating, while the opposite goes for the 
negative sign of the Debt to Revenues variable. Moreover, the inclusion of the 
interaction terms to form the augmented model points out the different behavior 
of regressions’ coefficients in the year 2013, which, in conjunction with the 
descriptive statistics illustrated above, can be attributed to the overall 
                                                             
56
 The ordered probit model applied to Fitch’s ratings found a weakly significant, and with the 
wrong sign, Financial Autonomy variable. However, the relevance of this variable has been 
excluded by the results of standard regression analysis. 
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downgrade of the whole Italian public sector due to the recent sovereign 
financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the comparison of the two methodologies adopted in the empirical 
analysis, ordered probit and standard regression, leans towards the latter. 
Standard regressions’ estimation appear more consistent and, although the 
pseudo R-Squared of the ordered probit model cannot be directly compared to 
the standard regression’s R-Squared, the ordinary least squares method seems 
to be better suitable for analyzing small sample cross-sections such as the data 
investigated in this study. 
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Appendix V 
APP.V.1 Selection procedure for explanatory variables 
The following Table APP.V.1 describes the complete list of variables included in 
this chapter with their formulas, measures and expected signs.57 
Table APP.V.1 - Description of variables 
Variable Symbol Description Formula Measure 
Exp. 
sign 
Accounting and financial variables 
Current Balance 
A_01_curr_ba
l 
Current revenues (CR) minus current 
expenditures (CE), over current revenues 
(CR). 
(CR – CE) / 
CR 
Ratio + 
Borrowing Need 
A_02_ 
borr_need 
Sum of current revenues (CR) and capital 
revenues (CaR) minus the sum of current 
expenditures (CE) and capital expenditures 
(CaE), over the sum of current revenues 
(CR) and capital revenues (CaR). 
((CR + CaR) 
– (CE + 
CaE)) / (CR + 
CaR) 
Ratio + 
Debt to 
Revenues 
A_03_debt_re
v 
Total outstanding debt (D) over the sum of 
current revenues (CR) and capital revenues 
(CaR). 
D / (CR + 
CaR) 
Ratio - 
Per capita Debt A_04_pc_debt 
Total outstanding debt at constant prices* 
(Dcp) over population (P), log-transformed. 
Ln(Dcp / P) 
Ratio 
(log) 
- 
Debt Service 
A_05_debt_se
rv 
Sum of debt reimbursement (DR) and 
interest payments (I) over current revenues 
(CR). 
(DR + I) / CR Ratio - 
Interest 
Coverage  
A_06_int_cov 
Current revenues (CR) minus gross current 
expenditures (CE – I), over interest 
payments (I). 
(CR – CE + I) 
/ I 
Ratio + 
Current 
Expenditures 
A_07_curr_ex
p 
Current expenditures (CE) over the sum of 
current expenditures (CE) and capital 
expenditures (CaE). 
CE / (CE + 
CaE) 
Ratio - 
Fiscal variables 
Per Capita 
Revenues 
F_01_pc_rev 
Sum of current revenues (CRcp) and capital 
revenues (CaRcp) at constant prices*, over 
population (P), log-transformed. 
Ln((CRcp + 
CaRcp) / P) 
Ratio 
(log) 
+ 
Financial 
Autonomy 
F_03_fin_aut 
Sum of tax revenues (TR) and other 
revenues (OR) over current revenues (CR). 
(TR + OR) / 
CR 
Ratio + 
Tax Autonomy F_04_tax_aut 
Tax revenues (TR) over current revenues 
(CR). 
TR / CR Ratio + 
Socio-economic variables 
Unemployment E_01_unem Unemployment percent rate (U)**. U % - 
Population E_02_pop Number of residents (P), log-transformed. Ln(P) Log ? 
Per capita 
Income 
E_03_pc_inc 
Local per capita added value (LAVpc) over 
national per capita added value (NAVpc)**. 
LAVpc / 
NAVpc 
Ratio + 
Dummy variables 
                                                             
57
 In comparison to the variables used in chapter IV, here A_08, A_09, F_02, D_01, D_02 and 
D_04 are missing, plus every other variable identified by M and I. Moreover, this chapter 
specification has two new dummy variables (D_05 and D_06). 
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Table APP.V.1 - Description of variables 
Variable Symbol Description Formula Measure 
Exp. 
sign 
Southern Italy D_03_south 
Takes value 1 if, according to the European 
Union NUTS classification (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics),  the local 
government belongs to the ITF group 
(Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Puglia) or to the ITG group 
(Sardegna and Sicilia), 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 - 
Year 2008 D_05_2008 
Takes value 1 if the rating assessment 
refers to year 2008, 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 ? 
Year 2013 D_06_2013 
Takes value 1 if the rating assessment 
refers to year 2013, 0 otherwise. 
- 1,0 - 
* 
**  
Base year: 1999. 
For the cities in the sample, since data at city level are unavailable, these indicators refer to the figures of the 
corresponding provinces. 
 
Table APP.V.2 reports, for the complete set of variables, the VIFs and the 
number of pair wise correlations exceeding the 50% threshold. 
Table APP.V.2 - Multicollinearity test 
Variable VIF 
Number of 
correlated variables 
Number of 
correlated 
coefficients A_01_curr_bal 3.13 1 1 
A_02_ borr_need 2.98 1 2 
A_03_debt_rev 2.36 1 0 
A_04_pc_debt 2.54 1 1 
A_05_debt_serv 1.63 1 0 
A_06_int_cov 2.32 1 1 
A_07_curr_exp 2.28 0 1 
F_01_pc_rev 2.26 0 0 
F_03_fin_aut 4.96 1 1 
F_04_tax_aut 6.58 2 2 
E_01_unem 7.54 2 1 
E_02_pop 2.10 1 1 
E_03_pc_inc 5.24 2 0 
D_03_south 6.30 2 1 
D_05_2008 1.69 0 0 
D_06_2013 2.17 0 0 
 
Table APP.V.2 shows no variable with a VIF above the 10 threshold. The 
condition index of the variance-covariance matrix of the variables in Table 
APP.V.2 is 63.61, well above the 30 threshold commonly considered in the 
literature. Therefore, a further analysis on the cross-correlations needs to be 
implemented in order to identify a more efficient version of the model. Variable 
F_01 and the two year dummies (D_05 and D_06) present no cross-
correlations, so they will be kept in the model. Hence, the following correlation 
analysis will ignore the non-correlated variables D_05, D_06 and F_01. 
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Table APP.V.3 - Correlation matrix (coefficients’ correlations in parentheses) 
Variable A_0
1 
A_0
2 
A_0
3 
A_0
4 
A_0
5 
A_0
6 
A_0
7 
F_03 F_04 E_01 E_02 E_03 D_0
3 
A_01_curr_bal 1         
   
 
A_02_ 
borr_need 
0.61 
(-0.71) 
1        
   
 
A_03_debt_rev -0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
1       
   
 
A_04_pc_debt -0.41 
(0.24) 
-0.08 
(-0.13) 
0.30 
(-0.33) 
1      
   
 
A_05_debt_serv -0.04 
(-0.03) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
0.56 
(-0.41) 
0.25 
(-0.05) 
1     
   
 
A_06_int_cov 0.45 
(-0.13) 
0.13 
(-0.02) 
-0.20 
(-0.20) 
-0.59 
(0.56) 
-0.14 
(0.01) 
1    
   
 
A_07_curr_exp -0.29 
(0.48) 
0.23 
(-0.56) 
-0.07 
(-0.02) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
-0.17 
(0.03) 
-0.24 
(0.16) 
1   
   
 
F_03_fin_aut 0.02 
(-0.05) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.23 
(-0.09) 
0.05 
(-0.18) 
-0.15 
(-0.12) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
0.22 
(0.03) 
1  
   
 
F_04_tax_aut -0.09 
(-0.05) 
-0.16 
(0.18) 
-0.40 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
-0.32 
(0.13) 
0.17 
(-0.04) 
0.33 
(-0.19) 
0.79 
(-0.79) 
1 
   
 
E_01_unem -0.28 
(0.10) 
-0.21 
(-0.10) 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.11 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(-0.12) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
1 
  
 
E_02_pop -0.19 
(-0.01) 
-0.16 
(0.05) 
-0.19 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(-0.13) 
-0.21 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.01) 
0.26 
(-0.09) 
0.27 
(0.33) 
0.52 
(-0.54) 
0.28 
(-0.31) 1   
E_03_pc_inc 0.31 
(0.03) 
0.30 
(-0.11) 
0.14 
(-0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
-0.16 
(0.22) 
0.17 
(-0.35) 
-0.11 
(0.40) 
-0.73 
(0.38) 
-0.05 
(-0.46) 1  
D_03_south 
-0.28 
(-0.06) 
-0.30 
(0.07) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(-0.03) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.83 
(-0.61) 
0.19 
(-0.07) 
-0.82 
(-0.31) 1 
 
Table APP.V.3 above shows several cross-correlated terms among both 
variables and coefficients. Clearly, since many indicator have a similar 
construction or are meant to measure similar phenomena, this is reflected in the 
correlation statistics. Hence, correlated variables will be removed and the 
overall variance-covariance matrix will be tested. According to the information 
displayed in Table APP.V.3 the following variables have been eliminated: A_02, 
A_04, A_05, F_04, E_01 and D_03. Therefore, the list of variables left is: A_01 
(Current Balance), A_03 (Debt to Revenues), A_06 (Interest Coverage), A_07 
(Current Expenditures), F_01 (Per Capita Revenues), F_03 (Financial 
Autonomy), E_02 (Population), E_03 (Per capita Income), D_05 (Year 2008 
Dummy) and D_06 (Year 2013 Dummy). The condition index for this version of 
the model is 47.01, well above the 30 threshold signalling multicollinearity. 
Moreover, four variables (A_06, A_07, F_01 and E_02) show correlation level 
below but very near the 50% threshold and seem to cause some stability 
problems in other variables’ coefficients. This diagnosis points to the need of a 
further analysis on the last list of variables. 
The following Table APP.V.4 show the coefficients obtained regressing each of 
the last four variables against the remaining explanatory variables in the model. 
It can be noticed that all the four variables are extremely related to remaining 
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variables in the model. Moreover, only dropping all this four variables allows to 
lower the condition index below the 30 threshold. 
 
Therefore, the variables A_06, A_07, F_01 and E_02 need to be excluded from 
the model. Finally, the final version of the empirical model consists of six 
variables (four explanatory variables and two dummy variables):  A_01 (Current 
Balance), A_03 (Debt to Revenues), F_03 (Financial Autonomy), E_03 (Per 
capita Income), D_05 (Year 2008 Dummy) and D_06 (Year 2013 Dummy). This 
final version of the model is characterized by extremely low VIFs, no cross-
correlated terms and a condition index of 16.89. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table APP.V.4 - Cross-regression coefficients (t-stats in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
A_06_int_cov A_07_curr_exp F_01_pc_rev E_02_pop 
A_01_curr_bal 
789.92 
(6.99) 
-0.16 
(-2.44) 
-0.68 
(-1.77) 
-1.29 
(-2.13) 
A_03_debt_rev 
-62.92 
(-1.44) 
-0.03 
(-1.16) 
-0.89 
(-7.09) 
-0.67 
(-3.15) 
A_06_int_cov - 
-0.01 
(-2.70) 
0.01 
(3.29) 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
A_07_curr_exp 
-323.73 
(-2.70) 
- 
-0.45 
(-1.17) 
1.15 
(1.93) 
F_01_pc_rev 
65.05 
(3.29) 
-0.01 
(-1.17) 
- 
-0.23 
(-2.35) 
F_03_fin_aut 
34.86 
(0.26) 
0.16 
(2.28) 
2.97 
(7.69) 
2.30 
(3.51) 
E_02_pop 
-4.63 
(-0.36) 
0.01 
(1.93) 
-0.09 
(-2.35) 
- 
E_03_pc_inc 
-66.18 
(-0.96) 
-0.07 
(-1.91) 
-0.06 
(-0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
D_05_2008 
-33.18 
(-0.84) 
0.07 
(3.29) 
0.13 
(1.03) 
-0.15 
(-0.75) 
D_06_2013 
68.27 
(1.30) 
0.15 
(5.92) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.47) 
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Conclusions 
This PhD thesis empirically investigated the determinants of Italian municipal 
bond yields and credit ratings.  
Firstly, chapter IV’s  results on municipal bond yields show that investors apply 
different pricing schemes to the different types of local governments. 
Specifically, bonds issued by regions are priced differently compared to those 
issued by local authorities (cities and provinces). The analysis on the latter 
category finds that the specific creditworthiness of a local authority is irrelevant 
in the pricing of a local authority’s bond. This significant result might be 
explained by the strong reliance of local authorities’ revenues on central 
government transfers and by the expectations of a bailout in the event of a city 
or province default. Hence, a local authority’s default risk is closely linked to that 
of the Italian Government, leaving little or no role to the individual economic, 
financial and fiscal characteristics of the issuer. Conversely, this doesn’t happen 
with yields paid by regions, as these are mainly driven by the economic strength 
of the issuer and are not affected by central government sovereign risk. The 
difference in regional bonds’ pricing behavior can be attributed to their 
institutional nature. While cities and provinces possess a similar status and are 
subject to the same legislation, regions are characterized by a greater 
independence and by a significantly higher degree of financial autonomy. 
Moreover, the divergences between regions and local authorities are confirmed 
also in the analysis of the role of credit ratings in affecting yields. The ratings 
assigned by international rating agencies to Italian local authorities are found to 
be relevant in the pricing process, with rated issuers paying, ceteris paribus, 
around ten basis points less than their unrated peers. However, the specific 
rating assessment assigned to an issuer (i.e. AA-, BBB+ etc.) does not affect 
yields. That is to say, for instance, that a BBB issuer does not face an interest 
rate penalty compared to a AA one, but both of them get a benefit from having a 
credit rating in comparison with an unrated issuer. Investors are not concerned 
with the credit quality information conveyed by ratings, but the presence of a 
credit rating increases the marketability of an issue in the secondary market, so 
the reason for this price discrimination can be attributed to liquidity risk, and not 
to default risk. On the other hand, whereas all issuer default-risk related 
variables, including rating, are irrelevant in the pricing of local authorities’ 
issues, this is not true for the pricing of regional bonds. Again, it has been 
confirmed that the default risk of a region matters, either measured by economic 
indicators or by the credit rating. However, it has not be detected any additional 
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informational role for credit ratings beyond the information obtainable from 
publicly available financial and economic data. 
Furthermore, chapter V’s results help understanding the determinants of Italian 
local governments’ credit ratings. First of all, the two different methods applied, 
ordered probit and standard regression analysis, even if from the 
methodological point of view the latter proved to be preferable to the former, 
both confirmed that few publicly observable indicators are able to explain up to 
65-80% of the variance in ratings. Moreover, the ratings assigned by Moody’s 
and Fitch resulted strongly driven by three explanatory variables such as 
current balance, debt to revenues ratio and per capita income, while for S&P 
only the two latter variables were relevant. 
Also, the structural break test detected a significant change in ratings’ behaviour 
during the recent euro-zone sovereign debt crisis. The analysis of descriptive 
statistics confirmed that, in this period, although all local governments’ 
indicators remained stable, the Italian sub-sovereign ratings experienced a 
dramatic overall downgrade following the deterioration of the central 
government’s rating. This means that, although rating agencies discriminated 
between rating categories according to the specific financial condition of local 
governments, the modal value of the sub-sovereign ratings’ distribution was 
primarily affected by the central government’s rating. Moreover, the series of 
central government’s downgrades, characterizing the sovereign debt crisis, had 
a different impact on the three tiers of Italian sub-national governments. While 
the number of rated regions remained almost unchanged, the number of rated 
provinces and cities in the sample experienced, respectively, a 81% and 65% 
drop in 2013 compared to the pre-crisis period. 
The findings in this thesis pose some policy considerations, both at the 
microeconomic and at the macroeconomic level. Under the former, local 
administrators should buy a credit rating since this significantly lowers interest 
expenditure, even if ratings appear to be largely driven by few simple publicly 
available indicators. From a systemic point of view, there is an issue concerning 
biased incentives, regarding the two lowest tiers of sub-sovereign governments, 
because highly-indebted local authorities are not penalized in terms of interest 
cost while the more creditworthy ones are constrained by sovereign risk. On the 
one hand, Italy being a risky issuer itself, sovereign risk affects those cities and 
provinces which are characterized by a very high credit standing, on the other 
hand bailout expectations advantage the less creditworthy local authorities 
which can borrow at the same interest rates of the high standing ones. Financial 
markets, in this context, are not able to impose debt discipline to local 
authorities, failing to penalize or reward borrowers according to the quality of 
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management. As pointed out by Bailey et al. (2009), “market discipline and 
control of borrowing is negated if national governments guarantee (whether 
explicitly or implicitly) the repayment of municipal debt”. 
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